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CHAPTER I 
THE CRITICISM OF RUSKIN'S WORK 
The Catholic teacher of English literature has a perpetual 
problem set before him. He must forever try to enliven a Catholic 
culture in the minds of those given into his charge, and he must 
forever do this by offering them the fruits of a non-Catholic 
culture. He knows that literature is not a thing separate from 
the rest of man's life,that it is only a way of viewing the same 
thing that the science of theology, and the sciences generally, 
that the whole cult and practice of religion regard - that whole 
reality: God, Man, the relations between God and Man, between 
man and man, between man and the world about him. And yet the 
Catholic teacher must try to develop toward this reality an at-
titude in his students, a culture that is Catholic, by the read-
ing and interpreting of an attitude toward this reality which is 
now partially, now totally, different from his and objectively 
false. The Catholic teacher must teach a largely non-Catholic 
~nglish literature. 
He cannot, I say, teach literature as a pleasant thing quite 
~ivorced from the fundamental culture of the Catholic, a thing to 
be enjoyed all by itself and worth the study of youth simply for 
its ovvn sake. He cannot say to youth: "Here are the beautiful 
thoughts, the interesting play of mind, the interpretations of 
1 
experience of the best minds that have been recorded in English 
literature. Of course, much of it is utterly fals·e; some of it 
indeed is half-truth; some of it might be taken as true if you 
read into it a Catholic sense, But it is stimulating to meet 
2 
such minds and to consider such a variety of thought. Do not, 
therefore, trouble yourself with the error; consider only that it 
is all human; and 'nil humani •• f II . . 
Nor can the Catholic teacher set himself down before an air~ 
abstraction called "style" and find that he can see it, handle it 
separate it from a literary work for the edification of his 
charges. He may well believe that no such distinction is possi-
ble, and say with Newman that "Thought and speech are inseparable 
from each other. Matter and expression are parts of one; style 
is a thinking out into language." He may say to the youth before 
him that he cannot talk to them of a master's style as something 
really distinct from his thought, that he cannot speak to them of 
the master's "choice of words", his "command of language" when 
all he really means is the command of a wealth of concepts for 
which those words stand- concepts which reflect their author's 
philosophy of life, his religious views, his knowledge of history 
his understanding of men and of himself. As these concepts, 
thoughts, views are Catholic or as they are atheist, agnostic, 
materialist, humanitarian, so the teacher must present them. He 
cannot prescind from them by talking of the author's style. 
Again, the Catholic teacher cannot ease himself of his prob-
lem by offering his pupils the history of literature. He would 
3 
then turn the study of literature into a study of history, how-
ever interesting and instructive the latter may be. Since the 
day Samuel Johnson and, later, Hazlitt proposed that a better 
understanding of literary works could be had from understanding 
the minds of those who wrote them, this shifting of interest fro 
the work itself to the man who produced it has been going on; it 
now has so much the greater share of attention in the schools 
that the Catholic teacher, beset by his own problem, might easil 
beguile himself with this easy solution and devote himself to th 
history of literary movements and the psychology of the great 
authors. 
No, there is no way out by the study of "style" or by the 
study of history and biography and psychological analysis. The 
teacher and student must sink their teeth in the meat, the solid 
substance of the literature itself. And it is for the Catholic 
teacher of English literature to find some way of treating it so 
that this mass of intellectual food, grown by a non-Catholic cul 
ture, can nourish in Catholic youth- for whom Catholic schools 
and universities are painfully supported- a truly Catholic 
culture. 
With one instance of this problem, which perpetually and 
everywhere meets the Catholic teacher of English literature, thi 
study is concerned - the work of John Ruskin. 
1. 
The Problem: What Can a Catholic Teacher Make of John Ruskin? 
It is not intended that this study will be made the occasion 
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to celebrate a sort of moral atmosphere in which Ruskin is sup-
posed by some to have enveloped his aesthetics and his economics 
It is true that this atmosphere seems to them to be the most dis 
tinctive contribution that Ruskin made to the thought of the 
nineteenth century; it is that which perhaps appealed most in 
Ruskin to a generation beginning to tire of mechanistic, deter-
ministic,economic views and finding itself rather fed up with an 
art that had ceased to have much meaning; and again it is that 
which has brought so much ridicule on Ruskin, perhaps as much in 
his own day as in ours. It is, however mistakenly, the most ob-
vious feature of Ruskin's mind and work to many readers, and fro 
first to last has been the subject of praise or blame, the objec 
of his friends' tender defense and of his critics' most scornful 
attack. It is then quite uncalled for that once again should be 
demonstrated that Ruskin saw in some cloudy way that great art 
was the product of great souls, great in their truthfulness,thei 
purity, their faith in God; that Ruskin had a sentiment that 
there was more at work in the economic activities of men than a 
blind selfishness, however "enlightened"; that, as a sort of su-
preme and unique achievement Ruskin's "moral sense" saw in both 
art and economics their dependence one on the other and describe 
it in that famous chapter from The Stones of Venice, "The Nature 
of Gothic." That passage alone, and indeed the whole tenor of 
Ruskin's controlling ideas, might seem a sufficient recommenda-
tion to the Catholic teacher who is suspected of asking only a 
"moral" to make him happy in his literary preferences. But this 
atmosphere of thought, or this tenor of it, or this one great 
moral intuition of Ruskin, if it may be allowed to reduce his 
doctrine to a single principle, is not, it must be emphatically 
asserted, the formal object of this study. 
That Ruskin's "moral" temper, his blanketing of economics 
and art in a shining mist of moral sentiment, is the object of 
study here is denied so emphatically simply because it may so 
easily be confused with what is the proper aim of this work. 
'5 
Here we are concerned with something more realistic, something 
both wider in its scope and deeper in all its implication, some-
thing rational and real - emphatically not a matter of moral sen-
timent. Vfuat then is conceived to be the proper object of this 
investigation may be put thus: Is there in Ruskin's thought a 
supernatural element that in any way corresponds to the Catholic 
teacher's and the Catholic student's Catholic culture -a culture 
which is supernatural in its very principle of life and which 
looks for a recognition of that supernatural in the literature 
and other forms of art which it makes use of? 
This supernatural element, whether or not it exists in 
~uskin, is not, it must be repeated, to be confused vaguely with 
~ny "moral" concept of art, or economics. It is, first of all, 
something real, not a sentiment; again it is something more than 
~ere rational ethics; it is something which natural powers are 
not enough to achieve. On the other hand, morality, at least as 
it is so frequently understood to be mere natural ethics or mere 
sentiment, is quite within the range of man's natural powers. 
,e 
A man can speak the truth, or make his artistic productions 
"truthful" out of a truth-loving heart; a man may be pure and 
create works of art that breathe of purity; a man may love jus-
tice and flame into wrath at sight of the injustices he sees in 
the society around him, and yet do all this by the powers of his 
own nature, of his intellect that can know truth and see what is 
just and recognize that purity is finer than impurity, of his 
will that can embrace all these good things that are proposed to 
it. 
But there are, it must be insisted, thoughts and desires, 
knowledge and wisdom, tb~t are in all truth a normal part of the 
Christian's life, which are beyond these natural powers. That a 
man may by the natural strength of his mind and will, at this 
time or that, maintain his purity, or his honesty, or be just or 
even generous, is true; but that so many men, and for so long a 
time as Christianity has witnessed, can maintain themselves in 
virtue is, in the technical sense, "morally impossible" without 
the special help of God. And more to the special point of this 
study, is this: There are ideas and truths afloat now in the 
world, accepted by many millions, that would not be current were 
it not for that divine interposition by which they were first re-
vealed to the world and maintained in men's minds, who never 
would for so long or at such great cost have supported them. 
These are, first of all, the truths of revelaed religion, and 
secondarily those which most concern us in this study, ideas and 
views of the conduct of Christian society and of its many offices 
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of statesman, and priest, and craftsman, and merchant, and artist 
Do we find such thought in Ruskin? Do we find in him the 
principles, the tone, the applications of greater truths to par-
ticular situations of the statesman, the laborer, or the artist 
that are the fruit in him, not only of a personal genius, but of 
a grace that has come to him, at least mediately, from a great 
supernatural tradition? Is he then one to whom we, who are of 
this Christian tradition, can look for the support and develop-
ment of our culture? 
At first thought, when all of Ruskin that bas been read has 
been recalled and when all that has been read about him is re-
viewed, the answer to this question seems quite clear and inevi-
table: Ruskin never reached such hei,ghts or sounded such depths 
Who indeed would look for the supernatural, for what is specifi-
cally of the Catholic culture, in a man who passed his formative 
years under the strict Calvinism of his mother, who was later, 
under the battering of the world's atheism and materialism, to 
reject all belief in revealed religion, and whose final views, 
disputed by those who have sought to interpret him, were those o 
the Deist and the Humanitarian, or, at most, of a diluted 
Protestantism? Or what Catholic teacher would seriously con-
sider proposing to young minds as part of, or consistent with, 
Catholic tradition the ravings of a "manic depressive", as one 
recent critic would make out Ruskin to be? Or dare to take ser-
iously the sentimental and weak-minded thinker, as J. M.Robertsoi 
describes him? 
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2. 
The Criteria of the Catholic Teacher. 
What is the Catholic teacher to make of such people as 
Ruskin? Well, he can interpret them, or read into them, or 
patiently dig out of them that residue of the old Catholic tradi 
tion that does truly live on in our civilization, no matter how 
diluted has become the Protestantism which was its immediate hei 
or however materialistic, atheist, or agnostic have become those 
who have written our books. For Christianity did bring into the 
world a view of man and of God and the relations between them, 
and especially of the relations of man and man, that was a super 
natural phenomenon in itself, a view of these things that never 
could have been accepted in a society that had remained pagan, 
views of the "value of each human soul" that a pagan philosopher 
here and there might have conceived, but which the mass of men 
could by no moral possibility accept, views of the place of woma 
and her dignity as mother and wife, views of the dignity of labo 
and of the laboring man, a new valuation of chastity, of charity, 
of the state, of the home. And these views remain today, or 
rather some residue of them, even in poetry of the pantheist or 
the economics of the materialist. And accordingly as he finds 
this residue, as it retains the marks of Christ's inspiration on 
it, the Catholic teacher can use it. 
There are in general two ways in which this residue of 
Catholic thought can be recovered. The first way is to find it 
in some of those words and phrases which once conveyed a clear 
Catholic sense, words and phrases which became so much a part of 
the familiar speech of the common man and of the intellectual 
alike that they have maintained themselves in our literature even 
when their original sense has been lost or partially dissolved in 
the philosophies of our times. The other way is to find it be-
neath those modern formulas of materialistic philosophies, words 
and phrases which are the jargon of the day and carry no memories 
of the ancient religious view of things, and yet represent aspir-
ations of the human mind and heart which no utterly pagan society 
or utterly pagan philosophy would ever have had. Of these two 
ways of reading into our literature something that the Catholic 
mind can embrace here are some simple examples. 
Near the end of "Rabbi Ben Ezra" Browning writes: 
Look not thou down but upt 
To uses of a cup, 
The festal board, lamp's flash, 
The new wine's foaming flow, 
The Master's lips aglowt 
Thou, heaven's consummate cup • 
and trumpet's peal, 
• • 
Surely no poet who had not the Christian, and originally Catholic 
tradition of the chalice of Christ's blood, drunk first by the 
Master, to be drunk "new" some day in heaven, the Sacrifice in 
imitation of which the Christian can offer up himself to God, as 
the poet suggests, - surely no poet without some such tradition 
in the recesses of his mind would have written these lines. And 
surely, little though Browning believed in this chalice and in 
the Sacrifice, yet the words with all their original meaning 
waken in the Catholic mind far more than was in the poet's. 
.LV 
Let the word "humanitarian" be an example of a modern con-
cept, strictly in itself and implications the product of godless: 
philosophies, that is yet only possible to the godless because 
once men were enabled by the supernatural grace of God to con-
ceive certain beliefs about the nature of man and of the rela-
tions of man with man. The worship of humanity is today possiblE 
only because once God impressed on the world that men - all ment 
were more than animals, that they had been created in His image, 
and had been raised to a supernatural state. And so today behinc 
the word "humanitarian" and all the jargon of the cult of human-
ity, the Catholic can read the high truth from which the modern 
thinker has fallen. 
And in this way the Catholic teacher may make something of 
John Ruskin. He cannot of course accept everything Ruskin has tc 
say as wholly consistent with his own beliefs. Finding so much 
of interest and value, he will yet be ready either to correct 
what is wrong, or to understand what is vague or apparently in-
consistent in the sense of his own more precise theology or 
philosophy. He will do this, not out of any "personal" interpre-
tation nor with meticulous attention to every possible philosophi~ 
cal or theological implication, but interested in what he can get 
out of Ruskin's thought as it is, knowing that that thought has 
often been obscured and hindered by ideas and terminology current 
in Ruskin's day. What these were and what allowances he must 
make for them he will find in the general knowledge he has of the 
history of the times. 
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Obviously the first consideration in judging a system which 
was so greatly Christian is to know what to allow for in the re-
ligious belief which inspired and governed its development. 
~uskin's was the diluted and obscure Christianity which had sur-
vived through three centuries of Protestantism. On the one hand 
the rejection of authoritative teaching in the Church had opened 
two lines of thought: the way to scepticm 8.nd agnosticism, to 
atheism or to Deism,and the way to assertiveness of personal opin 
ions of all kinds on religious matters. On the other hand the d& 
~arture from the sacramental life of the Church, especially the 
~ejection of the Eucharist, led to the forgetting of the super-
~atural life of Christians and, again, to a stress on natural vi~ 
tues md conduct so that religion tended to be simply morality. 
The last confusion still shows itself in such a critic as 
Ladd, who seems to think Euskin's aesthetics a matter of morality 
~s even Ruskin himself apparently thought when he wrote "· •• I 
~ holly deny that the impressions of beauty are in any way sensua, 
i 1 nl ~or ntellectual, but mora • • • But all the other weaknesses 
pf nineteenth century Protestantism are reflected in Ruskin's 
~hought, that is, in his own religious beliefs. Without the au-
~horitative teaching of the Church he was ready for doubts and 
~hey eventually overcame his early Calvinism, and left him even-
~ually what some have taken for a Deist and Humanitarian. The 
~ack of realization of the full supernatural life of the Christim 
~educes him often to mere humanitarianism, and the Catholic reader 
~Works, Vol. IV, p. 42. 
l2 
~ust be ready m read Ruskin's statements in his own sense when 
they are susceptible to it.For instance,he does not seem aware of 
the tremendous force that would be added to his social theoriesbj 
explicitly recognizing Christian society to be bound together su-
~ernaturally in Christ,though all he says is,as far as it goes,in 
accordance with that supernatural view. Again, the experiences~ 
the beautiful might have been realized as actual graces given for 
the better living of the supernatural life, an understanding of 
them which the Catholic reader can supply for himself. His con-
stant use of the term "moral" suggests a narrowness of his whole 
view which other elements in this exposition plainly disprove. 
thus: 
His religious history is neatly summarized by R.H.Wilenski 
Evangelical until he was thirty-nine years old, in 1858. 
Sceptic from 1858 to 1874, when he was fiftylfive. 
Broadminded Protestant from 1874 to the end. 
But the real formation of his mind took place in that first per-
iod, when the strong Calvinism of his mother had its hold on him. 
Both mind and style - or rather, to say with Newman, both to-
gether - were formed by the "steadily read chapters, morning and 
evening," of the Bible. The watc~~ul presence of his mother in 
the to\~ of Oxford protected even his student days from any con-
tamination, so that Leslie Stephen writes: 
Ruskin, we may note, was at Oxford during the most ex-
citing period of the movement. His ablest contempor-
aries were all going through the Newman fever. Ruskin 
~R. H. Wilenski, John Ruskin, an Introduction to Further Study 
of His Life and Work, p. 3~ • · 
l3 
seems never to have been aware that such a person as 
Newman existed. He amused himself with geology and 
botany, and seems to have been as blind as became the 
son of a sound Evangelical wine merthant to the very 
existence of any spiritual ferment. 
Of the doubts which came later and their effect on his thought 
there will be discussion later; only here it may be asserted that 
there was no such radical change as ever made it necessary for 
him to disown the view of life originated in this first period. 
\Vhat in particular went into that set of religious, philo-
sophical,and social principles so indeterminately "humanitarian"? 
Whose were the ideas? Carlyle's first of all, would be the 
answer. Following Ruskin's own statements, often repeated, that 
Carlyle was his master, 2 Lippincott summarizes the influence: 
If he was a learner from Plato and Xenophon, he was a 
disciple of Carlyle. Next to his mother Carlyle was 
the strongest influence of his life • • • The message 
of Sartor and Heroes aroused him, he says, "to do some-
thing, to be something useful." Of all Carlyle's 
writing, Past and Present and Latter-Day Pamphlets in-
fluenced him most • • • Though Ruskin already held many 
of the social, authoritarian and aristocratic ideas 
that Carlyle advooated, Carlyle, it seems, strengthened 
his belief ~n them, added to them, and made them more 
articulate. 
F. W. Roe says much the same, and with something of the same im-
plication: that the thought of Carlyle was received into a mind 
that was not only disposed to receive it, but could digest it, 
1 Leslie Stephen, Studies of a Biographer, p. 85. 
2 Works, Vol. XII, p. 507. 
3 B. E. Lippincott, Victorian Critics of Democracy, pp. 62, 63. 
- .L4 
turn it over, mingle it with ideas already possessed, and form it 
all into a new body of thought that was simply Ruskin - no mere 
disciple of a master, then, however humbly Ruskin so confessed 
himself. The influence of Carlyle, says Roe, 1 began early in 
Ruskin's life, especially through Past and Present and Latter-Da~ 
Pamphlets. Both were hero-worshipers , both held the "gospel of 
work," both held the foundation of all religion is in resolving 
to do one's work well, both believed in the plain dictates of 
conscience that "courage, chastity, and honesty and patience, 
bring out good, and cowardice, and luxury and folly and impa-
tience, evil;" both believed that man has "that singular force 
anciently called a soul;" both looked backward to a medieval age 
for suggestions of a new social order. We see in all this simpl~ 
the influence that one original mind has on another - the power 
to receive and digest another's thought does not imply disciple-
ship. 
One might trace to Cobbett with as much justification all 
Ruskin's protest against the destruction of medieval civilization 
for Ruskin himself said, "• •• please get Cobbett's little 
History of the Reformation, the only true one ever written as far 
as it reaches ••• "2, and in another letter during a corres-
pondence in the years 1884 and 1885 he says, "· • • the sum of 
my forty-four years of thinking on the matter • • • has led me to 
1 F. W • Roe, The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin, p. 144. 
2works, Vol. XXXVII, p. 503. 
l5 
agree with Cobbett in all his main ideas ••• " and "• •• what I 
say at Oxford must be the sum of my present conclusion, which 
Cobbett accurately though vulgarily expressed."! 
That while Ruskin was at Oxford he was nowise influenced by 
Newman may be true; yet it seems impossible that he heard nothing 
of that attempt to reach the Christianity that was England's be-
fore Calvinism and Lutheranism dominated all its belief - surely 
an attempt that would have enlisted Ruskin's sympathies on one 
side of his interests. But at least in that sanctuary of the 
classics he came to know the great thought of the distant past. 
And yet, as many men of all ages have fed on those thoughts and 
have themselves become philosophers of very divergent views, so 
too much stress need not be given them as "sources" of Ruskin. 
That he read Plato and Aristotle is only to say that he was in-
troduced to the ABC's of thought and not to say that he was in-
debted to them as his special sources. But another opinion may 
be expressed: 
• • • the study of the Republic and the Laws exercised 
a strong influence on him iri later years. He was to 
follow Plato's conception of justice; each manful-
filling the function.for which he was best fitted, and 
each man in his place. Plato's emphasis on the wisdom 
of the few and the unwisdom of the mass, as well as his 
emphasis on authority, supported attitudes, if not 
ideas, in which Ruskin had been trained and to which 
his temperament naturally inclined him. Xenophon's 
Economist, long a favorite with Ruskin, was the founda-
tion of his studies in political economy. Plato, 
Xenophon, and Aristotle all taught him that economics 
cannot be separated from other social studies, that it 
is a subordinate branch of the great art of politics 
••• as he later said, he wanted to recall to modern 
\vorks Vol XXXVII n 50:-l 
16 
minds the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle. 1 
And so of the many thinkers and writers of all ages whom 
Ruskin here and there refers to, and praises, whose thoughts he 
accepts, we can say even more truly than of his "discipleship" o 
Carlyle, that like all men he has learned from others. That the~ 
are to be considered as his originals is hardly true. It is 
Ruskin's digest of them and "making them his own", as Newman 
describes the process, that we have before us, not a piece of 
Plato, another of Carlyle, third of Locke, and so on. But it is 
worth while to remember that he has read all these works, and 
that he is a Protestant in the nineteenth century, that he becamE 
sceptical of Christianity for a time, and even when belief re-
turned to him, he could not again attach himself to any'~eligion 
of dogmas". But, as a man of his time with a heritage of 
Christianity, his language and thought is not without its echoes 
of the true Faith. And these we can hear. 
3. 
Light from Ruskin's Critics; Their Method 
Now the Catholic teacher, faced with the problem whether 
Ruskin has anything to say to Catholic students, is assured by 
the masters in the teaching of literature that he must not depenc 
on his theological and philosophical training, his acquaintance 
with history or economics as these may have come to him, that hif 
powers of judgment so formed are inadequate, that he must go to 
1 B. E. Lippincott, op. cit., pp. 60, 61. 
specialists in literary studies, and, equipped with a bibliog-
raphy of their works, he must sit at the feet of these critics 
and from their wisdom learn to make a scholarly decision. 
The process, if followed out, and if followed trustfully anc 
hopefully, will prove disillusioning. The critics of Ruskin wil~ 
not help him much to understand what Ruskin had to say and to put 
a value on it. Their failure may be traced to two general 
causes. The one may be called the academic, or the attitude of 
literary scholarship; the other may be described as philosophic. 
The attitude of literary scholarship is to center attention 
far too much on Ruskin the man, his "personality", in modern 
jargon, his qualities of mind; rather than to attend first of all 
to what he had to say. This attitude in its extreme may lead to 
the discovery of elements of character that have not the remotest 
bearing on the truth or value of Ruskin's thought. Such an atti-
tude is a perversion of literary study. It may be explained, bui 
not excused. It began in the critical theories of Samuel Johnsor, 
taken up by Hazlitt, then by Sainte Beuve, that a man's work can 
be better understood by understanding first of all the man him-
self - a theory which can be accepted with a distinction: it is 
true, if we wish to know simply what was on the author's mind 
when he wrote; but false, if we look first of all for the meanin~ 
of his words, supposing him as a matter of course to have been 
able to express what was on his mind. Studies made according to 
such critical notions may be interesting biography or history, 
but they easily miss the formal object of literary study - the 
lE 
literature itself. 
The most extreme of Ruskin's critics who would judge him by 
his "personality" is Reginald Howard Wilenski. His was indeed 
the most promising of introductions, the expression of the eager 
desire of a great admirer to dispose of certain superficial ob-
jections to a profound thinker: 
• • • It seemed impossible to capture his central at-
titude ••• Sometimes his dicta appeared part of a 
system, sometimes they seemed merely capricious ••• 
passages that revealed the wide range of real imagina-
tive vision and others which were obviously pettish and 
parochial • • • These threads - grouped ideas in fields 
of art, social economics and war - seemed to me so 
vital and serviceable at the present time ••• "1 
But this hope for a reasonable solution by a reasonable critic 
was immediately dashed - and forever - by the following: 
I discovered that there is hardly a page of his writi~ 
which can be properly apprehended until it is collated 
with the conditions of his mind, the circumstances of 
his life, not only at the general period within which 
the books fall, but on the actual day on which that par 
ticular page was written. There can be no doubt that 
Ruskin was • • • a mental invalid all his life • • • he 
appears to me to have suffered continuously from the 
malady now known to psychiatry as Manic-depression. I 
am no psychologist • • • I speak therefore under cor-
rection • • • The object of this inquiry is • • • to 
indicate a way of studying his wri~ings that makes 
every word in them comprehensible. 
And from this beginning to the end of a quite extensive 
study Ruskin is studied, his work is examined, in this light only 
Ruskin, who is read at all only because his mind is great enough 
to attract the attention of the Wilenskis as well as the rest of 
us, is called a madman; his work is pulled to pieces to show the 
1 Op. cit., p. 9. 
2 Ibid., pp. 10, 11. 
l~ 
intimate workings of a manic-depressive. If indeed the works of 
Ruskin are sane enough to have held the attention of sane men for 
nearly a hundred years, of what use is it to discover that their 
author was insane? The work stands; it has never been called the 
raving of a madman; it cannot be called raving now. The author 
is dead; if he was insane, it is now only a matter of pity; we 
cannot lock him up now to see that he does not write another 
stones of Venice. And this great clue to the unsuspected mystery 
of Ruskin has been discovered by a man who admits he is not a 
psychologist1 And if he had only delayed the announcement of his 
discovery till the end of the book ••• As it is, the book is 
only a protracted anti-climax. 
How much crazier was Ruskin than the rest of us may be seen 
in other bits of Wilenski' s analysis. "He was always something 
of an exhibitionist ••• He always wore unusual and conspicuous 
blue ties."l Only an amateur psychitrist could have damned a man 
for liking blue ties with the devastating word "exhibitionist"; 
But why he should consider blue ties relevant to an understanding 
of, say, "The Nature of Gothic" is quite beyond comprehension. 
Another discovery that could have been made only after the mod r 
ern psychologist discovered human nature isalso Wilenski's. Ruski 
stressed the "doctrine that all interest on money is usury ••• a 
~ationalization, of course, of his own position at the end of the 
'seventies when •.•• he no longer had dividends • 
·~ro 
1Ibid., p. 34. 
2· ~., p. 298. 
n2 Again, . . 
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what Ruskin's personal concern in the matter had to do with the 
truth or error of the doctrine on usury, is hard to see. Perhapf 
the unsuspected relevancy is in the word "rationalization", a 
concept utterly unknown to generations of men until now. A last 
sample of this valuable criticism of Wilenski's is his report 
that"· •• his mother indulged herself in a selfish fear that 
he would fall off his pony."l 
Much more reasonable are the complaints that Ruskin did not 
have the scientific and scholarly temper of mind. Says Sir 
Charles Walston (natus Waldstein) of Ruskin: 
••• a prevailing spirit of narrow dogmatism • • • in 
the life of this great man can be accounted for and 
morally justified ••• it is the result of a life too 
much shut up in itself, and not sobered down by the 
constraint of fixed discipline • • • It is a mind too 
much concerned with its own substance • • • its own 
inner lights • • • 
This exaggeration of the importance of one's own 
thoughts is often due to the neglect of reading what 
others have written on the very subjects of our 
thoughts. Now a doubt must often have come to the ori-
ginal student or writer whether ••• to spend much 
time in seeing how others have said it and to quote 
their views and encumber his own with footnotes and 
other customary forms that characterize a scholar's 
work. Still it will be found that the student becomes 
wider, and generally without loss of originality; he 
becomes maturer, clear, and more condensed ••• and I 
venture to think that if Ruskin had followed this more 
••• we should not have lost much of his originality, 
while I certainly hold that we should have had more 
systemA more careful deliberation, and more moderation 
fiG 
• • • 
This may be called at least a reasonable criticism of Ruskin's 
1 
1.£!£., p. 36. 
2 Sir Charles Walston, The Work of John Ruskin: Its Influence unon 
Modern Thought and Life, pp. 148-150. 
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habit of thought. 
Yet it may be answered: If in Ruskin's thought the reader 
finds something of value, more than is to be found in any but a 
handful of writers, why should he complain that Ruskin's is not 
a mind without fault? Is it, after all, a fault that he was not 
a scholar and did not think in the approved fashion of the 
scientist? Granting that this scientific procedure, or the pre-
tense of it, is the prevailing fashion of the day, is it neces-
sarily the only right one? Yes, it may be said, it is the only 
way for one who pretends to be a philosopher and to write trea-
tises on aesthetics, the social order, and politics. Such a man 
must know all that has been said on the matters of which he would 
write; and must weigh all opinions and evidence; he must argue 
carefully; he must present his views in an orderly way and with-
out irrelevancies. But the very element that makes Ruskin a 
figure in literature, and indeed makes him the subject for criti-
cal study, is that he does not write in the scientific manner, 
impersonally, with logical precision always, with encyclopedic 
knowledge. Rather he is a great figure in literature and not in 
science because his thought is colored with personal elements 
such as Newman describes as differentiating a work of literature 
from a scientific treatise. Not that these personal notes are 
valuable for tliemselves, but for what they contribute to the 
~hought itself by way of accidental perfection. Such thought, 
so produced, has a value to us of its own; it may give us truth 
~a does "science", but in a different way. We should not 
~ 
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complain of it. 
A like insistence on the scientific method is found in an-
other comment by Walston: 
The difficulty of forming a just estimate ••• i. 
to be found ••• secondly, in the fact that ••• the 
marked distinction which generally serves to classify 
intellectual workers into two broad groups, namely, the 
practical and theoretical, does not hold good in his 
case • • • when he claims to be theoretic • • • there 
is an actual predominance of the practical or ethical 
aim, often interfering with and confusing its con-
sistency • • • On the other hand the manifestly prac-
tical works often suffer from an apparent an~ obtrusive 
predominance of preconceived general maxims. 
Just why Ruskin must think in the framework of pure theory or 
pure practice is hard to see, or why he should not make use of 
"preconceived general maxims", unless one is so obsessed by 
"scholarly methods of procedure" that no other way to truth is 
conceivable than induction from present facts. 
Wilenski has, of course, the ex planation of the lamentable 
lack of scholarship; it is, he says, a piece with Ruskin's manic 
depression: 
1 
••• his self-indulgence was a definite weakness ••• 
he never did any thing except the thing he felt like 
doing at the time. Of work against the grain he had 
no experience; he was never compelled to db it, and 
never put the compulsion on himself • • • He wrote the 
last three volumes of Modern Painters without really 
wanting to do so - that was as near as he ever came to 
disagreeable work! ••• and he was always ashamed of 
it ••• making fantastic transferences to persuade 
himself • • • he was really fulfilling some duty • • • 
his drawing and his intermittent studies were forms of 
play, and he could never pursue these activities with-
out a sense of guilt - unless he could persuade himself 
Op. cit., p. 2Z. 
,......-· 
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that •• 1 • he was in some way engaged in service to mankind. 
In other words, Ruskin was lazy like most men; at least that is 
the worst of him that can be gathered from this passage. But 
that a man who never did anything he did not like to do should 
have written three large volumes when he had lost interest in the 
project itself, who produced as prodigiously all his life as did 
Ruskin, should be condemned because his energies did not expend 
themselves in the approved "scholarly methods of procedure" is a 
proposition futile and ridiculous. But Wilenski in another place 
sees quite clearly, and values quite rightly, this unscholarly 
mind of Ruskin: 
He was always learning - or rather he was always learn-
ing by fits and starts. He learned as the imaginative 
genius learns, by suddenly piercing to the heart of a 
thing and understanding it ••• ~e boasted of the 
power ••• And he really had it. 
Leslie Stephen recognizes the same power: 
He was incapable of arranging his thoughts in orderly, 
symmetrical pigeon-holes; his mind was essentially dis-
cursive; he could see things more vividly than anyone, 
and argue acutely and ingeniously; but he had never 
the patience to consider how his thoughts should be co-
ordinated into consistent unity • • • he has to make 
his theories ••• not by Datient induction, but by 
flashes of intuition •• • a 
And this power of mind, perhaps not precisely described either as 
power of intuition or power of analysis, but as something of both, 
1 Op. cit., pp. 36 and 39. 
2 ill9:_. , p. 191. 
3Leslie Stephen, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 90, 91. 
~· 
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was indeed the real genius of Ruskin. It should be recognized 
ror what it was and for what ·it accomplished. As one critic 
says, "In fine, Ruskin analyzed both the moral and the social ef 
fects of capitalism with far greater precision than any other 
writer • nl • • 
Amabel Williams-Ellis is obviously torn between an admira-
tion for cold, hard scholarliness and for the more beautiful proc-
esses of Ruskin's mind; she writes of 
• • • His tendency to branch out and away from the mair 
stem of his argument. 
It was natural to Ruskin always to trace out the 
more delicate and intimate consequences of his econom-
ics or aesthetics • • • Ruskin had in many respects a 
feminine mind • • • one of the chief characteristics of 
the feminine mind seems to be that it is vitally aware 
of the fact that life, and all the subjects of know-
ledge form a continuum. Interdependencies • • • the 
uselessness of this, without that ••• these are the 
facts that look large to it ••• So he mixed up argu-
ments about the best use of wealth with his economics, 
and arguments about truth with his aesthetics ••• 
He should have known that for the purpose of 
analysis it was essential that he should not listen to 
the insidious voice of common sense • • • The longer 
fibres and roots with which every subject that he 
touched embrace and involve every other subject seemed 
to him less and less separable • • • When he has set 
himself to discuss the growth of crystals he finds him-
self dealing with education, or with the place of art 
and nature i~ common life, or with the right attitude 
to religion. 
Wilenski cannot with patience pass over this discursiveness 
of Ruskin, and is bound to say that "· •• both books [Unto this 
~ and Mu,nera Pulveris] are badly arranged and badly written; 
lB. E. Lippincott, op. cit., p. 55. 
2 Amabel Williams-Ellis, The Tragedy of John Ruskin, pp. 215, 216. 
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and the arguments in both are obscured by digression and quota-
tions from the Bible."1 But he displays an extraordinary insight 
into Ruskin's mind, at least for one whose psychology has else-
where been so tiresome, when he says of Ruskin: 
In his writings the confusing irrelevancies and dis-
cursions are as real and organic as the essentials ••• 
they are not ••• tied on with a string ••• always 
genuinely personal. He never decked himself with othel 
people's writings ••• The digressions ••• are nevel 
padding. They have a life of their own which often 
conflicts with • • • the central the sis • • • curious 
intensity of idea at the moment which seems to go with 
morbid mobility of interest • • • The incidentals al-
ways bear relation to the man's attitudes even though 
they may bear little or no relation to the immediate 
context. Such passages are real ~nd organic because 
they are autobiography disguised. 
These are some of the "characteristics" which go to make the 
conventional summary of Ruskin, a little garland of generaliza-
tions about the man that are well calculated to ruin the effect 
of his work on a fresh mind. When a reader approaches Ruskin for 
the first time after an editorial introduction which warns him 
that he will find Ruskin an undependable scholar, digressive and 
disorderly, inconsistent, and, cardinal sin in this day of 
fancied "objectivity," arrogant and dogmatic, what will he find 
under such tutelage but disorder, lack of scholarliness, incon-
sistency, and dogmatism? 
Thus he will be warned by Leslie Stephen, "The arrogance of 
Ruskin's language was partly adopted from Carlyle, and, indeed, 
1 Qp. cit., p. 288. 
2 I£.1£.' p. 186. 
,.....-
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is one of the awkward consequences of being an inspired prophet.rl 
J. M. Robertson finds this arrogance deeply rooted in Ruskin's 
character, and is bitter in his attack: 
• • • the very wording of the confession [that Ruskin 
had lost his religious faith] had come too late in his 
intellectual life to permit of his building up for him-
self a rational philosophy; he partly worded the gospe, 
of sane life; he could not live it. The very avowal of 
past error is put with a threat of a terrible new pre-
dication to come, a recovered and redoubtable certi-
tude. This spirit may taste of bitter awakening, neve! 
of a really teachable humility on great problems. 
His very gifts condemned him to perpetual subjec-
tivity. It was said of him by Mazzini that he had the 
most analytical mind in Europe; and in a sense that is 
true. His mind did play analytically. But always the 
process is visibly limited by the self-willed temper 
••• he claimed for himself a power of seeing, infin-
itely rarer, 2he complacently declared, than the power of thinking. 
Wilenski, the amateur psychologist, is kindlier, but kindly 
as one is to manic depressives and other mad people: 
It is easy to call Ruskin arrogant • • • Now I know he 
was not arrogant. What we mistake for the expression 
of his arrogance was sometimes manic exaltation, some-
times an effort to restart an engine which depression 
had almost paralyzed, and sometimes a defiance of some 
personal ••• fear. For example: "It is at least ten 
years since I ceased to speak of anything but what I 
had ascertained; and thus becoming the most practical 
and positive of men, left discourse of things doubtful 
••• content ••• to range all matters under broad 
heads of things certain ••• and things uncertain." 
Arrogance? No. We know that he was speaking 
after four years experience as the Master of his Guild 
of St. George, which meant four years experience of be-
ing called Utopian and impractical • • • a few months 
after the death of a girl whose personality had long 
been for him an obsession, in the house of a woman 
friend who was a spiritualist ••• ten years since 
••• he had been half converted to spiritualism. Reaa 
in this light • • • an attempt to get back to terra 
1Qp. cit., p. 110. 
2J.M.Robertson. Modern Humanists Reconsidered~ nn. 90. 91. 
~ 
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1 firma. 
This is at least an excellent example of the psychiatric method, 
if not of the approved method of literary study. And it does 
make interesting biography, even though it puts quite a strain 
on the imagination. But as a preparation for "the further study 
of Ruskin" it is unfortunate. 
That such force, such down-right and unqualified expression 
of views, should be complained of so universally, and should be 
unexpected in one whose fire of style is conceded without much 
blame, is a fact th~t is rather hard to understand. The two, in 
human nature in concreto, are -almost necessarily bound together; 
if the one amounts to the power of genius, surely the other does 
not deserve such reprobation. And this is what is admitted, 
rather contemptuously however: 
• • • admiration once felt for Ruskin and the mildness 
of the critical censure ••• may be set down to the 
essentially emotional nature of his influence • • • 1m 
pairing his thought and heightening his attraction 
••• the gift of fascinating speech was for him a 
prophet's prestige ••• Ruskin's "values" ••• funda~ 
mentally that of the genius for utterance - a force of 
appeal that is independent of wisdom • • • He who s~s 
men in multitudes to admiration is not the thinker ••• 
What thrills and stirs a generation is the gift for 
emotional utterance • • • the element and function of 
his geniys gave an electric force to his every ut-
terance.::: 
Sir Edward Cook, the faithful secretary and biographer, not 
only knows the eloquence of his master, but is wiser in recog-
1 Op. cit., P• 30. 
2 
J. M. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 75, 79, 80, and 84. 
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nizing that Robertson's contempt for such a power may be taken as 
onlY the intellectual fashion of the generation following Ruskin: 
The true secret of Ruskin's influence is this: that his 
books are stimulating and suggestive, because they were 
the expressions by a master in the art of language, of 
a mind which was extraordinarily rich and acute, and 
which had grasped some great and abiding principles 
• • • The criticism current at the present day is large 
ly intellectual and scientific • • • is it quite certa~ 
that such criticism has rendered the more emotional 
method of Ruskin out of date for all time?1 
On this matter of mere eloquence let the last word be 
~ilenski 1 s. And the last word of his that will be quoted is com-
~entary enough on the value of such criticism. Here indeed is 
~athos: "My generation, who will not drink rhetoric, demand a 
palm parade of arguments and statistical facts; and so they read, 
pot Ruskin's Fors Clavigera, but Wells' Outline of History • n2 . .. 
4. 
Reli~ious and Philosonhical Disaualifications of Ruskin's Critics 
The failure of Ruskin's critics to satisfy the Catholic 
~eacher has also been ascribed to a cause which has been desig-
~ated philosophic. By this is meant the difference, not only in 
philosophy but in views of the supernatural order and its very 
existence which separate the Catholic teacher from nearly every 
one of the critics of Ruskin, a difference in fundamental views 
of metaphysics, religion, the social order, psychology, 
~he Life of John Ruskin, Vol. II, p. 570. 
2"::. -~...._....::C:..=i:.:::.t • , p. 368. 
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aesthetics. The Catholic will not readily overlook this differ-
ence out of love for variety in thought. Moreover, there is the 
difficulty a Catholic, trained in the precise language of ~is 
philosophy and theology, has with the vague terminology, and what 
seems to him simply the jargon of literary critics who have 
picked up some smattering of psychology or metaphysics or modern 
religion in the secular universities. When a teacher who remem-
bers a little of his scholastic metaphysics meets a literary 
critic who acquired his metaphysics and psychology at Columbia 
University and when together they proceed to inquire into 
Ruskin's aesthetics, little but chaos can result. Lastly, in 
this connection, the Catholic teacher misses in such critics a 
habit of mind that goes with a training in scholastic dialectics, 
the habit of distinguishing. He has been taught to separate the 
true and the false without losing the one or accepting the other; 
he has learned that unqualified statements which at first sight 
seem contradictory can frequently be reconciled by distinguishin~ 
them - denying them insofar as they remain unq1alified, acceptine 
them with the reservations derived from the context of the au-
thor's whole work. Most critics, not trained to do this, are 
forever finding contradictions and inconsistencies in Ruskin 
where none exists. 
\fhile the two fundamental faults of Ruskin's critics natur-
ally mingle in particular expressions of opinion,· it has been 
possible to emphasize in the preceding pages that tendency of 
literary criticism to reduce all a man's work, and his ideas on a 
~----------------~~ 30 
multitude of distinct matters and at many times, to a set of per 
sonal characteristics by which it would prepare the literary 
neophyte to read that work. Likewise, it is possible to throw 
into the center of attention those manifestations of the differ-
ence in philosophical and religious position and training that 
mal{e these critics very indifferent aids to a Catholic teacher. 
The charge of inconsistency has been so constantly leveled 
at Ruskin that it is scarcely necessary to mark any particular 
instances of the accusation. Nor would it be of much avail to 
clear Ruskin by showing that some few instances of the charge 
were false. A devout reader of Ruskin has - unscientifically it 
is true - come to the conclusion that there are no inconsisten-
cies in Ruskin; but what is such unscientific criticism against 
nearly all the world? But at least one instance of the charge 
will be brought forward, at least to show the inability, or the 
lack of the habit, of distinguishing in critics without training 
in the methods of scholastic dialectics. Says Ladd: 
In 1860 art's function is conceived rather in practica 
and social terms. "And in these books of mine," he 
writes, "their distinctive character, as essays on art, 
is their bringing everything to a root in human passio 
or human hope." Thus ••• good morals are even de-
sired for the sake of life, and art is understood as 
the way of healthy life. At this period the emphasis 
upon the revelatory power of fine art is secondary. 
Yet scarcely six years later, Ruskin claims, "In all m 
past work, my endeavour has been to show that good art 
is essentially religious ••• " This is an example of 
how the moral or humanitarian interest has been grafte 
upon his earlier passionate conviction of natural 
theology • • • It is therefore fair to say that Ruski 
closed his life, as he had lived it, divided in though 
with an apparent conflict still unresolved between a 
desire to make art a necessary social virtue, a way of 
life, an expression of the fullest development of the 
~-··--------------------------------------------------------~3~1 
moral nature of man - and that other desire to conceive 
it as a communication to men of the spiritual truths ir 
an idealized universe ••• The social values then upor 
which Ruskin based his Aesthetics were contradictory; 
his attitudes toward religion, nature, man, alternated 
from a recognition of material needs to the transient 
assurance of immaterial hopis • • • it flowered into 
profound ethical confusion. 
Now Ladd, presumably full of the idea that a man's personal 
experience must be shown up to explai~ his every word, seems to 
suppose that Ruskin's loss of his belief in Calvinistic 
Christianity in the late 'fifties necessarily introduced a con-
tradiction into his views of art; that because there was a shift 
of emphasis in Ruskin's own mind that a reader cannot do less 
than find a contradiction in his doctrine. This is not so. 
Ladd would make out - perhaps to the pained surprise of 
Ruskin himself - that Ruskin at one time defines art as essen-
tially "communication" and at another time defines its essence as 
"expression"; that at one time he thought its essence was limited 
to producing an effect ulterior to itself, and at another he 
thought it was essentially limited to gratification of the ar-
tist's inner urge for "self-expression" in the fashion of the ar-
tistic temp~rament rebelling against Main Street and in the 
fashion of educators who would educate by having children "ex-
press themselves". Ladd would make out that Ruskin limited his 
"communicative" art to the revelation of God in the world; that 
the artist's "expression" was of all those social and moral ex-
periences within the soul of the artist. And this shift to a 
1 Henry Andrews Ladd! The Victorian Morality of Art: an Analysis 
Df Ruskin's Esthet!c, pp. 325, 326. 
~------------------------------------~--------------3~2~ 
contradictory view is supposed to have followed Ruskin's loss of 
hiS Faith. 
The answer to all this- which seems to be the conclusion of 
all Ladd's efforts for 336 pages - is very simple. Allowing tha 
Ruskin would understand "expressionism" at all, let us distin-
guish: In Ruskin's mind, to be interpreted by his biographers 
apart from his writings, that there were inconsistent and contra 
dictory views may be transmitted, though there is no very con-
vincing proof of it. In Ruskin's works, to be interpreted by 
themselves, we may further distinguish: If statements and defin 
itions, made at different times and without qualification, are t 
be read outside the whole context of all his work, we might con-
cede the inconsistency; if these opinions are to be judged by th 
context of all his work, they can be easily reconciled as com-
plementary rather than contradictory. 
For the whole body of Ruskin's teaching, from first to last 
was that all human experiences are linked, as one man with an-
other. It is impossible to believe that at any time in his life 
he would have admitted the aesthetic doctrine of "expressionism" 
by which the artist is conceived to be such an insufferable 
egoist and prig as to express himself for himself alone and not 
as part of all mankind and all creation. Of a man's own soul in 
relation to God and Creation, Ruskin has much to say indeed; but 
that is not "expressionism." 
Nor is there any contradiction between the revealing of God 
in man and nature, as they mirror their creator and act by His 
~----------------------------------------~--------~--33~ 
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power, in a work of art, and the dealing with moral and social 
"facts." The two are parts on one: God's image, His goodness, 
His mercy is truly revealed in the social and moral exuerience oi 
:man • 
But against the general opinion that Ruskin is consistently 
inconsistent, there are two voices.that should be heard. E.T.Cool 
has this to say: 
His method of writing and his temperament are them-
selves responsible for many misunderstandings. He 
seldom qualified his statements. He wrote at white 
heat. His thought was comprehensive, but at a given 
moment, when engaged on a particular point, he did not 
always see things steadily and see them whole. Yet I 
have shown that his doctrine of realism is not essen-
tially inconsistent with his doctrine of impression-
ism.l 
To this may be added the explanation of W. A. Knight: 
• • • his power of getting below the surface • • • TakE 
this in connection with the growth of his character, 
the unfolding of his genius in many directions, and thE 
consequent changes which occurred in his point of view. 
You will find the germ of his latest teaching within 
some of his earliest opinions ••• but all expanded, 
modified. So that what a surface critic deems ••• ar 
inconsistency • • • is really a sign of its opposi~e 
• • • with the added evidence of development • • • 
The difference in philosophic principles is, of course, the 
principal reason why most critics of Ruskin are unsatisfactory tc 
a Catholic teacher. The latter will find difficulty enough in 
Ruskin himself, whose metaphysical notions were formed rather 
haphazardly from Plato, Aristotle, post-scholastic philosophers, 
1 Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 569. 
2 Six Lectures on Some Nineteenth Century Artists, English and 
French, p. 70. 
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' together perhaps with some of his own invention; but these no-
tions were gathered in that beautifully free and eclectic spirit 
which distinguished the age. Yet it is only when the young 
thinkers from Columbia University, such as Ladd, interpose their 
religious, metaphysical, and psychological notions into the in-
terpretation of Ruskin, that the matter becomes truly serious. 
Henry Andrews Ladd is perhaps the most difficult of these 
people, as indeed might be expected. His rather lengthy thesis 
for the doctorate is devoted to an analysis of Ruskin's aesthe-
tics, and therefore has metaphysics always in the foreground. Tc 
guarantee that complete confusion will come of it all, he first 
acknowledges his debt to those two great sources of confusion in 
American education, psychology, and philosophy, Professors Dewey 
and Thorndike of Columbia. It then becomes grimly inevitable 
that he will deliver himself of this: 
Ruskin had no metaphysical bases and no reasonable 
logic ••• His position remained unphilosophical -
even evangelical: the beautiful is useful because it 
is beautiful; through its contemplation revelation is 
possible to the pure of heart • • • in 1846 the ethical 
function of art is presumptuously evangelical; it is tc 
celebrate, in a sense quite close to that of the 
Catholic theological esthetics of Patmor~, Thompson, 
and Mrs. Maynell, the glory of God ••• 
So a metaphysical basis, a philosophical position, is impossible 
to one who believes the beautiful a revelation of the glory of 
Godt And this function is called "ethical", the ethical, not 
ethical alsot And it is also evangelical and Catholic at one and 
1 Op. cit., p. 324. 
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the same time; and to be evangelical is in the same line a fur-
ther degree of being unphilosophical, as if an evangelical could 
not also be a philosopher. By being "presumptuously" evangelica, 
Ladd doubtless refers to Ruskin's crowning folly of arguing 
~priori. And the beautiful is useful just because it is beauti 
ful - preciselyt It is a good in itself, of the greatest "use-
fulness" to those faculties to which it appeals. 
And again Ladd objects, "The theoretical confusion that 
arose from this position was not of esthetics with morals, but oj 
esthetics with mysticism."1 And what does the Columbia metaphy-
sician mean by "mysticism"? Does he, with his contemporaries, 
mean anything that is imagined to be over and outside matter? or 
anything that is by other men called "idealistic"? To the 
Catholic reader the term means neither; nor does it mean super-
natural; but is limited to certain phenomena and experiences 
within the wider range of the supernatural. But to the Catholic 
Ruskin is never "mystical". Ruskin's belief that art can be a 
revelation of God is not mysticism. 
For the further confusion of one trained in scholastic psy-
chology Ladd offers the following: "'underlying will' for Ruskin 
was not a metaphysical concept; it was a moral law involving sim-
ple moral emotional states of mind."2 Now Ruskin never agreed tc 
take over the concept of Schopenhauer' s "underlying will", whateve .. 
1 ~., p. 331. 
2 
Ibid. , p. 331. 
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"moral sense" he posited. And no Catholic will ever understand 
the coupling of "moral" and "emotional", or quite understand what 
is a nmoral state of mind". 
Amabel Williams-Ellis is another who expresses, as a self-
evident truth, the conviction that esthetics can have nothing to 
do with God or theology: 
The Seven Lamps ••• is one that the modern reader 
will perhaps least care to survive • • • The narrow and 
impertinent theology of the second volume of Modern 
Painters is here repeated and intensified • • • the un-
easiness that we shall probably feel in reading it was 
••• shared by its author ••• we are ••• in short 
reminded all through this treatise ••• of nothing so 
much as that Ruskin was taught the Christian religio~ 
by a woman who was stupid • • • and intolerant • • • 
Walston, writing when the "new" psychology was indeed new, 
and newly experimental, objects vigorously to any truth being 
discovered except by experimentation: 
According to him all art is revelation and all art is 
praise. This at once gives a religious bias to scien-
tific investigation. I call it bias because considera 
tiona that might be introduced ultimately, when the 
main facts 2have been established, are here prematurely presented. 
And of course "mysticism'must be deprecated in Ruskin: 
This religious bias manifests itself furthermore in thE 
mystical tendency apparent in his heading and sub-
division. Take, for instance, his types of beauty; 
"Infinity, or the Type of Divine Incomprehensibility" 
••• This mystical admixture vitiates the character 
of his Seven Lamps of Architecture ••• in the "Lamp 
of Sacrifice" it leads to the mo.st absurd jugglery 
• • • his formalistic mysticism has often led him • • 
into serio-comic niceties • • • as for instance the 
lop. cit. , p. 123. 
2Qp. cit., pp. 31, 32. 
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importance he attaches to luminous backgrounds1of pic-tures as suggestive of expression of infinity. 
It is indeed difficult to get on anywhere with such critics. 
1 ~., p. 37 
~-" ----_____,..~ 
CHAPTER II 
RUSKIN'S "WAY OF LIFE" 
If the criticism of Ruskin is generally as unsatisfactory as 
haS been described, one might conclude that a Catholic teacher 
would hesitate to offer his classes a doctrine that must be con-
fusing in itself, or very abstruse, to have so baffled or led 
astray the critics. But this difficulty need not stand in the 
way. For the thing that makes the reading of Ruskin worth the 
while is precisely that which can be seen in the light of a gen-
eral knowledge of Catholic truth which may be supposed in the 
Catholic teacher. 
1. 
The Unity of Ruskin's Art and Social Teaching 
I say the valuable and interesting thing about Ruskin is 
that he has taken a whole view of life and at the same time he 
has given the part of Beauty in life a new importance. That th 
are these two elements in Ruskin's contribution must be insisted 
on. A Catholic teacher will not read him because he is a 
Christian or because he views the whole of life as a Christian. 
s a preacher of the Christian way of life Ruskin would scarcely 
e trustworthy. Nor will a Catholic read him simply as an art 
Critic: the study of art is generally not a part of the 
38 
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curriculum. But it is because of the union of the two elements 
in a "way of life," that Ruskin is valuable, because he offered a 
"way of life" in which Beauty and Art are implicated in the very 
notion of Christian living, not merely added to it or proposed as 
something not inconsistent with it. What this general view was, 
this "way of life", will be discussed in this chapter. 
While this unity of Ruskin's view of the many things he 
treats may be called too obvious for notice, still it is the note 
of his work that calls forth an almost unanimous chorus of praise 
~. W • Roe says of it: 
••• One principle aim in his voluminous writings 
from Modern Painters to Fors, and it is this: that 
sound art, whether individual or national, is the ex-
pression of a sound life and depends for its nobleness 
and truth upon a noble spirit in the artist or in the 
age; and further, that art, so understood, is not pos-
sible when it is thought of as a mere luxury created by 
a few highly gifted and highly paid virtuosos for the 
enjoyment of an aristocratic order alone, but only when 
it is conceived as the creative expression of a people, 
working, from humblest craftsman up to master artist, 
in response to impulses that spring from a happy and 
healthy co~~unity life ••• 1 . 
Soundness in the life from which art proceeds is the central 
thought of this unity as just described. The same point is made, 
and much the same way, by another critic: 
It is a notable thing in Ruskin's career that beginning 
as a student of Art, he soon saw - as few have done -
that initiation into its true principles will lead us 
far beyond it; that it conducts ••• to the central 
principles of morality. I give you a list of these as 
I used to put them before the students of philosophy at 
St. Andrews: truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, 
~Qp. cit., p. 150. 
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magnanimity, piety, obedience ••• 
And again the same critic says: 
••• he taurpt them that Art has a mission ••• that 
its function is to educate as well as to delight, and 
to delight by education. He thus shows us that all 
noble art is a portrayal less or more of the inherent 
truth of things • • • while the perception of Beauty 
elicits admiration, it should lead on to homage, and 
end in worship; because, as he puts it, "all great Art 
is praise."2 
Sir Edward Cook q1otes Ruskin's briefest summary of his doc-
trine: 
••• from delight in the form and laws of God's crea-
tion Art comes; to that delight it appeals. This is 
the central idea of the chief book of Ruskin's gosp,el. 
"In the main aim and principle of Modern Painters,' he 
says, "there is no variation from its first syllable to 
its last. It declares the perfectness and eternal 
beauty of the work of God, and tests a113work of man by concurrence with or subjection to that." 
The testimony of George Willis CooiD on this matter suffers 
somewhat from the nebulousness of so many humanitarians,uplifters 
and "literary" art critics: 
Both [Browning and Ruskinl alike accept the Christian 
faith with thorough conviction, not as a dogma and not 
as a tradition, but a union of man's soul with the 
Infinite One in the sacrament of life. To them revela-
tion is universal and unfailing, not exceptional and 
arbitrary. It is the neverceasing activity of God, by 
which his nature consummates itself in the communion of 
rational beings ••• For Ruskin the aim of religious 
development is the perfection of4men in the common fel-lowship of love and right doing. 
, 
Lw. A. Knight, op. cit., p. 79. 
2 Ibid., p. 82. 
5
studies in Ruskin, p. 6. 
~Poets and Problems, p. 264. 
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This curious passage is one of those things that bring more 
suspicion on Ruskin than is really his due; it seems to identify 
Ruskin with theological "modernism", that is, if any meaning can 
be had from it besides the clear one that Ruskin had a single 
view in which all life was seen together. But more sensibly the 
same writer says: 
"The main aim and principle of this book," he says in 
Modern Painters, "is that it declares the perfectness 
and eternal beauty of the work of God, and tests all 
work of man by concurrence with or subjection to that." 
Nature, as the eternally abiding and unchanging re-
flection to man of God's law and will, is an element in 
his teaching of conspicuous importance. 
The danger of reading into Ruskin's unity of view some vague 
pantheism is clearly apparent in another passage from George 
Willis Cooke: 
The "natural-supernaturalism" of Carlyle, he has ac-
cepted with the utmost confidence, as he has accepted 
Carlyle as his greatest master in his moral teachings 
••• In his thought, God, man, and nature belong to 
one order, unite into one interblending harmony, inter-
fuse with and interpret each other • • • he turns away 
from the supernatural, because God is here in flower, 
cloud, and child. He cares not for angels and dis-
torted attempts to expres~ the spiritual because the 
whole world is spiritual. 
Ruskin has indeed written.something like that; but as the 
passage comes to mind, it does not necessarily suppose that 
Ruskin rejects the supernatural from his beliefs, but rejects the 
attempts to represent it in pictures. Nor is it necessary to be-
lieve that Ruskin identified God, the material world, and man in 
1 Ibid., p. 231. 
2 Ibid., pp. 205, 206. 
anY pantheistic sense; if it is conceivable that he followed the 
Modernist in a belief in the "immanence" of God, it is equally 
certain that the reader can be utterly unsuspicious of this and 
see in Ruskin only a statement of the familiar Catholic doctrine 
that God is everywhere in creation, maintaining it in being and 
concurring with its action. 
2. 
The Fundamentals of Ruskin's System 
Perhaps it is a dangerous thing, and more likely it is an 
impertinent thing, to attempt for a great author what he either 
ever dared to do, or did perfectly what he alone was capable of 
doing: to put within the limits of a single proposition the sum 
nd substance of all his thought, its core, its root idea. It is 
ttempted here for Ruskin, on the score of separating clearly 
hat Ruskin did not, of course, put in tabular form. It is this: 
1) To praise, reverence and serve God in this life 
2) by contemplation, with delight, gratitude, and love, of 
the beauty of His creation as it reflects His own infin-
ite Beauty - the highest human activity attaining the su• 
preme value of life by which all others are measured -
3) and in this contemplation 
'to see revealed His own life and attributes for our im-
itation - His truth, justice, charity, holiness ••• 
to see the supreme value of life is not in selfish 
possessions but in admiration and love, 
to see that in loving Him we must love all whom He has 
made our fellow-men, 
to see that, as all his works act together for his gl 
so we are not created to contend and compete for the 
goods necessary to maintain life, but to co-operate in 
~--------~ 
distributing them. 
The first part of the proposition states that "foundation" 
bich we find as well in Ruskin's catechism as in our own and in 
Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises: that the end of man on earth is to 
raise and serve God. It is a dictate of natural reason and of 
atural theology; but it was from the Catechism that Ruskin re-
eived it as a believing Christian. If it does not make Ruskin's 
thought Christian and supernatural in the strict sense, at 
east many readers would accept it trustingly as from a true 
The second part describes the proper function of Beauty and, 
consequence, of Art in the life of man: the contemplation and 
reation of it are in the very scheme of Creation, a phase of tha 
and service man owes to God. Here must be noted the re-
of these two parts. They are not parallel and separate; 
the one is but a particular form of the other. Serving G 
enjoying the beautiful, Religion and Art, according to Ruskin 
not unconnected departments of life; they are joined in the 
nature of things. 
The third part indicates what proceeds from the other two; 
and so it has relations with them which must be understood if we 
are to grasp the scheme of Ruskin's doctrine. According to the 
third principle, man learns from the contemplation of God's 
Creation, how he can return to God that service prescribed by the 
first principle, a service that is marked by selflessness, char-
ity, and by co-operation in obtaining the means of life. The 
~------_,.....,..,..,~~ 
third part then becomes the immediate basis for Ruskin's social 
teaching. 
The main direction of this "way of life" may be said to have 
~een pointed out in the second volume of Modern Painters when his 
criticisms of other painters and his defense and exposition of 
Turner in the first volume had proved the need of stating the 
principles of his criticism. He begins: 
••• the investigation now before us rinto these prin-
ciples], which, being not of things outward, and sensi-
bly demonstrable, but of the value and meaning of mentw 
impressions, must be entered upon with a modesty and 
cautiousness proportioned to the difficulty of deter-
mining the likeness, or community of such impressions, 
as they are received by different men; and with serious 
ness proportioned to the importance of rightly regard~ 
those faculties over which we have moral power, and 
therefore in relation to which we assuredly incur a 
moral responsibility. There is not a thing left to the 
choice of man to do or not to do, but there is some sort 
or degree of duty involved in his determination; and by 
how much the more, therefore, our subject becomes em-
barrassed by the cross influences of variously admitted 
passion, administered discipline, or encouraged af-
fection, upon the minds of men, by so much the more it 
becomes matter of weight and import to observe by what 
laws we should be guided, and of what responsibilities 
regardful, 1in all that we admit, administer, or encourage. 
It might be objected to this passage that it assumes the 
fact of our responsibility for what perceptions of the beautiful 
we admit to our minds. Yet Ruskin is here only stating a propos-
ition, connnon enough, that there are in concreto no "indifferent" 
acts, that everything a man does bears a relation to his last end~ 
w hether for good or evil. At any rate Ruskin has not introduced 
lworks, Vol. IV, pp. 25, 26. 
as yet into the formal definition of the beautiful any so-called 
moral element. But he does assume that as these perceptions are 
in some measure under the control of mind and will that they can-
not be indifferent to the good or evil end of man's living. From 
this position he moves on to a statement that sounds presumptuous 
enough, and yet is a simple statement of the fact which alone in-
terests us in Ruskin. Speaking of the seriousness of Art and the 
importance of it, he continues: 
But that his labour, the necessity of which, in all 
ages, has been most frankly admitted by the greatest 
men, is justifiable from a moral point of view, that it 
is not a vain devotion of the lives of men, that it has 
functions of usefulness addressed to the weightiest of 
human interests, and that the objects of it have calls 
upon us which it is inconsistent alike with our human 
dignity and heavenward duty to disobey, have never been 
boldly asserted nor fairly admitted; least of all is it 
likely to be so in these days of despatch and display, 
where vanity, on the one side, supplies the place of 
that love for art which is the only effective patron-
age, and, on the other, that of the incorruptible and 
earnest pride which no applause, no reprobation, can 
blind to its shortcomings, or beguile of its hope.! 
Ruskin is here drawing nearer to his main proposition; he 
has gone one step forward in asserting that experiences of the 
beautiful are not only not morally indifferent acts, but of great 
weight in the life of man. The reason for this will be put in 
his main propositions, soon to follow. But the passage is quoted 
for this one statement, that this matter "has never been boldly 
asserted nor fairly admitted." It may be said, that however 
bumptious this may appear, there is this much truth in it: no on 
1 Ibid., p. 27. 
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but Ruskin in his own age and ours has insisted on this - whethez 
true or false - as the central idea of a long life's work. 
He was at this stage of his exposition not yet ready to come 
out with his fundamental idea. Perhaps he felt that there was 
only one way to approach the readers of his day with th+s strange 
notion of his, and that was the way of an appeal to their mater-
ialist, "practical," Utilitarian mentality. Under the benign 
star of Utility he will put forth his definition of the Beautiful 
• • • because • • • men in the present century under-
stand the word Useful in a strange way • • • it will be 
well in the outset that I define exactly what kind of 
Utility I mean to attribute to art, and especially to 
that branch of it which is concerned with those impres-
sions of external Beauty, whose nature it is our presen 
object to discover ••• Therefore that we may deter-
mine what is chiefly useful to man, it is £ecessary 
first to determine the use of Man himself. 
And now Ruskin lays down that doctrine, in the trinity of 
elements already ascribed to him, which was the root, the ulti-
mate criterion, which he never recalled and with which he was 
never inconsistent. 2 
3. 
The Perception of Beauty According to Ruskin. 
Such a holy and eternal function would be attributed to the 
arts of painting and sculpture 
• • • but for two fatal and widespread errors respecti~ 
the great faculties of mind concerned in them. The 
first of these, or the Theoretic faculty, is concerned 
1works, Vol. IV, p. 28. 
2 Ibid., pp. 28-32. 
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with the moral perception and appreciation of ideas of 
beauty. And the error respecting it, the considering 
and calling it Aesthetic, degrading it to a mere opera-
tion of sense ••• 1 
In respect to the second faculty, the Imagination, the error is 
to assume that its function is the propagation of falsity. The 
first error is what next, after the statement of his fundamental 
thesis, concerns Ruskin. That thesis could never stand if it 
were claimed that life's supreme value and highest activity were 
to be found in the gratification of the senses. So he argues: 
• • • I wholly deny that the impressions of beauty are 
in any way sensual; they are neither sensual nor intel-
lectual, but moral; and for the faculty receiving them, 
whose difference from mere perception I shall immediate 
ly endeavour to explain, no term can be more accurate 
or convenient than that employed by the Greeks, "Theo-
retic," which I pray permission, therefore always to 
use, and to call the operation of the faculty itself, 
Theoria.2 
Some of the difficulties, psychological and metaphysical, 
offered by this definition of the nature of impressions of beauty 
will not be profitably considered in this chapter. They will be 
taken up later, but, for the present, discussion will be limited 
to the more general aspects of Ruskin's theory and what others 
think of it. Omitting some intermediate steps in the argument, 
~e may take this passage which implies all that precedes it: 
• • • we find very sufficient ground for the higher es-
timation of these delights; first, in their being eter-
nal and inexhaustible, and, secondly, in their being no 
means or instrument of life, but an object of life. 
Now, in whatever is an object of life, in whatever may 
~orks, Vol. IV, p. 35. 
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be infinitely and for itself desired, we may be sure 
there is something of divine; for God will not make an~ 
thing an object of life to His creatures which does not 
point to, or partake, of Himself. And so, though we 
were to regard the pleasures of sight merely as the 
highest of sensual pleasure, and though they were of 
rare occurrence, and when occurring, isolated and im-
perfect, there would still be a supernatural character 
about them, owing to their self-sufficiency. But when, 
instead of being scattered, interrupted, or chance-dis-
tributed, they are gathered together, and so arranged 
to enhance each other • • • there is caused by them not 
only a feeling of strong affection toward the object ir. 
which they exist, but a perception of purpose and 
adaptation of it to our desires, a perception therefore 
of the immediate operation of the Intelligence which sc 
formed us, and so feeds us ••• 
Out of which perception arise Joy, Admiration, ana 
Gratitude ••• Not the mere animal consciousness of 
the pleasantness I call Aesthesis; but the exulting,, 
reverent, and grateful perception of it I call Theoria. 
For this, and this only, is the full comprehension anq 
contemplation of the Beautiful as a gift of God • • • 
Ruskin continues the argument: 
It will now be understood why it was formerly saia 
in the chapter respecting ideas of beauty, that those 
ideas were the subject of moral, and not of intellectu-
al, nor altogether of sensual perception; and why I 
spoke of the pleasures connected with them as derived 
from "those material sources which are agreeable to our 
moral nature in its purity and perfection." For, as it 
is necessary to the existence of an idea of beauty,that 
the sensual pleasure which may be its basis should be 
accompanied first with joy, then with love of the ob-
ject, then with the perception of kindness in a super-
ior intelligence, finally, with thankfulness and vener-
ation toward that intelligence itself; and as no idea 
can be at all considered as in any way an idea of 
beauty, until it be made up of these emotions, ••• 
and as these emotions are in no way resultant from, nor 
obtainable by, any operation of the Intellect; it is 
evident that the sensation of beauty is not sensual on 
the one hand, nor is it intellectual on the other, but2 is dependent on a pure, right and open state ~ t'he heart. 
lworks, Vol. IV, p. 46. 
2Ibid., pp. 48, 49. 
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That beauty is, in truth, the reflection of Divine per-
fections in visible creation and that our delight in Beauty is tc 
see and realize those perfections is what the world at large 
would simply deny, and which Ruskin has so far not demonstrated. 
He r~s argued for it a priori that God has created the world for 
His glory to be given by us and that our praise is in seeing and 
delighting in His creation, and that that perception and delight 
in it must be what we call the perception and delight in the 
Beautiful. But some deny the inference, saying that we call 
beautiful gives a sensual, or, more strictly, sensible, delight 
and hence cannot be identified with this praise of God. To that 
objection Ruskin has just given answer: Yes, there is in per-
ceptions of the Beautiful a sensible pleasure, but there is some-
thing more. 
Hereupon witnesses arise to testify that they have never in 
any sense seen God in what they are accustomed to call beautiful. 
They appeal from reason to experience and the testimony of their 
consciousness. But Ruskin appeals from the testimony of consciou-
ness of those who have not "a pure, right, and open state of 
heart" to the testimony of those who have "a pure, right, and 
open state of heart", repeating what he had once said long before 
that "we may indeed perceive, as far as we are acquainted with tre 
~ature of God, that we have been so constructed as in a healthy 
state of mind to derive pleasure from whatever things are illus-
~rative of that nature."1 
1 
Works. Vol. IV, p. 51. 
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rt Hence it is necessary for him, before he can demonstrate 
from the experience of men the fact that in beautiful things we 
are seeing the reflection of God, that he explain what is that 
«pure, right, and open state of heart," and "healthy state of 
. d " m~n . He must chiefly, though, explain why so many are not in 
that state of mind and heart, and again, how they may arrive at 
it. He opens this stage of his argument thus: 
Hence there arise two questions ••• the first, in 
what way an impression of sense may be deceptive, and 
therefore a conclusion respecting it untrue; and the 
second, in what way an impression of sense, or the 
preference of one, may be a subject of will, and there-
fore of moral duty or delinquency.l . 
Ruskin has here carelessly left himself open to the criti-
cism that Walston immediately brings forward: "To the first of 
these (a really fundamental one) he devotes a short paragraph, 
referring us to 1 the connnon consent of mankind' (which man, or 
men, or race, or age?) But the second question admits of preach-
ing, and he dwells upon it with fervent eloq:t ence. n2 Bu1:; Ruskin 
is not speaking here in the main of a purely psychological ques-
tion, how far our senses report truly; he is referring to per-
captions of beauty and how far they are worthy of our attention. 
And the second question of Ruskin is how the power to see worthil~ 
is to be trained under control of our will. To these questions 
together Ruskin devotes the whole of the chapter which they in-
troduce. He does not dismiss the "really fundamental" one in a 
1~., p. 52. 
2 Op. cit., pp. 36, 37. 
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paragraph, does not merely "dwell with ·fervent eloquence non the ana 
which "admits of preaching." At any rate this preaching of a 
"pure, right, and open state of heart" is worth attending: 
• • • we should have so much faith in authority as 
shall make us repeatedly observe and attend to that 
which is said to be right, even though at present we 
may not feel it so. And in the right mingling of this 
faith with the openness of heart which proves all thirg~ 
lies the great difficulty • • • 
The temper, therefore, by which right taste is 
formed, is characteristically patient. It dwells upon 
what is submitted to it. It does not trample upon it, 
lest it should be pearls, even though it look like 
husks ••• it is hungry and thirsty too, and drinks 
all the dew that falls on it ••• it is distrustful of 
itself, so as to be ready to believe and to try all 
things, and yet so trustful of itself that it will 
neither quit what it has tried, nor take anything with-
out trying • 
• • • if we can perceive beauty in everything of 
God's doing, we may argue that we have reached the true 
perception of its universal laws. Hence, false taste 
may be known by its fastidiousness, by its enjoyment 
only of particular styles and modes of things ••• it 
is forever meddling, • • • its eye is always upon 
itself, and it tests all things round it by the way 
they fit it. But true taste is forever growing, learn-
ing, reading, worshipping, and testing itself by the 
way that it fits things. And it finds whereof to feed, 
and hereby to grow, in all things ••• 1 
Supposing then a condition of mind and heart capable of re-
ceiving the reflections of Divinity in Creation, Ruskin proceeds 
to establish his thesis experimentally by an analysis of those ex 
periences we have of the beautiful and showing that in them there 
are indeed glimpses of what is divine and that our delight is 
truly in them. It would be impossible to summarize this demon-
stration which in Ruskin is carried over many chapters. But that 
1 
Works, Vol. IV, pp. 58, 59, 60. 
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". 10ng argument from the facts of experience - though they may be 
too largely Ruskin's experience -.at least shows he is not so 
given to mere assumptions, intuitions, guesses, and the final 
crime - a priori reasoning - for which he is sometimes criticized 
Two points in this argument should be well noted: The first 
is that he anticipates the obvious objection to his classifica-
tion of these perceptions, 
I pretend neither to enumerate nor perceive them all 
••• that the infinite ways, whether by reason or ex-
perience discoverable, by which matter in some sort may 
remind us of moral perfections, are hardly within any 
reasonable limits to be explained, if1even by any single mind they might all be traced. 
And the second is that the apparently inexplicable division of ai 
beauty into two kinds, of Typical Beauty, that is, reflections of 
the divine attributes discovered in inanimate creation, and of 
Vital Beauty, the appearance of the fulfillment of function in 
living things, is by no means essential to the rightness of his 
thesis. For the second kind of beauty, in spite of his insist-
ence that it is different from the first, is also like it in 
this, that it too reflects the Divine power, it too, in his own 
~ords, is "an image of moral purpose and achievement" primarily 
in the action of God upon and in the world. 
Whatever force his argument as a whole will have, there is 
~robably no better instance of his dealing with the host of ex-
~eriences of the beautiful than this analysis of 
• • • the emotion, namely, caused by all open ground, 
~orks, Vol. IV, p. 76. 
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or lines of any spacious kind against the sky, behind 
which-there might be conceived the Sea. It is an emo-
tion more pure than that caused by the sea itself, for 
I recollect distinctly running down behind the banks of 
a high beach to get their land line cutting against the 
sky, and receiving a more strange delight from this 
than from the sight of the ocean. I am not sure that 
this feeling is common to all children ••• I am cer-
tain that the modification of it which belongs to our 
after years is common to all, the love, namely, of a 
light distance appearing over a comparatively dark hor-
izon. This I have tested too freqQently to be mistaken 
by offering to indifferent spectators forms of equal 
abstract beauty in half tint, relieved, the one against 
dark sky, the other against a bright distance. The 
preference is invariably given the latter ••• "What-
ever beauty there may result from effects of li~~t on 
foreground objects, - from the dew of the grass, the 
flash of the cascade, the glitter of the birch trunk 
• • • there is yet a light which the eye invariably 
seeks with a deeper feeling for the beautiful, - the 
light of the declining or breaking day, and the flakes 
of scarlet cloud burning like watch-fires in the green 
sky of the horizon; a deeper feeling, I say, not per-
haps more acute • • • 
Let us try to discover that which effects of this 
kind possess or suggest • • • 
Do they show finer characters of form than can be 
developed by the broader daylight? Not so; for their 
power is almost independent of the forms they assume 
• • • the fairer forms of things are by them subdued 
• • • Have they more perfection of fulness of color? 
Not so; for their effect is oftentimes deeper when 
their hues are dim ••• But there is one thing that it 
has, or suggests, which no other object of sight sug-
gests in equal degree, and that is - Infinity. It is 
of all visible things the least material, the least 
finite, the most typical of the nature of God ••• For 
the sky of night, though we may know it is boundless, 
is dark • • • a roof that seems to shut us in and down; 
but the bright distance has no limit, we feel its in-
finity, as we rejoice in its purity of light.l 
Indeed, this is not the "language of the schools," yet of 
such argumentation one may say with Leslie Stephen, 
~orks. Vol. IV, pp. 79, 80, 81. 
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I do not know whether the chapters in which he dis-
cusses the theoretic faculty, or imagination, will 
pass muster with later psychologists better than his 
theory of the beautiful with professors of aesthetics. 
But I never read anything which seemed to me to do more 
• • • to make clear the true characteristics of good 
poetry.l -
To make clear the characteristics of good poetry! Indeed, to 
make clear to the willing eye whatever is beautiful to see and 
why we say it is so. 
4. 
Objections to Ruskin's Aesthetics 
Detailed criticism of this main concept, that man's praise 
and service of God is in the delight in His reflection in Creatim 
and in Art, is not very frequent among those who have written of 
Ruskin. !funy are content to SQ~rize his teachings in either a 
vaguely laudatory way or with a general tone of disapproval. 
Such are the "criticisms" quoted earlier in this chapter, where 
they were given not for the value of judgments which were not in-
deed given, but simply because they recognized the uniqueness -
and the unity- of Ruskin's teaching. Hence there are only three 
from whom will be drawn any definite objections to the theory. 
They are Sir Charles Walston, R. H. Wilenski, and H. A. Ladd. 
Difficulties that a Catholic teacher might have with their criti-
cism have already been described at length, and will perhaps ex-
plain a certain impatience now with their objection. 
The most reasonable one of them is that which Walston· 
1op. cit., p.-93. 
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I maintain that for the discovery of the principles of 
all art, those arts which reproduce known forms of na-
ture, such as sculpture and painting, are not so likely 
to yield satisfactory results as the more purely decor-
ative arts and the early forms of music.l 
surely the theory breaks down that art is essentially representa-
. tive of the divine perfections, when it is applied to music. But 
so do all theories break on the· same rock; all, of course pre-
serve some appearances of their original consistency, and 
~uskin's is equally successful or unsuccessful. It might be 
~nswered in Ruskin's place that music first stirs the emotions 
~ithout rousing any particular ideas, as the bare notion of 
"program" music would imply; then the emotion stirs the mind to 
~ppropriate reflections - any reflections that fit the mood cre-
~ted.by the music, and why not of heavenly things? Or, it might 
~e answered that the perception among sensibly pleasing sounds of 
~ "formn, intricate in its counterpoint, its development of the-
matic material, colorful, as they say, in its orchestration, 
gives a pleasure akin to that we find in the unity-in-variety of 
all creation. Well, a not very satisfactory answer ••• 
Walston is not satisfactory either when he challenges 
one of Ruskin's principal statements in this wise: 
l.Qp. 
It surely brings us no further to say that "we may in-
deed perceive, as far as we are acquainted with the 
nature of God, that we have been so constructed as in 
a healthy state of mind to derive pleasure from what-
ever things are illustrative of that nature." If he. 
could undertake soberly and adequately to define the 
cit., p. 42. 
~----------------------------------~~----------------~--~--~v~IIQ~· 
L 
nature of God, we might then test the healthy state of 
man's mind by it. But this he does not do.l 
Inexplicably Walston misses the meaning of Ruskin. Ruskin does 
not argue that we know the healthy state of man's mind and its 
nature from our knowledge of the nature of God and His "mind." 
The for_ce of his words is that we know from the nature of God 
that he creates for a purpose, His extrinsic glory, that man is 
made to praise Him and is given the faculties and the visible 
means by which those faculties can exercise themselves to praise 
and glorify Him, that the contemplation of His excellence is the 
visible and even invisible creation, the delight 'in it, the 
acknowledgment of it are all to be identified in the perception 
of the Beautiful. The pious complaint, "If he could undertake 
soberly and adequately to define the nature of God," is the 
gentle irony we might look for from Walston. Ruskin never spoke 
as one having a knowledge of God beyond what any Christian who 
had read his Catechism might have. 
1 
2 
Again Walston objects: 
Now even granting his teleological premise that all na-
ture is pervaded with divine spirit ••• the different 
artists, in search of this divine spirit, will see it 
in different parts and lights and aspects, according tc 
their personal, moral, intellectual, or artistic char-
acter • • • and even the same artist will see different 
spirit in the same scene in his varying moods • • • But 
surely the spirit at work lay in this personal element 
which they added or infused, the unity of soul which 
welded together into a necessary whole the infinite 
multiplicity of phenomena before them ••• What makes P 
it art is this human organization of the facts ofnanrre.~ 
Op. cit., P• 36. 
~., pp. 40, 41. 
~riefly, we must distinguish: this personal view and organizatio 
constitute the formal element of Art, Yest That they are the 
terial element, Nol This is no concession, or receding from 
-
Rusldn' s view. All the facts that ·walston alludes to are des-
cribed at great length in the fifteenth chapter of Modern 
fginters, the second volume. The inference which Walston makes 
is simply unwarranted. In the work of art th~ infinity of as-
pects seen by various artists and in their varying moods, are not 
precisely "creations" of their own minds as he suggests; they are 
simply, one would say with Ruskin, the infinitely numerous and 
different, because all are imperfect and incomplete, glimpses of 
that Infinite Being Who can never be perfectly known, no matter 
how great the minds and how numerous and how different are the 
little pieces of their knowledge of Him. 
Ladd apparently cannot believe that Ruskin approached the 
problem logically; he seems to believe that Ruskin got himself 
into an awiDffard position and then wrenched the facts out of their 
own ground to protect himself. The following pass age pretends 
to trace the process: 
He believed that art was a noble language, and above a 
that landscape was perhaps its most thrilling and cer-
tainly its newest type. He began by justifying the es-
thetic representation of "natural truth." Only by . 
genuine esthetic seeing could the artist "reveal" the 
facts of God's universe. But the true facts of an art 
must necessarily be shown compatible with beauty; so he 
proceeded to ana:}.yze the objects on grounds of beauti-
ful impressions. His explanation, however, had to im-
press the reader with as great authority as those of 
critics before him. It seemed to him, therefore, that 
each kind of truth or beauty in art had to be given so 
unusual connection with human behavior, some ultimate 
value, if possible, to human life ••• this drove him 
~----------s-t_r __ a_i_g_h_t __ t_o __ m_o_r_a _ l_s-.----------------------~--------~--~0~~ 
The revived tenets of "Natural Religion" illumin-
ated the emotional value of landscape; but emotion, 
sentiments, fancies demanded some discriminative prin-
ciple. With religion gone from the current subject 
matter, what could serve as a criterion to his own con-
science and to that of other educated men but some suer 
absolute as the moral sense? It could apprehend the 
beauty of emotional meaning of landscape • • • It was a 
triumphant sanction, Ruskin's reasoning was not ob-
scure: if the language of art must convey something, 
that something must be of value to life besides being 
in itself esthetically good; beauty could not be ab-
stract and esoteric: it was obviously something emo-
tional ••• Art, by the very nature of its content, 
its potent form, its human expressiveness, must involve 
a theory of moral value ••• 1 
This sort of criticism offers no rational objection to 
Ruskin's argument for his main thesis; it simply suggests his in-
sincerity in offering it. There is also implied in it a com-
plete separa tion between Beauty and what both Ruskin and Ladd 
agree to call "morals." That this is a weakness in the metaphy-
sics of Ladd and of Ruskin too is a matter to be discussed in the 
next chapter. But because this and other criticisms are aimed at 
the fundamental notions of Ruskin's view of life, it is well to 
bring them together here: 
1 
Believing and explicitly stating that beauty consists 
of mental impressions, that it is without objective 
reality in any metaphysical sense, Ruskin objectifies 
it as all esthetic writers tend to do. He analyzes 
beauty into types ••• in order to discover secrets 
of the instinctive and spiritual pleasure which beauty 
affords. Granting the illusion of its essential ob-
jectivity this seemed the only sensible way·to discuss 
beauty.2 
Op. cit., p. 168. 
2Ladd, op. cit., p. 170. 
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Now many statements of Ruskin are easily contrued into in-
consistency with his main principles, and such an explicit one 
can only be understood in the light of the whole body of Ruskin's 
exposition. To say that beauty consists in mental impressions is 
equivalent to saying that it has no basis in reality is not quite 
true. Something outside the mind is necessary to the making of 
an impression on it, and this is the fundamentum in re. And 
everywhere Ruskin speaks as if he supposed that all concepts of 
Beauty are derived from the world outside the mind; indeed his 
hole theory is built precisely on that metaphysical assumption 
that the perceptions of the divine perfections are derived from 
the visible and very objective world.· Such criticism as this of 
dd's is simply blindness to everything but the sentence before 
What appears to be Wilenski's chief objection to Ruskin's 
theories is that a century ago he did not foresee the art 
moderne" and embrace it. Elsewhere will be recorded his com-
laints that Ruskin had no prophetic vision of Corbusier and his 
house flowering on stalks of central plumbing, heating, and 
lighting shafts. Now his complaint is less fantastic: 
Ruskin had Baudelaire's concept of the Universal 
Analogy. The concept in itself was the product of his 
genius - though his assumption that he could demon-
strate that Analogy in the whole system of nature •••. 
was born of the manic aspect of his illness. That con-
cept as I have tried to show in The Meaning of Modern 
Sculpture stands at the center of the modern artist's 
creed. But the modern artists do not draw Ruskin's 
distinction between geometric and organic art. They re 
gard the distinction as a fallacy inherent in The 
Romantic Movement, which postulated a wild, free, rugge 
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"Nature" with no formality in its structure and op-
posed in its essential character to unity, harmony, an< 
order. Science· has shown more and more the amazing 
formality of natural form ••• and the modern artist 
looks upon geometric form as symbolic of the formality 
in organic life.l 
The impertinence of Wilenski's attributing the concept of 
the universal analogy to Baudelaire as his private property and 
invention is not the least irritating of all Wilenski's impertin-
ences; the universal analogy is probably as old as the mind of 
man; at least Wilenski need not be ignorant that Christian 
thought has always known the world as created in God's image and 
reflecting in some way and degree the infinite content of the 
Divine Being and so bearing similarity, one being to another, 
throughout creation. That the effort to demonstrate that analogy 
in the "whole system of nature" could only be "born of the manic 
aspect of his illness" is a quite impossible inference; Ruskin 
does attempt to see all that may be seen of the divine beauty in 
"the whole system of nature"; he explicitly, at the beginning of 
his chapter on Typical Beauty, denies that he can exhaust that 
infinite wealth. 
That Ruskin rejected the geometric in art, that he even went 
so far as to find the straight forms of wall and roof, and their 
proportions of mass, not of the essence of art, is somewhat par-
donable,· seeing, first, that the Creator has not used geometric 
forms in the visible massing of His creation, however much of 
geometry there is in its structure below the eye's perception; 
1 Op. cit., p. 240. 
~condly, that geometric painting 
taken very seriously by any but a 
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and sculpture has not been 
suspiciously super-sophisticat~ 
group of moderns. There may be "something in it" which Ruskin 
missed, but not many will complain that he did. 
Wilenski makes much of another discovery of inconsistency: 
He saw that value ••• derives from the metaphysical 
goodness of the artist and that it cannot be assessed 
by its effects on the spectator. But he did not press 
this to its logical conclusion and say that no. one but 
the artist who revealed it could receive the full revel 
ation ••• He did not advance to the concept ••• of 
value altogether present to the work after its comple-
tion by the ,good or bad, wise or stupid, gross or sen-
sitive spectator ••• he was held back here, I fancy, 
by manic confidence • • • that he himself could assess 
all types of Value in works of art. He was always 
ready to say that a picture was or was not "worth so 
much money" • • • did not realize • • • he was • • • 
confusing Intrinsic Value and Exchange. 1 
• • • his Intrinsic Value in Art was the Value of the 
Artist, Deity taught by Deity, but in Eco.nomics it is 
the Avail toward Life ••• To have been consistent, 
Economic Intrinsic Value should have been in terms of 
Cost to the human being ~ho made it ••• 2 
Wilenski argues further in this passage that as Ruskin so 
often appraised a picture's intrinsic value in terms of money, sc 
he should have praised the intrinsic value of economic goods, but 
that Ruskin dared not attempt so impossible a task. But the sup-
posed inconsistency between the intrinsic value ascribed to workE 
of art and that ascribed to the products of the factory can be 
cleared up, as most such "inconsistencies" can, by referring botr 
valuations to the context of Ruskin's thought. The intrinsic 
1 
Op. cit., p. 241. 
z Ibid., pp. 300, 301. 
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· value of art is the "artist, Deity taught by Deity," says 
Wilenski. Obviously to any one who has read Ruskin's theological 
opinions, this does not mean the Artist is to be identified in 
any pantheistic sense with God, nor that his work has value as 
the words of a President of the United States are valued, simply 
because his position deserves our respect. No, the artist's wor 
has value in virtue of his being made in the image of God and be-
ing taught by God only in so far as his powers of intelligence, 
faintly reflective of God's, produce works that must have the im-
print of that intelligence and imagination on them objectively. 
Since those powers are in themselves noble and worthy so must 
their imprint be, just as God's own work must be good simply be-
cause He cannot be conceived as doing a poor thing. Now what the 
artist, with God-like powers, puts into his work cannot avail to-
ward life. Thus read there is no inconsistency in Ruskin's no-
tions of Intrinsic Value in Art and in Economics. 
The criticisms of Ruskin that have just been discussed re-
gard particular points of doctrine, though generally reflecting 
adversely on the view as a whole. vVhen we pass from these and 
look for opinions on that whole view of Ruskin, what I have 
called his "way of life," we find, first of all that series of 
generalizations which do little more than recognize he had a gen-
eral view of life of which Beauty and Art were portions. These 
critics seem afraid to offer a definite opinion on this view. 
But there are some remarks of Ladd on this matter that 
should be noted simply because they attribute to Ruskin a view 
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which he did not hold. In summarizing the work of Ruskin Ladd 
says: "It [~uskin's theory 1 was, moreover the first modern emo-
tionalist theory in England to imply as its central position the 
'expressionistic' end of emotional language.nl And again, 
Finally, Ruskin's is the first theory that I know to 
suggest that in the activity of art itself there lay 
the ultimate social value • • • that art was itself a 
good life.2 
Lastly and at greater length: 
The critic of an art isolated from the so-called mun-
dane interests of life cannot admit moral consideratior.~ 
in any of the objects he beholds. He can discuss art 
only in terms of form, color and technique or emotiona] 
abstractions which attempt to deny their moral roots 
••• It may be then that Ruskin's emphasis upon moral 
values in art holds a specific importance for the twen-
tieth century •. In an industrial civilization where the 
machine has lifted the pleasurable burden of making 
things, art may remain the only adequate medium for the 
realization of personality. To such a world Ruskin's 
theory has precise relevance; not only does it relate 
art objects to the moral values of daily life, but it 
centralizes an ethical principle in revealing art as 
the best possible kind of work. For the heart of 
Ruskinism lies in understanding~art to be, not the es-
cape from, but the way to life.~ 
Many are likely, with Ladd, to form the opinion that Ruskin 
would make art the way of life. Ladd moreover would seem to make 
the chief value of this life the "realization of personality," 
its "expressionistic end," as he says of emotional language. 
This interpretation is a mistaken one indeed. To Ruskin Art and 
the contemplation of natural beauty are a form of service and 
1 Op. cit., p. 339. 
2 
Ibid. 
-
3 Ibid., pp. 339, 341. 
rr------~ 
praise of God; his whole teaching is to that effect. But he doe 
not argue that it is the only way to praise God; we are still to 
worship and praise Him according to the ways prescribed by the 
Church. Moreover there is all that Ruskin teaches of this ser-
vice that we include in his economic and social doctrine. It is 
true that Ruskin derives this from that knowledge revealed 
through Beauty, but the social order that may be revealed by God 
through His creation and through Art is not the same as Art. Art 
then, is not the whole of life. That the end of Art in Ruskin's 
mind is not "expressionism", the "realization of personality," 
no mere egotistical self-exploitation, has already been very em-
phatically denied. 
5. 
Ruskin's fundamentals in the Light of Catholic Thought. 
If Ruskin neither.makes Art and the cultivation of Beauty a 
matter of ttself-realization" nor a complete and sufficient "way 
of life," but instead of realization of the Divine Being and a 
part, but only a part, of our service of the Divine Being, will 
not his doctrine be found entirely conformable to the views of 
Catholic theology and philosophy? The answer to that question is 
not an easy one to make. 
Now the theory of Beauty and its place in our lives to whic 
e may say Catholic philosophers in general subscribe, basically 
that of St. Thomas, is not the opinion of Ruskin. Because they 
differ, rather than contradict each other, the two, perhaps, can l be reconciled. Let the most fundamental base of the estion be 
. '6E ~ken first and the two opinions compared. 
l 
'St. Thomas and most 
of the scholastics define the essence of Beauty as a splendor or 
resplendentia, or clari tas, or perfectio of a being's forma, that 
-
is, of its nature, its very being. 1 Ruskin makes nothing of sucb 
a suggestion of ideality, but places the essential of beauty in 
the creature's imaging of its Creator. So far Ruskin and the 
scholastics differ quite plainly. But they not only differ, but 
they also agree; each makes concessions to the other. 
No scholastic philosopher, no Catholic theologian, but would 
admit that every being necessarily is created in the image of the 
Creator: the Creator and Infinite Being contains eminenter ever~ 
perfection that is found in the creature. This much of Ruskin 
they would all admit. That this image constitutes beauty there 
are some scholastics to agree, but most would not. With St. 
Thomas they would say that to the forma in which is the image of 
the Creator there must be added a note by which it can be consti-
tuted "formally" beautiful. For, they say, not all things are 
beautiful; men simply do not apply the term to everything. This 
formal element of Beauty is the splendor or claritas or perfectb 
in which the being's "form" shows itself; in other words, it is a 
matter of degree - of the degree of clarity in which the image of 
the Creator shows itself. Hence they admit that every being, by 
virtue of its creation and its reflecting in some way the 
1cf. John Rickaby, S.J., General Metaphysics, pp. 150, 151, or 
P. Coffey, Ontology, p. 202, for the scholastic opinion as gener-
ally taught. 
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1 mally, Beautiful. Now Ruskin, from the tenor of all his work, 
seems to insist on finding Beauty in everything and to do so 
without any qualification only to save his principle that God has 
given us Beauty to help us adore and know Him. Yet he does on 
every page admit that there are degrees in Beauty, he speaks of 
what is ugly, of what emphatically is not beautiful. Taking him 
with all he has to say, one might be justified in saying that he 
is really in agreement with the scholastic view. 
That the scholastic philosophers and theologians do not wit 
Ruskin take Beauty into the service and praise of God as its 
necessary function is another difference on which reconciliation 
is in some degree possible. With what must seem to theologians 
uch surer, more necessary ways of worshipping God, and, in com-
parison with the worship offered Him in the 1~ss and the prayers 
of Christ-ians, with so uncertain, so humanly fallible a means of 
orship as Beauty,- with these in front of them for comparison, 
it is easy to see that the way of Beauty would be ignored, or re-
jected, or at least slighted. Theologians and Catholics gener-
ally would not perhaps contradict Ruskin's view, but rather find 
it unnecessary to the Christian life. 
For, indeed, there is so much in Catholic theology that 
grees with Ruskin on this matter, or perhaps more accurately, 
lays a foundation for agreement. Supernaturally we are to con-
template God face to face, delight in His countenance, praise and 
adore Him, in the beatitude of the heavenly life; that contem-
~lation is to be the essential happiness of Heaven. Similarly~? 
~ 
the natural destiny of man is to liappiness in knowledge of God, 
in a contemplation of Him, not face to face, but by knowledge of 
Him as He shows Himself in His creatures. 
In these last pages no Catholic philosophers have been cite 
for their individual authority or for their original views, and 
with a reason. The Catholic teacher, ordinarily, is wisely de-
pendent on the common opinion of theologians or philosophers in 
any matter that touches God and His divinely revealed religion as 
does such a theory as Ruskin's. Such matters are not for specu-
lation in the class room. Hence it is that no effort has been 
ade here to discover every variety of speculation on the nature 
by Catholic philosophers. Fathers Rickaby and Coffey 
ave been referred to for their dependability in giving sound 
Catholic views, the latter as a professor at Maynooth, the former 
s one of those chosen to do the "Stonyhurst Philosophical 
Series." 
CHAPTER III 
TEE TRUE AND THE GOOD 
It has seemed well to postpone the discussion of certain 
elements of Ruskin's theory that are really presupposed to what 
e have been calling his fundamental concepts. While it seemed 
best to discuss first Ruskin's special contribution and the rea-
son for our interest in him, yet there are presupposed to this 
etaphysical, or ontological, considerations. 
1. 
Metaphysical Presuppositions of Ruskin's Aesthetics, 
These suppositions of Ruskin's are the relations of Beauty 
to the True and the Good. A glance at any treatise on ontology 
y a scholastic philosopher will reveal how intimately connected 
these relations are. For it is appended to the discussion of the 
transcendental attributes of Being - that every being is One, 
rue, and Good - that the reader will find the exposition of the 
eautiful. Is beauty, the philosopher asks, another transcenden-
tal attribute of Being? If not, what relation does it bear to 
ruth and to Goodness? 
Says St. Thomas: 
••• ergo dicendum ~od pulchrum et bonum in subjecto 
quidem sunt idem, quia super eamdem rem fundantur, 
scilicet super formam; et propter hoc bonum laudatur ut 
pulchrum; sed ratione differunt; nam bonum propria 
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respicit appetitum; est enim bonum, quod omnia appetunt 
et ideo habet rationem finis; nam appetitus est quasi 
quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cog-
noscitivam; pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placent; 
unde pulchrum in debita proportions consistit; quia 
sensu delectantur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut 
in sibi similibus; nam et sensu ratio quaedam est; et 
omnia virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per 
assimilationem, similitude autem respicit formam; p~l­
chrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis. 
And again: 
••• pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. 
Cum, enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni 
est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem 
pulchri pertiriet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione 
quietetur appetitus; unde et illi sensu praecipue res-
piciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet 
visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim 
pulchra visibil.ia et pulchros sonos. Insensibilibus 
autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; 
non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic 
patetquod pulchrum addit·supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad 
vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod sim-
pliciter complacet appetitu1; ~ulchrum autem dicatur id 
cujus ipsa apprehensio placet. 
t The first significance of these passages is the repeated 
[ statenent that the Good and the Beautiful differ only logically; 
' 
that the same thing, the same perfection, on account of which an 
object is called "good,"is the basis for calling it "beautiful." 
~he difference is in the aspect of it: viewed as moving the ap-
petite, the will, to possess it, it is called "good"; considered 
as appealing to the cognitive faculties which are satisfied in 
the pleasure of beholding it, it is called "beautiful." 
In these passages there are a number of points made relative 
to the compl~e theory of the beautiful; such as, for instance, 
1
summa Theologica, Para Prima, Q.V., a. 4, ad lum. 
2~. cit.~ Prima Secundae~ Q. XXVII. a. 1. ad 3um. 
that beauty consists in a "due proportion" of the elements of a 
thing; that we do not call those things beautiful which come 
through the less cognitive senses, such as taste and smell; that, 
more important just now, though only implicitly, that the Beauti-
ful is related to the True as it is to the Good. But the state-
ment that it differs only "ratione" from the Good is by all means 
to be stressed. For that complete divorce of the Beautiful, so 
as to deny its relations with the Good and the True, is the in-
itial heresy of most modern errors in art. And it is the reason 
for most of the excellence in Ruskin's theory that he did not 
sanction the separation. As William Knight says of him: 
"Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty, that is all ye know on 
earth, and all ye need to know." To a dictum so one-
sided, he would have replied by a direct negative; and 
both in writing and in conversation, from first to last 
he unfolded the distinction between the two provinces, 
clearly an~ unmistakably. But he knew their corres-
pondences. 
Although so many simply identify them as does Keats, yet for a 
long time it has been the more frequent error to go to the other 
extreme. Ruskin, to judge him by his whole work, and like St. 
Thomas, made a logical distinction between them - and saved him-
self. 
That the teaching of St. Thomas on this matter, as on most, 
is the common opinion among scholastic philosophers, and that it 
ay, perhaps, be clearer for the repetition, the explanation of 
Father Coffey is given: 
----------------------------------------------------------------------· 1 Op. cit., p. 69. 
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Truth and Goodness characterize reality as related to 
intellect and will. Intimately connected with these 
notions is that of the beautiful • • • 
But the ~ood pleases us and affects us agreeably. 
Is the beautiful then identical with the good? No; the 
really beautiful is indeed always good; but not every-
thing that is good is beautiful • • • The owner of an 
art treasure may derive pleasure from his sense of pro-
prietorship; but this is distinct from esthetic plea~ 
that may be derived by others, no less than by himself, 
from the mere contemplation of those objects. Esthetic 
pleasure is disinterested; it springs from the mere 
contemplation of an object as beautiful; whereas the 
pleasure that springs from the object as good is an in-
terested pleasure, a pleasure of possession. No.doubt . 
the beautiful is really identical with the good, though 
logically distinct from the latter • • • 
But if esthetic pleasure is derived from contempla-
tion, is not this identifying the beautiful with the 
true, and supplanting art by science? Again the conse-
quence is inaQmissible; for not every pleasure peculiar 
to knowledge is esthetic; there is a pleasure in seek-. 
ing and discovering truth, the pleasure which gratifies 
the scholar • • • The really beautiful is indeed always 
true, but it cannot well be maintained that all truths 
are beautiful • • • 
• • • the scientist's pleasure proper 
sively in discovering truth, whereas that 
lies in contemplating something imagined, 
• • • 
And again: 
lies exclu-
of the artist 
conceived 
That the works of God in general are beautiful can-
not be denied ••• But while creatures, by revealing 
their own beauty, reflect the Uncreated beauty of God 
in the precise degree which He has willed from all 
eternity, it cannot be said that they all realize the 
beauty of their Divine Exemplars according to His pri-
mary purpose and decree. Since there is physical and 
moral evil in the universe, since there are beings 
which fail to realize their ends, to attain to the per-
fection of their nature, it follows that these beings 
are not beautiful. In so far forth as they have real 
being, and the goodness of perfection which is identi-
cal with their reality, it may be admitted that all 
real beings are fundamentally beautiful; for goodness 
or perfection is the foundation of beauty • • • in 
Ontology, pp. 192-196. 
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its nature be formally beautiful, it must actually show 
forth by the clearness of its proportions and the har-
mony of its activities the fulness of its natural per-
fections ••• this is not universally verified • ~ • 
hence we must infer that formal1beauty is not a trans-cendental attribute of reality. 
To summarize: Beauty is identified with the Good and the 
~ruein so far as it is a matter for cognition and for the facul-
ties of appetition; it is, however, different from them logically 
in that it is not a matter of the discovery of truth, nor of 
~ossession of the good, but gives satisfaction in contemplation. 
Fundamentally, or radically, every thing, just as it is true and 
good, is beautiful; but it is formally beautiful only wten its 
perfections have a certain distinction, clarity, or splendor. 
And Beauty therefore is something objective, not a state or mere 
activity of the mind, but identified with Truth and Good in the 
reality outside the mind. 
With all the points that Father Coffey makes, Ruskin is in 
substantial agreement. In spite of his explicit assertion that 
the ~erception of Beauty is not intellectual but moral, the whole 
tenor of his writings shows that he never believed it anything 
else than intellectual. Particular statements of Ruskin and the 
terms he uses make him appear inconsistent with himself and with 
the scho.lastic doctrine reviewed above; yet again a consideration 
of his whole exposition will likely prove him in agreement with 
scholastic metaphysics. 
~---------------·----------------------------------------------------1 
1 Op. cit., pp. 202, 203. 
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The difficulties arise as soon as he defines the nature of 
our perceptions of the Beautiful. He says at the beginning of 
the second chapter of the second volume of Modern Painters, 1 "I 
~holly deny that the impressions of beauty are in any way sensual 
they are neither sensual nor intellectual, but moral." La.dd re-
IPeatedly reports his teaching as if he read him to assert that 
~eauty was essentially something emotional. Now if impressions 
of beauty are neither sensual (a term confusing in itself, for 
rvvhich the scholastic would substitute "sensible" without changing 
~uskin's meaning) nor intellectual, how can they involve Truth? 
~ow can they be representative of the Divine Being? assimilations 
pf it? And again, what does "moral" mean here? Does it refer to 
an act of the will as the scholastic would suppose? Or is it 
merely emotional, as Ladd seems to have gathered in his reading 
of Ruskin? And finally, what is a "moral" impression? Is this 
"moral" impression, which seems to be an emotional experience, 
enough to lead a man to the Good? 
Yet along with these very confusing terms we find Ruskin 
speaking of the "contemplation 11 and the "perception" of Beauty, 
~nd since what is received is the reflection of God's perfections 
in creatures, we come to the conclusion that Ruskin really did 
believe that the impressions were first of all sensible and then 
intellectual, and therefore involved the True; and that by des-
cribing the impressions as "moral" he could only have been re-
~~orks, Vol. IV, p. 142. 
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garding the will as in some fashion embracing the Good after it 
has been proposed by the intellect and as accompanied in its 
action by emotions. Consistently with this interpretation is the 
general tenor, the implications of all his important principles, 
but he is often enough confusing, either by the carelessness, or 
the very fervor and rapidity of his development, or out of the 
vagueness of his metaphysical background. 
2. 
Truth in Art 
By recognizing; at least implicitly, the relation of the 
Beautiful to the True Ruskin saved himself, it has been said. 
From what was he saved? From errors that have wrought so much 
arm in the arts, especially since his time, but which were at 
even before him. These have been of two kinds - two basic 
errors we may say. 
The one was a revolt from the belief that the Truth is im-
portant; scepticism, idealism, materialism, everything that had 
ade truth seem an idle dream to men, prepared the way for this 
evolt. It was an easy development to assert the complete di-
vorce of Art from Truth, and from the Good as well. Subjectivism 
ecame the rule in Art. The exploitation of personal feelings, 
thoughts, not for the sake of their true illustration of human 
ature, but as mere "self-realization" or "self-eA~ression"; the 
irresponsible playing with ideas, for the mere sake of the "play 
of intellect"; and the encouraging of novelists, dramatists, and 
oets to ut forward their wa 
~tory or play - these were but the more notable fruits of this 
separation of Art from Truth. 
It is true that while Truth was being denied and the possi-
ility of certain knowledge, there was growing a tremendous in-
in Fact as reported by the senses. But the Realism, which 
as its literary phase, was only another way of rejecting Truth; 
be called the school of Fact without Meaning, in its 
heory a mere negation that there was in the world any truth be-
ond the report of our sen·ses. It really was only another phase 
of Subjectivism. 
What is the opposite of this? For what was Ruskin saved? 
ead these sentences of Ruskin: 
Vfuen the entire purpose of art was moral teaching, 
it naturally took truth for its first object, and 
beauty, and the pleasure resulting from beauty for its 
second. 
That is to say, in all they did, the old artists 
endeavored in one way or another to express the real 
facts of the sybject or event, this ·being their chief 
business ••• 
And again: 
••• the simple fact is, that there is a man's life-
time taken up in writing and ornamenting a Bible, as 
the sole end of his art; and that doing this either in 
a book, or on a wall, was the common artist's life at 
the time; the constant Bible reading and Bible thinking 
which this work involved made a man serious and thought 
ful, and a good workman, because he was always express-
ing those feelings which, whether right or wrong, were 
the groundwork of his whole being.2 
1Pre-Raphaelitism,P• 321, Estes edition. 
2 Ibid., p. 32J. 
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vVhile Ruskin in the first of these passages speaks of Beauty 
as separate from Truth and Reality - and the statement must be 
read in the light of his fundamental beliefs as an exaggeration 
ror present effect -, it remains that he saw in the medieval ar-
tist one whose eye was on the Truth as something outside him and 
not a "personal view," who believed it simply his job to report 
this Truth as something beautiful, something in the service of 
God. Ruskin saw that to the medieval artist the Incarnation was 
a thing supremely true, supremely good, and supremely worth con-
templating and delighting in. Perhaps Ruskin did not foresee the 
subjectivity of the artist who would paint the grass blue "be-
cause it seemed blue to him," but the error that leads to pink 
elephants was apparent to him. Thus, to Ruskin, the Artist had a 
simple function in life - to make visible, to repeat to men the 
Truth that was their common property, but whose realization could 
always be made stronger and more vital. 
But there are in Ruskin's own expositions of his theory in-
dications that he separated Truth from Beauty as several elements 
of equal independence and value in a work of art. There is the 
sentence just quoted; there are the seven "lamps," among which 
Beauty shines as only one and independently of Truth and all the 
rest~ in the very first volume of Modern Painters where the sev-
eral "ideas" to be had from painting are explained, and where 
. 
Beauty is again numbered only one among others. And that he in-
tended such a separation was the conclusion of Ladd, who writes: 
It will be recalled that up to Ruskin's time art had 
been rimaril concerned with beaut • Even the 
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psychological theories were an attempt to explain the 
beautiful. Ruskin however in his attempt to humanize 
beauty itself by reading into nature and art the indi-
cation of moral states, broadened the theoretical scope 
of natural beauty; moreover, he brought into art two 
other classes of feelings, ideas of Truth and of Rela-
tion; these became increasingly important • • • Beauty 
became merely one of Art's concerns, and not the most 
important one.l 
And again: 
Ruskin's theory ••• is also the first to emphasize 
true impressions rather than formal beauty as a primary 
concern and thus to ~reak the traditional bonds of 
beauty worship • • • . 
Taking note of the first volume of Modern Painters, he says: 
Ruskin's avoiding of Locke's metaphysics ••• yet tak-
ing over ••• five categories of Truth, Beauty, Power, 
Imitation, Relation from Locke, got into difficulties 
he never cleared up • • • "Ideas of Truth" remained for 
Ruskin very much what Locke meant by simple ideas. As 
applied to art, "Ideas of Truthn are the foundation ma-
terial derived from sense perception. In just this, 
"Ideas of Beauty" correspond without exact metaphysical 
precision to Locke's 11complex ideas" of modes or sub-
stances. "Ideas of Relation" are the simple or complex 
ideas brought together either in "considering or com-
paring." 11 Ideas of Imitation" are nothing more to 
Ruskin than a persuasion that an image is true when it 
isn't ••• 3 
Ladd's understanding of these "ideas" seems at least inade-
quate when he supposes Truth, Beauty, Relation to be so many 
equal and independent elements. But Ruskin is not very careful 
to clear up the misunderstanding that comes of such divisions as 
~e makes. Yet there is revealed in Ruskin's exposition of these 
"ideas" and similar groupings of Truth, Beauty, Power, and so 
1 Op. cit., p. 336. 
2 1£.!£.' p. 339. 
3 Ibid • , p • 37 • 
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higher unity around the concept of Beauty. 
The ideas of Beauty and Relation refer to one and the same 
thing, perceived differently; those of Beauty are received, we 
would say, subconsciously, or as Ruskin says, instinctively and 
without reflection of the intellect, so that he calls this kind 
of perception "moral"; 1 those of Relation are the perceptions re-
ceived by the reflective activity of the one contemplating. Ladd 
correctly describes these latter as "thoughts" and as "ideas 
brought together in considering or comparing," though these des-
criptions do not distinguish clearly the difference from ideas of 
~eauty which he describes, taking Ruskin too literally, as "moral 
~motions," and as "complex ideas of modes or substances," what-
~ver that may mean. Incidentally it may here be seen what con-
IPusion Ruskin introduces by calling all these "ideas": for we tber 
~et, "ideas of thoughts" and "ideas of complex ideas of modes." 
Again, the ideas of Truth and Imitation should be understood 
~together as the right and the wrong of one and the same matter. 
~hey are not two equal and independent elements in Art, while 
~eauty is a third. Ladd calls the former "foundation material de 
rived from sense perception" and "facts"; Ruskin calls them per-
ceptions of "the faithfulness of such a statement," i.e. of the 
racts of nature. As Ruskin understan~it the relation of such 
Pruth to Beauty is that of the foundation, or we may say the 
l ~orks, Vol. III, pp. 109, 110. 
condition under which Beauty is. 
'( ';; 
And it is just this relation we 
must insist on: so that Beauty is not simply a less important 
element in Ruskin's art theory and Truth the greater, but Truth 
is the foundation or condition of the artist's good work. 1 And 
it's well to recall here the scholastic view that Truth and 
Beauty are one and the same thing, only ratione distinct. But 
Ladd does not indicate any such connection between the ideas of 
~ruth and Beauty. Nor does he see the relation between the ideas 
of Truth and Imitation, describing the latter as "false impres-
sions" and the "persuasion that an image is true when it isn't," 
descriptions which entirely miss the point of Ruskin who opposes 
Imitation to Truth as the wrong condition or foundation of Beauty. 
"Whenever anything looks like what it is not ••• whenever 
the work is seen to resemble something which we know it is not, 
we receive an idea of imitation."2 He compares the two, Truth 
and Imitation, not in their definition, but in the effect pro-
duced: 
••• the mind in receiving one of the former of Truth 
dwells upon its own conception of the fact, or form, of 
feeling stated, and is occupied only with the qualities 
and character of that fact or form ••• all the while 
totally regardless of the signs or symbols by which the 
notions of it has been conveyed. These signs have no 
pretence • • • they bear their message simply and cleaP 
ly, and it is that message which the mind takes from 
them, dwells upon, regardless of the language in which 
it is delivered. But the mind, in receiving an idea of 
imitation, is wholly occupied in finding out that what 
has been suggested to it is not what it appears to be 
••• it derives its pleasure, not from the contempla-
tion of a truth, but from the discovery of a falsehood; 
~Works, Vol. III, pp. 136, 137. 
3
,Ibid., p. 100. 
'Ibid. n. 108. 
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Four of these ""ideas" have now been seen reduced to this 
formula: Truth is related to Beauty as its necessary condition. 
There remains the "idea of Power," the perception of the power 
and skill and labor of the artist in his work. That it can be 
reduced to a part or phase of Beauty itself may be doubted, un-
less we take these words of Ruskin as doing so: "that beauty and 
difficulty go together" 1 and "wherever power of any kind or de-
gree has been exerted, the marks ••• are stamped upon its re-
sults.2 
Again we may explain Ruskin's enumerating Beauty as a separ-
ate element in art along with Truth and others, by recalling how 
terms are often used and carefully defined by scholastic writers-
how frequently a term is defined, first in ttsensu strictissimo," 
then in "sensu stricto," and finally in "sensu lato." So seems 
Ruskin to use the term Beauty and understand by it, first of all, 
the whole matter of Art, and again, a very limited kind of per-
ceptions, the subconsciously grasped image of God in creation. 
In this latter sense, it is only one of several elements in the 
whole work of Art. 
In conclusion then, it may be said that, according to Ruskin 
Truth is not separate from and unrelated to Beauty; neither is it 
the same; it is very much as St. Thomas would say "ratione 
differens." 
1 Ibid., p. 95. 
2 1.£!9... ' p • 98. 
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3. 
Morality in Art. 
It has been said that Ruskin recognized the relation between 
Beautiful and the Good: that they are the same reality with a 
ogical difference, different aspects of the same thing. Roughly 
his phase of the discussion corresponds to Ruskin's notion of 
orality in art; and, indeed, it would seem the most important 
of all. 
But to speak of "morality in art," and especially of Ruskin' 
heory of it, can be very misleading. Ruskin himself used the 
erm "moral" constantly, yet, it does not seem, with full justice 
thought. The objection to it, voiced in an earlier chapte 
be enlarged on. 
First of all, to most people "morality" refers to the expli-
matter of the Ten Commandments, and especially and almost ex-
lusively to one of them. It does not refer to life as a whole, 
of life," the cant phrase adopted in the preceding chap 
to denominate what Ruskin was talking about. For instance, 
many people would suspect that by "morality" Ruskin intended 
rimarily that praise of God inspired by the revelation of Him in 
reated Beauty? Or that it extended so far as to involve the 
conomic principle of competition? 
Again, to most people "morality" looks to the service of God 
xclusively as a matter of duty or obligation, and that imposed 
der pain of eternal misery, and to be fulfilled in the fear of 
How many would think to include in it all that is done 
~'~[.imply out of love for God, the works of supererogation that 8 
r come under the "counsels," or that are considered in themselves 
"indifferent" and yet can be used in His service? How many woul 
l 
think of these acts as done in joy? in the delight of contempla-
tion? Yet to all these does Ruskin's "way of life" extend. 
A third mistake would be common, indeed. To many "morality 
in art" means "influencing men to do good." They are thinking of 
the "moral" to the pious tale, to the uplifting characters and 
thoughts they meet in books. And opposed to this influence for 
good, they thiru{ of that whole complexus of things prohibited by 
the "Code of the Legion of Decency." Yet Ruskin scarcely con-
siders the possibility of such an influence, and, if memory 
serves, is very doubtful that Art has such an influence. It is 
not Art as an influence to good, to the proper service of God an 
love of our neighbor, that he values, but Art and the contempla-
tion of the Beautiful as the very act of that worship and service 
These are harmless misunderstandings of "morality."But there 
is one that is very dangerous. It is probably current among men 
educated in the secular universities and accepting the religious 
and philosophical views of those who have lost all touch with 
true Christianity. It supposes that morality is a matter of emo 
tion. Inasmuch as Ruskin denied that the perception of beauty 
was either sensible or intellectual, but insisted that it was 
"moral," and that he frequently speaks of these perceptions as 
feelings, it is easy to accuse him of this error. 
Ladd, who may be cited as an example of the man with current 
83 
religious and philosophical views, first of all seems scandalized 
that Ruskin did not quite define "moral" as 'proper emotion," or 
"respectable feelings" - definitions which he puts in quotation 
~arks as if the words of his university masters. But at various 
times Ladd seems to be sure that Ruskin meant only "respectable 
feelings." He says: 
••• suppose also we grant that art is a language, 
which has emotions as its principal concern,for this is 
implicit from the first to the last of Ruskin's pages. 
\Vhat then does art do? Does it primarily express this 
emotion, or does it convey its truths?l 
After a lift of our metaphysical eye-brow at "truths" of "emo-
tion," we read again: 
Theoretically, however, his position was very important 
because by relying upon instinctive moral elements 
••• emotion itself, which on the one hand is the es-
sence of the appreciative aspect of art ••• 2 
Again, in ascribing to Ruskin the desire to avoid "intellec-
tualism" by accepting the symbolism of Plato - the doctrine that 
the ektypes in nature have been reduced to material being from 
the universals, or prototypes -he speaks of Ruskin's "emotional 
in reading of moral metaphor."3 That the metaphor which Ruskin 
found in creation was "moral" and read into it by "emotion" is a 
hard saying to understand. Probably he intends by his opposition 
of "emotional in reading" to "intellectualism" to say that while 
Plato supposed in a material thing a real foundation for its 
1 Qp. cit., p. 334. 
2 Ibid. , p. 332 . 
3 lli_g,., p. 189. 
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rf.ymbolizing the ideal prototype, Ruskin found no real basis in 
creation for his metaphor, but produced it entirely out of his 
own being by some process he calls "moral" or "emotional inread-
" ing. 
Now such an error is not to be charged to Ladd with a great 
deal of indignation, nor, if he really accepted it, to Ruskin 
either; they are innocent victims of their environment. For this 
confusion of emotion with morality, and of both with religion, 
as an extensive history in modern times. It can be.traced back 
to the sentimental mysticism in Germany in the eighteenth century 
to the English sentimentalists - novelists and revivalists - to 
ousseau in France, and on down through all the "modernists" that 
the Church and through the Protestant Liberals. But 
owing its history, we need not be surprised that apparently 
usldn made use of some of its terms at least, nor that there are 
critics today who read in him this error. 
To avoid these misunderstandings it would seem better to 
substitute "religion" for "morality," "religious" for "moral," to 
esignate that relation of Art to the Good of which Ruskin makes 
so much. 
First: Art regards the same reality - the supreme Good, God 
and His creation, not simply as the object of the will, but with 
special reference to the cognoscitive faculties, as that reality 
is contemplated. It looks to the knowing of God just as well as 
to~ of service. Now "religion" is that living union with God 
ot only in acts of service, of obedience to His commandments, bu 
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· in our knowledge of Him, and our praise. Hence to describe 
Ruskin's theory as "religious," or to speak of "religion in art" 
obviates the first misunderstanding. 
Secondly: Reli~ion includes all those matters of the "coun-
sels," and even of "indifferent" acts, which most people do not 
consider a matter of morality because they are not ofobligation; 
it includes all that is done in joy, gratitude, and out of love 
rather than fear. 
Perhaps the term "religion" would be open to the same misin-
terpretation of being "emotional" to those to whom religion is 
moti.on, and of being merely a "good influence." But it certain-
liable to misunderstanding. At any rate let it pe 
derstood that Ruskin's "morality" means simply that looking to 
as the supreme Good, and to that Good in created being which 
Thomas said is only logically distinct from Beauty. 
Surely one of the most startling features of Ruskin's theory 
though indeed it is only a corrolary of the basic teaching des-
cribed above, is that for the right appreciation of the Beautiful 
calls for a morally good man, or better, for a religious 
n; and for the creation of great works of art, a.morally good, 
or religious, artist. That people aesthetically inclined and 
that artists generally conform to such demands seems too much 
gainst the facts, and consequently Ruskin's theory meets with a 
smile. But let us hear his argument, taken from the fifteenth 
chapter of the second volume of Modern Painters, and see how he 
aces the facts: 
~---------,::rz:n 
••• If it be the moral part of us to which Beauty ad 
dresses itself, how does it happen, it will be asked, 
that it is ever found in the works of impious men, and 
how is it possible for such to desire or conceive it. 
On the other hand, how.does it happen that men in 
high state of moral culture are often insensible to th 
influence of material beauty; and insist feebly upon i 
as an instrument of soul culture? 
••• the right determination of these two ques-
tions is indeed the whole end and aim of my labour 
••• namely, the proving that no supreme power of art 
can be attained by impious men, and that the neglect o 
art, as an interpreter of divine things, has been of 
evil consequence to the Christian world • 
• • • I have, throughout the examination of Typical 
Beauty, asserted our instinctive sense of it; the mora 
meaning of it being only discoverable by reflection. 
Now this instinctive sense of it varies in intensity 
among men, being given, like the hearing ear in music, 
to some more than to others; and if those to whom it i 
given in large measure be unfortunately men of impious 
or unreflecting spirit, it is very possible that the 
perception of beauty should be by them cultivated on 
principles merely aesthetic, and so lose their hallow-
ing power • • • There is in all works of such men a 
taint and stain, and jarring discord, darker and loude 
in proportion to the moral deficiency; of which the 
best proof and measure are to be found in their treat-
ment of the human form • • • of which the highest 
beauty has been ~ained only once, and then by no sys-
tem-taught painter, but by a most holy Dominican mo~~ 
of Fiesole • • • 
But secondly, it is to be noted that it is neither 
by us ascertainable what moments of pure feeling or as 
piration may occur to men of minds apparently cold and 
lost ••• It seems to me that much of what is great 
••• has been wrought by those who neither intended 
nor knew the ~ood they did • • • 
• • • I proceed, therefore, shortly to reply to 
that other objection urged against the real moral dig-
nity of the faculty, that many Christian men seem to be 
themselves without it, and even to discountenance it i 
others • 
• • • this falsity is not wholly and in terms ad-
mitted, yet it seems to be partly and practically so i 
much of the doing and teaching even of holy men, who i 
the recommending of the love of God to us, refer but 
seldom to those things in which it is most abundantly 
and immediately shown; though they insist much on His 
giving of bread and raiment and health ••• they re-
quire us not to thank Him for that glory of his works 
which he has permitted us alone to perceive; they tell 
'd'l 
us often to meditate in the closet ••• but they ex-
hibit not the duty of delight • • • It seems to me that 
the real sources of bluntness in the feelings towards 
the splendour of the grass and glory of the flower, are 
less to be found in ardour of occupation, than in the 
turning of the eye at intervals of rest too selfishly 
1 within • • • 
These passages are by no means strong enough to establish 
hiS case; but at least they indicate that Ruskin was not blind to 
the facts. 
The lengthy analysis omitted does much to establish that the 
untrained saint in Fra Angelico reached a beauty achieved by no 
man less spiritual. How it may be that impious men have their 
moments of perception of spiritu~l beauty because they are not 
wholly bad, is made clear enough. Why it is that many good and 
holy men are wholly unappreciative of beautiful things, may, or 
!may not, be explained by their "turning the eye too selfishly 
~ithin." Masters of the ascetical life - a thing which Ruskin 
professed himself to disapprove - might be willing to grant him 
something, but with many distinctions • • • Of how the percep-
tion of true beauty is learned by a process of ascesis indeed, 
of the creation of a humble and clean heart, Ruskin has already 
been quoted from Chapter III of the same volume. 
4. 
Did Ruskin's Aesthetics Change with His Religious Beliefs? 
If the religious element is so strong in Ruskin's theory, it 
~auld seem reasonable to suppose that the changes in Ruskin's 
1 Works, Vol. IV, pp. 210-218. 
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• religious beliers would mean serious changes in his theories 
of Art and Beauty. If this supposition were true, the Catholic 
teacher might, of course, still find it worth while to read such 
of the work as was written while the author was under Christian 
inspiration, and to let the rest go. He wou~d nevertheless be 
happier if he could see that the whole body of Ruskin's thought 
remained fairly consistent - consistent enough so that his own 
commentary and correction - necessary at all stages - would not 
beco:me too CU.."!lbersome. And this consistency seems discoverable. 
Ruskin, when he was professing to deny Christian revelation and 
when he later became what one 'nan calls a Deist, another a Human-
itarian, and others a Christian without Church or dogma, does not 
recall what he wrote as a proressed Christian, except one notion 
that he takes back only half-heartedly. In fact such a consis-
tency is discoverable in his work that it suggests that Ruskin's 
religious views were pretty much of one piece, that he was after 
all a believer even when he most forcibly announced his loss of 
faith. Wilenski says of his religious belief that it "never fun-
damentall.y varied all his life. nl Ladd sunnnarizes the matter 
thus: 
1 
All through his life Ruskin held a general belief 
in the existence of a Ruler and Judging Spiritual Power 
••• The changes in the nature of the deity, however, 
are not a little astonishing. 
In 1846 the presence of a watchful God hovers over 
••• morality at this time is distinctly religious and 
puritanical, though there is no great emphasis on fear. 
Op. cit., p. 329. 
rr !j~ Praise and awe, however, have actually been carried in 
to the esthetic system. But in 1862 a profound change 
has occurred. Ruskin writes to his father: "· •• so 
far from its being difficult or strange for a man to 
hold his morality when he has lost what is called in 
modern language religion, I believe that all true 
nobleness and worthiness only comes out when people 
cease to think of another world. The relations of God 
to us have been entirely broken and obscured by human 
lies." 
In 1860, however, the influence of Carlyle ••• 
along with the breakdown of his earlier theology ••• 
discovers the transformation of the naturalist's mys-
ticism into that of the impulsive humanitarian ••• 
Ruskin declares that neither God can be manifest nor 
nature revealed except through first knowing the human 
spirit - the man himself ••• nKnow thyself; for 
through thyself only thou canst know God." Thus the 
concept of the awful father had given way to that of 
divine benevolence, immanent in man ••• So too had 
the clafification of a relation between religion and 
morals. He had set aside the religion of fear and 
tried to rid his morality of negative, ascetic and su-
pernatural notions ••• "There are many religions, 
but only one morality." 
One may say that although Ruskin believed in the 
existence of a~iritual power, his conception of the 
nature of this deity was a matter of change. But the 
conviction of the instinctiveness, naturalness, and 
universality of a moral sense, "fastened," as he said, 
"in the hearts of men," was permanent with him and 
necessary to all his conclusi£n on architecture, esthe 
tics, history, and economics. 
In this account it is to be noted that Ruskin all his life 
believed in a "Ruling and Judging Spiritual Power", -a personal 
God, therefore. Now God scarcely appears otherwise even in what 
was written in his most believing days; there God never appears 
instituting a supernatural order; nor is His direct revelation of 
Himself alluded to as in any way affecting the theory of Beauty; 
even then Ruskin taught only a "natural theology," easily made 
1Qp. cit., pp. 163-165. 
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cceptable to one believing in the supernatural religion because 
the latter is in no wise contradicted. What is changed in this 
otion of God and His works when Ruskin "loses his Faith"? At 
one time, Ladd says, his regard for God was puritanical, though 
ith no emphasis on fear, that it was full of praise and awe; at 
nether time Ruskin would sever norality from all dependence on a 
ope of heaven, and he believed that our relations with God have 
een obscured by human lies. Strictly there is no opposition 
here at all. In the first place it is hard to conceive that 
Ruskin ever was puritanical; his whole theory of praising God in 
delizht and contemplation of Him in creation seems quite unpuri-
tanical, and, as Ladd says, without emphasis on fear. After the 
supposed loss of Faith, he retained all his old notions of the 
relations of man to God, except that he would indeed withdraw 
from man all hope of heaven, all fear of hell, as the motive for 
maintaining these relations. But when did he in his aesthetics 
ever preach such hope or such fear? Are they implied in the 
praise of God through contemplation of nature? Not only had he 
never preached them while he was a believer, but he never denied 
them afterwards; he but asserted that "true" virtues only come 
out when other motives are present. This is not true indeed, as 
it stands; a Catholic would say that the highest perfection of 
virtue only comes out when the motive of love is also present. 
But with this qualification, he can maintain his original posi-
tion that Beauty helps us to serve God out of love rather than of 
fear. 
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The transformation, especially as it was under the influence 
of Carlyle, and as it embraced the "Gospel of Work," did put more 
stress on good works than did his original Calvinism; and Ruskin 
does overstress it, putting aside Faith and the worship of a vis-
ible Church, and so far he cannot be followed; but his is the 
partial truth, the obscured truth of the fallible mind unprotectec 
by infallible religion. 
In another place, Ladd, after saying that "He is the apothe-
osis of contradiction in the period," specifies that: 
At one moment he is discovering moral law, almost a 
pantheistic deity in the world of natural phenomena; at 
another he is disinclined toward the "moral of land- 1 scape" in the interests of hard work or human nature. 
Granted that in Ruskin's own mind there was a shift of the re-
ligious beliefs behind these two statements, yet in themselves 
they are not contradictory; in fact the two appear together as 
complementary parts of his doctrine; - the praise of God as seen 
in Nature and the learning from it to live, to "work hard," the 
Gospel of Work." And again, that a man brought up in the Protes-
tant tradition of electing his own beliefs should have been 
shocked to find himself "At one moment quoting Richard Hooker; 
at another pleased with Rousseau ••• " is hardly to be expected, 
as Ladd seems to in this summary of Ruskin's inconsistencies. 
There too he says of Ruskin that "almost simultaneously he 
is founding beauty on sensual pleasure, admitting the relativity 
of taste and dedicating art to the glory of God about whom he 
19n. it --~-=c~., p. 321. 
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admitted he knew little." It is this sort of criticism that 
drives a reader almost to the conclusion that Ruskin was never 
inconsistent at all. "The founding of beauty on sensual pleasure' 
means in Ruskin what it means to any Catholic metaphysician: the 
senses provide the data of our higher cognitions, and of our per-
ceptions of the beautiful; they do not constitute its essence; 
such teaching is not self-contradictory, nor does it contradict 
any "dedication of art to the glory of God." And where is the 
contradiction in "dedicating art to the glory of God" while ad-
~itting that he knew little about Him? Enough is known to the 
Christian to make such dedication most reasonable, if not logi-
cally necessary. 
Wilenski has some interesting remarks on the inconsistencies 
that are supposed to have grown out of Ruskin's changes of re-
ligious belief. He says: 
I have already given his own explanation of his con-
tinued use of Biblical quotations after 1860. Here we 
must realize that from an early period this was largely 
automatic - a form of perseveration. But his use of 
these quotations in the 'sixties was also due to other 
factors • • • In ordinary social life he did not like 
to make himself conspicuous • • • and he was unaffected 
in conversation because he was always unconsciously at-
tempting to appear normal and to conceal his mental 
ills • • • But on the lecture platform • • • the parade 
of his Biblical erudition satisfied his exhibitioriism.l 
One may reasonably ask whether the parade of psychological 
~rudition in this confessed amateur - "automatic," "form of per-
severation," "exhibitionism," this talk of suppressing the 
[Op. cit., p. 364. 
: 
l 
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«mental ills" - may1not mean that in Ruskin his religious belief~ 
were not altogether lost, that though he was scarcely aware of it 
he still believed the Bible the Word of God? If we are to be 
psychological analysts, can we not discover, or at least propose 
as an interesting hypothesis, that Ruskin's religious beliefs 
"automatically perseverated" (I suppose one must not say per-
severed)? Wilenski continues the same charge: 
This RuskinW1o had said in the Seven Lamps that all 
questions ••• were most conclusively solved by refer-
ence to God's Revelation ••• had reached a point in 
1867 where he admits that he deduces the principles of 
action, first from the laws and facts of nature - i.e. 
on the basis of his personal experience • • • and then 
reinforces his precepts from the Bible which some of 
his audience think the Word of God.l 
Although there is no inconsistency in deducing principles now 
from the Bible and now from experience and the laws of nature, aE 
we see it done commonly by Catholic theologians and philosophers 
there is involved here what might well appear to be hypocrisy in 
Ruskin's quoting Scripture to his audiences after he had ceased 
to believe in it. Ruskin openly confessed to doing just this. 
Now he often uses hard words of himself: no critic is more con-
temptuous than at times he is of himself. Perhaps this is one oj 
those occasions, and why should we not be good amateur psycholo-
gists and, refusing to take him at his word, seek in his sub-
conscious the true cause of his continuing to quote the Word of 
God, namely, that he still believed in it? 
Perhaps the most obvious of Ruskin's supposedly many 
1 IQ!£., P• 343. 
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inconsistencies is that in his attitude toward the qualificationf 
of the great artist. Along with his conviction that Beauty was 
essentially the reflection of divine attributes in creation it 
was only reasonable to suppose that it would be best grasped by 
those whose purity of heart and spiritual strength made them most 
ready to apprehend such a revelation. And so he spoke in his be-
lieving years. Wilensld records this change in religious belief 
and aesthetic theory as taking place together in a year of 
crisis, 1858,1 quoting on the one hand four of Ruskin's later 
comments on the critical incident, and on the other, the state-
ments of Ruskin's changed view of the artist. 
The occasion was a day in Turin, in 1858, when Ruskin passed 
from viewing the art of Paul Veronese in the Turin Gallery to 
hearing a Waldensian preacher in a small chapel of that sect in 
the same town. Wilenski quotes the Diary for 1858:2 
Is this mighty Paul Veronese ••• a servant of the 
devil? and is this poor little wretch in a tidy black 
tie ••• a servant of God? 
Then from letter 76 in Fors, of April, 1877: 
In 1858 it was, with me, Protestantism or nothing; the 
crisis of the whole turn of my thoughts • • • when fron 
Paul Veronese's "Queen of Sheba," and under quite over-
whelming sense of his God-given power, I went away to a 
Waldensian Chapel, where a little squeaking ••• was 
preaching • • • that they were the only children of Goc 
in Turin • • • I came out of the chapel in sum of twen-
ty years of thought a conclusively ~-converted man 
••• what is left? You will find what was left, as, 
in much darkness and sorrow of heart I gathered it ••• 
1 Ibid., p. 231. 
2 Ibid., pp. 338-340. 
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variously taught in my books, written between 1858 and 
1874. 
once more, from Praeterita, Vol. III, Chapter I, paragraph 23, 
written in 1888: 
" 
. . 
••• that hour's meditation in the gallery of Turin 
only concluded the course of thought which had been 
leading me to such end through many years. There was 
no sudden conversion possible ••• But that day my 
evangelical beliefs were put away to be debated no 
more ••• 
Whereupon the irrepressible Wilenski comments that this 
• was not a sudden revolt ••• but a manic desire to pro-
claim his loss of faith," and ends the history thus: 
When he recovered from the excitement of the defiance, 
his earlier personal religion became a simple belief ir. 
God and in a Religion of Humanity - a religion which 
served the Creator by doing kindness and justice on 
earth ••• concepts of the Fall, of Redemption, of 
Eternal Punishment and Immortal life are all elimin-
ated. 
Let us see now, after his critics have made the most of the 
matter, what changes in his theory of Art are really involved in 
this loss of faith in a Christian sect: First of all, he still 
believes in God, though he rejects any Church and its dogmas; but~ 
as has been already remarked there is little in Ruskin's early 
teaching that requires anything more than a belief in a personal 
God; his dogmatic beliefs did not much contribute to his philoso-
phy of Art. It is not for loss of dogmatic belief that any chang~ 
came in that philosophy. Unrelated to this religious change, but 
parallel to it and arising from the same occasion, there did come 
a change in his notion of what the artist must be. He saw on the 
one hand the glorious power of Veronese, the artist, perhaps the 
~pagan; 
' 
on the other he saw the pitiable weakness, the narrowness 
of the professed minister of Christianity, the "spiritual" man. 
He became confused. Still believing in God, he felt there must 
be something God-like in the artist, but this something was not 
explainable by the pietism of the Waldensian minister. 
Here, with Wilenski, we may quote from Ruskin's "Notes on 
the Turin Gallery" from the Diary, 1858: 
Certainly it seems intended that strong and frank ani-
mality, rejecting all tendency to asceticism, monachis , 
pietism, should be connected with the strongest intel-
lects ••• Dante, indeed, is severe ••• But Homer, 
Shakespere, Tintoret, Veronese, Titian, Michael Angelo 
• • • are all boldly Animal • • • Francia and Angelico 
and all the purists, however beautiful, are poor weak 
creatures in comparison. I don't understand it; one 
would have thought that purity gave strength, but it 
doesn't ••• It is a great mystery. I begin to be-
lieve we are all mistaken together - Paul Veronese in 
letting his power waste into wantonness, and the re-
ligious people in mistaking their weakness and dullnes 
for seriousness and piety. 
After all, is this so new a thought in Ruskin? so great a 
change? He struggled with these same difficulties years earlier 
in the second volume of Modern Painters; and the solutions then 
found are not invalid: that saintly people have their limita-
tions; that impious men are not wholly evil; that there is still 
in them the Mirror, though it is Dark - that mirror in which man 
reads the image of God. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSKIN' S VIEWS: ARCHITECTURE 
Just as the central thought of Ruskin's work may be found 
in the chapter on "The Nature of Gothic" in the Stones of VenicE!_, 
so the decisive step toward that central position was taken afte 
he had completed the second volume of Modern Painters in 1846. 
His interest and attention, for one reason and another, turned t 
architecture, and after three years of intensive study of the 
buildings of Venice, northern Italy, and northern France he pub-
lished in 1849 The Seven Lamps of Architecture. It was to be in 
his studies of architecture, rather than in his first interest 
in painting, that he was to realize fully what was scarcely more 
than implicit in his early writing: that vital connection betwee 
art and the whole social order, the exposition of which is his 
peculiar claim to greatness. And here in the Seven Lamps that 
view begins to take definite form. 
He wrote in the introduction: 
••• have long felt convinced of the necessity, in 
order to its ~rchitecture'sl progress, of some deter-
mined effort to extricate from the confused mass of 
partial traditions and dogmata ••• those large prin-
ciples of right which are applicable to every stage an 
style of it ••• some general, and irrefragable laws 
of right - laws which based upon man's nature, not upo 
his knowledge, may possess so far the unchangeableness 
of the one, as that neither the increase nor the 
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imperfection of the other may be able to assault or in-
validate them • • • it has been just said, that there 
is no branch of huma·n work whose constant laws have not 
close analogy with those which govern every other mode 
of man's exertion. But more than this ••• we shall 
find them passing the mere condition of connection or 
analogy, and becoming the actual expression of some ul-
timate nerve fibre of mighty laws which govern the mora 
world ••• and the truth, decision, and temperance, 
which we reverently regard as honourable condition of 
the spiritual being have a representative or derivative 
influence over the works of the hand, the movements of 
the frame and the action of the intellect.l 
The first of these "mighty laws," or ttlamps" to guide, is the 
"Lamp of Sacrifice." 
1. 
"The Lamp of Sacrifice." 
Because it may be taken as the first of those definite steps 
~hich were to march in a direction so peculiarly Ruskin's, "The 
Lamp of Sacrifice" is offered the Catholic teacher to see what he 
~ill make of it. The argument of it is as follows: 
••• of the principles which I would endeavour to de-
velope, which all must be, as I have said, applicable 
to every state and style of the art, some ••• have 
necessarily fuller reference to one kind of building 
than another; and among these I would place first that 
spirit which ••• has nevertheless such especial ref-
erence to devotional and memorlal architecture - the 
spirit which offers for such work precious things, sim-
ply because they are precious • • • as an offering, 
surrendering, and sacrifice of what is to ourselves de-
sirable • • • 
Of this feeling then, there are two distinct forms: 
the first, the wish to exercise self-denial for the 
sake of self-discipline merely • • • 
• • • in the second branch . • • the justice of the 
feeling ••• depends on our answer ••• Can the Deity 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------1 
\vorks, Vol. VIII, pp. 20-23. 
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! be indeed honoured by the presentation to Him of any 
material objects of value ••• ?1 
Ruskin asks, as the sacrifice of Moses was to prefigure the 
Redemption, was it necessary to its completeness as a type that 
it should be costly? should it be the best of the flock? There 
was in these things an awful danger to the Jews as they were so 
much like the sacrifices of the idolatrous, and yet God demanded 
••• for Himself such honours ••• And for what rea-
son? ••• There was but one reason, and that an eter-
nal one, that as His covenant was accompanied with 
some external sign of its continuance ••• so the ac-
ceptance of that covenant might be marked and signified 
by men, in some external sign of their love and obedi-
ence, and surrender of themselves and theimto His 
will; and that their gratitude to Him and continual 
remembrance of Him, might have at once their expressior. 
and their enduring testimony, in the presentation to 
Him, not only of the firstlings of the herd and fold, 
not only of the fruits of the earth and the tithe of 
time, but of all treasures of wisdom and beauty; of the 
thought that invents, and the hand that labours; of 
wealth of wood, and weight of stone; of the strength of 
iron, and the light of gold. 
And let us not now lose sight of this broad and un-
abrogated principle - I might say incapable of being 
abrogated so long as men shall receive earthly gifts 
from God. 
It has been said • • • that a better and more hon-
ourable offering is made to our Master in ministry to 
the poor, in extending the knowledge of His name, in 
the practice of the virtues by which that name is hal-
lowed. Assuredly ••• but let us examine ourselves 
••• The question is not between God's house and His 
poor ••• It is between God's house and ours ••• I & 
not understand the feelings which would arch our own 
gates and pave our own thresholds and leave the church 
with its narrow door and footworn sill ••• I say this 
that the tenth part of the expense which is sacrificed 
in domestic vanities, if not absolutely and meaningles& 
ly lost in domestic discomforts and incumbrances, would 
if collectively offered and wisely employed, build a 
marble church for· every town in England ••• 
I do not want marble churches at all for their own 
~Ibid., pp. 29-53. 
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sake, but for the sake of the spirit that would build 
them. The church has no need of any visible splendour~ 
• • • The simplicity of a pasto~ sanctuary is lo~ier 
than the majesty of an urban temple • • • It is not the 
church we want, but the sacrifice; not the emotion of 
admiration, but the act of adoration; not the gift, but 
the giving ••• 
• • • The payment of those first fruits was never-
theless rewarded • • • by the increase Of those posses-
sions • • • Therefore • • • the arts will never flour-
ish until they have been primarily devoted to that 
service - devoted, both by architect and employer; by 
the one in scrupulous, earnest, affectionate design; b~ 
the other in expenditure at least more frank, at least 
less calculating than that which he would admit in the 
indulgence of his own private feelings ••• There 
would be such an impulse and vitality given to art as 
it has not felt since the thirteenth century ••• 
• • • ours has as constantly the look of money's 
worth, of a stopping short wherev~and whenever we can, 
of a ley compliance with low conditions • • • if you 
cannot afford marble, use Caen stone, but from the best 
bed; and if not stone, brick, but the best brick; pre-
ferring always what is good of a lower order of work or 
material, to what is bad of a higher ••• 
Such is the main argument; there follow some valuable obser-
vations, valuable for the criticism of architecture, but not es-
sential to the main idea. But the essay· closes on a last appli-
cation and reiteration of the idea of sacrifice: 
• • • All else for which the builders sacrificed has 
passed away - all their living interests, and aims, and 
achievements. We know not for what they laboured, and 
we see no evidence of their reward. Victory, wealth, 
authority, happiness - all have departed, though bought 
by many a bitter sacrifice; but of them, and their life 
and their toil upon the earth, one reward, one evidence 
is left to us in those gray heaps of deep-wrought stone 
They have taken with them to the grave their powers, 
their honours and their errors; but they have left us 
their adoration. 
Well, what is the Catho1ic teacher to think of this? 
Surely, he may say, there are few such sustained passages in 
English literature of immediate meaning to him and to those he 
,..- l.Vl. 
teaches. The appositeness to one of his first duties, and of 
every Catholic and Christian, the duty of worship; the mood; the 
imaginative power; the music of its words - all recommend them-
selves to him as something that is at once - to make use of the 
familiar if utterly wrong distinction - at once a great piece of 
literature and an inspiration to Faith. 
But is this first impression to be confirmed by second 
thought on it? After all, has this great passage that distinctly 
Catholic quality, that something beyond a vague 11moral feeling," 
beyond a mere naturalism which would make it equally acceptable 
to the Protestant, to the Deist, to the Pagan? Is there here any 
note of the religious, even of the supernatural, as it has been 
already distinguished from mere morality? Yet, it has. 
For today 11The Lamp of Sacrifice" has its obvious meaning 
only for the Catholic, indeed a meaning for him that apparently 
it could not have had for Ruskin himself, for Ruskin the Evangel-
ical Protestant or Ruskin the Humanitarian. What means the 
building and ador~~ent of a House of God, all the expenditure and 
labor on fine limestone and marble, fine wood, on carving and 
painting and stained glass to the Protestant whose church is at 
most a meetinghouse, where indeed there is the worship of song 
~nd prayer offered to God, but where there is no true sacrifice, 
and where God does not dwell, body and soul, humanity and divin-
ity? What does all this mean to the deist who would worship God 
in Nature and without temple at all? Surely, it would seem to be 
so much empty sound and ttreligious" enthusiasm to any of these. 
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only to the Catholic who can build a true House of God, one whic 
He 'Nill inhabit under the species of bread, one which will house 
the Sacrifice of the Mass, will this mean anything at· all. 
And it is one of the strange things about Ruskin, or the 
s trange, which first of all suggested that something truly 
Catholic might be had from this man, now Evangelical, now of the 
religion of Humanity, that he wrote better tr~n he knew and that, 
as in the "Lamp of Sacrifice," he wrote to the heart of Catholic 
what apparently could have meant little to himself. 
That this spirit of Sacrifice in the architect and painter 
and sculptor and musician is, in concept, a supernatural thing 
need not be asserted. It may be called a dictate of the natural 
reason, unilluminated by God, that man must worship God and 
acknowledge his dependence and God's supreme dominion by offerin 
to Him the best of goods and works; it may be insisted that man, 
outside the influence of God's supernatural aids, has continuall 
and everywhere in the world offered God sacrifices and adorned 
temples in the spirit of sacrifice. But it is also true that 
only to the Catholic is this natural instinct or reasonable ser-
vice joined to a supernatural act of worship - the Sacrifice of 
the Cross mystiRlly repeated in the Mass. It is then to 
Catholics, and only to Catholics, that "The Lamp of Sacrifice" 
carries its fullest meaning. 
It is obvious then how Ruskin shows us one function of the 
Artist in Society, to express in painting and sculpture and arch-
itecture that spirit of sacrifice by which the Christian, as 
~member of the Mystical Body of 
' 
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Christ, represents in his life an 
works that Sacrifice of Christ of \Vhom he is a member: how Ruski 
shows us how Art is dravm as a vital part into that circle of 
Life, a supernatural life which vivifies and elevates all phases 
of the natural life of man. But it is also true that we see her 
a definite step of Ruskin's toward that view of the Artist in 
Society as the laboring man, the craftsman, in the economic 
\Vhat dominated that view v:hen first clearly formulated in 
"The Nature of Gothic" was that the laboring man should not be 
the slave of another's mind but a creative artist or craftsman. 
And it is here in this essay before us that we see how this may 
be and how it may be encouraged. For the essence of this spirit 
of sacrifice is the costliness of the offering of labor of mind 
and of hand; a costliness that cannot be achieved by the econo-
mies of machine production, of the short cuts to sho\vy effects, 
but only by the long labor of many men, each working out some in-
vention of his own in the carving of capitals or niches or the 
figures of saints, in the painting of pictures. 
Such painstaking in our churches alone would require no in-
considerable number of artisans, but the total effect of insist-
ing on it as part of a sacrifice offered to God will, to follow 
the mind of Ruskin, be much greater. For he says, this principle 
"must be • • • applicable to every stage and style of art" al-
though it has a more·immediate reference to art devoted to wor-
ship. As a habit of mind that looks for such work in churches is 
strengthened, it will look for such work in all forms of art and 
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will come to prize whatever has the marks on it of the maker's 
invention and wherever in all the things we use and make this 
element of original design can find place. 
2. 
"The Lamp of Truth" 
One of the most interesting experiences in teaching litera-
ture is the reading with a class of Catholic students - at any 
rate, 1."lith seminarians -of "The Lamp of Truth," the second essa 
of The Seven Lamps of Architecture, in which is developed the 
second principle which architecture must hold by in company with 
all other human activities. It is so interesting an experience 
because Ruskin's ideas here meet an opposition where it might 
least be expected. It is easily pointed out to seminarians that 
here is an idea that must concern them every day of their lives 
in the ministry; that it is fundamental to the beauty of the 
churches in which they will every day minister. 
But when this idea of truth in the building and decoration 
of churches is explained to them by Ruskin, and when they are 
asked to examine from memory the churches with which they are 
familiar and to see how this idea, or principle, has been follow 
ed out in them, there invariably and suddenly appears in the 
class a strong chorus of dissent. They well remember this in-
stance or that of the violation of truth which they have wit-
nessed - the "Gothicn vault done in plaster and spanning, as a 
low ceiling, a nave of sixty feet or more; the "marble" shafts o 
wai 
like them occur to the students at a moment's reflection. But 
they do not recoil now in horror at the indignities shown the 
house of God in the name of architecture! Rather they rise in 
eager defense of what they have learned all their lives to love! 
That altar has always looked so magnificent1 The shafts of the 
nave arcade were so rich in the dim light1 That vault was so 
much like that of a cathedral they had seen picturedl 
But graduall y the idea takes hold; the objections die away; 
perhaps a few years later, the seminarian, now near the end of 
his course, discusses in an academy some phase of liturgy or ec-
clesiastical art, and the principle of truth in architecture ap-
pears now to be taken for granted; and again perhaps, years late 
the one-time seminarian will build a church, or add to, or redec 
orate an old one, and he will insist that the architect with a 
mind for shams - if at that future day such an architect will 
still be at large - submit himself to the limitations of truth-
fulness in his materials and construction. And so the Catholic 
teacher thanks Ruskin for right instruction in so lovely a branc 
of Catholic culture as its art and architecture. 
The substance of this essay is not easy to present. The 
matter is too closely argued to be represented by a summary or a 
series of phrases chosen from the text. And yet this very qual-
ity is ,JV"hat should very much be insisted on in any proper appre-
ciation of Ruskin. He needs some defense against that 
allows him to read into the arts what could not possibly be there 
And that defense can only be made by showing the closeness of 
this areument - whether finally right or wrong - and the detail 
of his analysis. What follows therefore will sketch in very few 
lines his main argument in "The Lamp of Truth," but here and 
there will include his full exposition of a particular point. 
First let him speak for himself: 
••• I would have the Spirit or Lamp of Truth clear ir. 
the hearts of our artists and handicraftsmen, not as if 
the truthful practice of handicrafts could far advance 
the cause of truth, but because I would fain see the 
handicrafts themselves urged by the spurs of chivalry; 
and it is, indeed, marvellous to see what power and 
universality there are in this single principle, and 
how in the consulting or forgetting of it lies1half the dignity or decline ofevery art and act of man. 
It is well to note the proposition here laid down. It is 
with no delusion that deceits in architecture have undermined the 
morals of men that Ruskin writes this. Rather it is the evil 
retribution that architecture has brought on itself; and that,not 
in the immediate effect of a piece of structural shamming on 
those who see it, but in the destr~ction of style itself when 
sha~s have become a habit. It is well too to note what immediate 
ly follows: "I have before endeavoured to mow its range and pOM9r 
in painting; and I believe a volume, instead of a chapter, mi£pt 
lworks, Vol. VIII, P• 57. 
r be written ~U'/ on its authority over all that is great in architec-
ture."l 
Reasonable objection might be taken to Ruskin's use of the 
term "truth" to stand for one thing in painting and another in 
architecture. Much of Modern Painters deals with the nature of 
truth in art, and rather roughly summarizing his doctrine, Ruskin 
means by it that imitation of the forms of Nature by imaginative 
selection and conventional abstraction. But in architecture he 
does not mean by "truthn the right imitation of anything, but to 
present to the eye materials and their construction just as in 
fact they are. In a word, he means 11 sincerity" as cpposed to pre-
tence or sham that plaster is marble, that a steel supported lath 
ceiling is a stone vault. 
The argument enters into its main course when Ruskin lists 
architectural shams under three heads: 
1st. The suggestion of a mode of structure or support, 
other than the true one; as in pendants of late 
Gothic roofs. 
2nd. The painting of surfaces to represent some other 
material than that of which they actually consist 
(as in the marbling of wood,) or the deceptive 
representation of sculptured ornament upon them. 
3rd. The use of cast or machine-made ornaments of any 
kind.2 
Of structural deceits, 11 the determined and purposed sugges-
tion of a mode of support other than the true one," Ruskin does 
not at once give such obvious examples as we ourselves are 
1Ibid. 
2 
Ibid., p. 60. 
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familiar with, but later he names one under the head of "surface 
deceits": nThus, for instance, the roof of Milan Cathedral is 
seemingly covered with elaborate fan tracery, forcibly enough 
painted to enable it, in its dark and removed position to deceive 
a careless observer." BU:t just as the general principle is fair-
ly clear in its enunciation, so for its refinement we must go to 
one of those detailed analyses which are the most notable fea-
tures of Ruskin's writing but apparently have never become part 
of his legend. Such is the long passage in which he studies the 
apparent deception in the Gothic mode of supporting its high 
cathedral vaults, and which can be found in this essay on"T:ruth."~ 
'While introducing the most important piece of analysis in 
this essay, Ruskin gives another definition of the matter which 
may be more satisfactory to the modern artist, and uses almost 
the cant phrase "respect for the medium" which the modern so wil-
lingly accepts. Ruskin says: 
I would remind the architect who thinks that I am un-
necessarily and narrowly limiting his resources or his 
art, that the highest greatness and the highest wisdom 
are shown, the first by a noble submission to, the 
second by a thoughtful providence for, certain volun-
tarily admitted restraints.2 
He is, indeed, leading up to that failure of the Gothic builders 
to "respect the medium" which he says led to the destruction of 
Gothic architecture. In this excellent piece of analysis of 
Gothic tracery and its evolution he shows brilliantly the force 
1 Ibid., pp. 61, 62, 63. 
2 1.1?1£.' p. 71. 
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idea· with which he began, "how in the consulting or for-
getting of this principle lies half the dignity or decline of 
every art • • •. " 
The argument is this: Following Willis' account of the ori-
gin of tracery, 1 Ruskin explains how the original shield of stone 
that filled the space of the arch of the windows was pierced to 
produce a design in light. This sort of work marked the period 
of early Gothic. Gradually the penetrations came to take more 
and more of the space until between the lights there were only 
narrow bars of stone. Ruskin says of this stage of development: 
••• it was at the instant when the rudeness of the 
intermediate space had been finally conquered, when the 
light had expanded to its fullest, and yet had not lost 
its radiant unity, principality, and visible first 
causing of the whole, that we have the most exquisite 
feeling and most faultless judgments in the management 
alike of the tracery and the decorations.2 
The moment, says Ruskin, was "the great water-shed of Gothic 
art. Before it, all had been ascent; after it, all was decline 
" And he continues, "The change of which I spealr, is expres • • • 
sible in few words: but one more important, more radically influ-
ential, could not be. It was the substitution of the line for the 
~~ as an element of decoration."3 He more vividly describes 
this moment, or pause of some fifty years which constituted the 
great period of Gothic at the beginning of the thirteenth century 
1R. Willis, Remarks on the Architecture of the Middle Ages, 
Cambridge, 1835. 
2. ~Works, Vol. VIII, p. 89. 
3 Ibid., p. 90. 
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Up to that time, up to the very last instant in 
which the reduction and thinning of the intervening 
stone was consummated, his eye had been on the opening~ 
only, on the stars of light; he did not care about the 
stone; a rude border of moulding was all he needed; it 
was the penetrating shape which he was watching. But 
when that shape had received its last possible expan-
sion, and when the stone-work became an arrangement of 
graceful and parallel lines, that arrangement, like 
some forn1 in a picture, unseen and accidentally devel-
oped, struck suddenly, inevitably, on the sight. It 
had literally not been seen before. It flashed out in 
an instant, as an independent form. It became a fea-
ture of the work. The architect took it under his care~ 
thought over it, and distributed its members as we see. 
The reader will observe that, up to the last expan-
sion of the penetrations, the stone-work was necessar-
ily considered, as it actually is, stiff and unyiel~ 
It was so also, during the pause of which I have spoker~ 
when the forms of the tracery were still severe and 
pure; delicate indeed, but perfectly firm. 
At the close of the period of pause, the first sigr 
of serious change was like a low breeze, passing 
through the emaciated tracery, and making it tremble. 
It began to uridula te like the threads of a cob.web 
lifted by the wind. It lost its essence as structure 
of stone. Reduced to the slenderness of threads, it 
began to be considered aa possessing also their flexi-
bility. The architect was pleased ••• This was a 
change which sacrificed a great principle of truth; it 
sacrificed·the expression of the qualities of the·ma-
terial; and ••• it was u:J_timately ruinous.l 
Ruskin, at this point, with a careful eye for the apparent 
contradiction between what he here asserts to be a falsification 
of the material and what he previously asserted was right, the 
appearance of elasticity in the Gothic pier with its tree-like 
branching vault-ribs, insists that there is a differenc~ between 
the elasticity of the one impression and the ductility of the 
other. The tree-like appearance was not sought, could not, in-
deed, be avoided; the latter impression was deliberately assumed; 
1 Ibid., p. 91. 
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the one had some basis in the nature of the material, the other, 
none. The last stage in the development is thus described by 
Ruskin: 
But the declining and morbid taste of the later ar 
chitects was not satisfied with thus much deception; 
they were delighted with the subtle charm they had ere 
a ted, and thought only of increasing its power. The 
next step was to consider and represent the tracery, a~ 
not only ductile, but penetrable; and when two mould-
inros met each other, to manage their intersection so 
that one should appear to pass through the other, re-
taining its independence; or when two ran parallel to 
each other, to represent the one as partly contained 
within the other, and partly apparent above it. This 
form of falsity was that which crushed the art. The 
flexible traceries were often beautiful, thou~1 they 
were ignoble; but the penetrated traceries, rendered, 
as they finally were, merely the means of erl1ibiting 
the dexterity of the stone-cutter, annihilated both the 
beauty and dignity of the Gothic types.l · 
Ruskin follows this by no means sketchy analysis with a lon~ 
passage of such detail and complexity that it cannot, as he says 
himself, be followed without illustrative drawings. But the pas-
sage is surely as characteristic of Ruskin in its thoughtful care 
for every step in his progress and for the objections of his 
readers as is that magnificent "purple patch 11 that closes the 
essay - not a mere purple patch sewn on for extraneous decoratior 
-though Ruskin himself said of it, "The closing paragraph is ver;; 
pretty"- but to the unsophisticated reader a burst at last of all 
the pent up indignation for a lost art that had been restrained 
while a long and complex argument had been patiently built up. 
lworks, Vol. VIII, p. 93. 
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3. 
"The Lamp of Obedience" 
Ruskin begins the last of the Seven Lamps, "The Lamp of 
Obedience," with these words: "It has been my endeavour to show 
in the preceding pages how every form of noble architecture is in 
some sort the embodiment of the Polity, Life, History, and Reli-
gious Faith of nations." The sentence more explicitly indicates 
that essence of Ruskin's thought, that all things within human 
experience are to be drawn into one view and circle of life and 
society, than anything that he has said so far in these essays. 
It is because of this unity in his view that he is of some inter-
est to those who would teach a Catholic culture which likewise 
insists on this unity. 
Obedience, "the crowning grace," as Ruskin calls it, of all 
the principles "which direct that embodiment" of all elements in 
the one, great unity, is of special interest to the Catholic tea-
cher. Not because the notion of it is beyond the reach of natur-
al reason, for reason,studying the necessary relation of creature 
and Creator, would discover it; but he finds it inextricably 
bound to his Catholic culture and to it peculiarly in this: it is 
a notion that can maintain itself in the world and it is a virtue 
that can be continually practised and by men in general only 
through the supernatural aid that God may give. For obedience, 
the submission of the heart, of mind and will, to the authority 
of another demands humility; and humility has never been the 
r ~rk o:f a. pa.ga.n or atheist society. 112 
Therefore it is not only of architecture that Ruskin was 
thinking when he wrote the "Lamp of Obedience," but of the whole 
way of Christian life. Ruskin's thought was not only of the obe 7 
dience of the architect, but of that political and moral obedi-
ence against which the forces of the French Revolution and the 
revolutions of that very moment when he wrote in 1848 were 
struggling. And in the readings today selected to preach Democ-
racy and Individualism and Liberty to the youth in school and 
college, there is little likely to be found that which Ruskin up-
held so strongly: 
••• how franctic the pursuit of that~eacherous phan-
tom which men call liberty; most treacherous, indeed, 
of all phantoms; for the feeblest ray of reason might 
surely show us, that not only its attainment, but its 
being, was impossible. There is no such thing in the 
universe. There never can be. The stars have it not; 
the earth has it not; the sea has it not; and we men 
have the mockery and semblance of it only for our heav-
iest punishment • • • if there be any one principle 
more widely than another confessed by every utterance, 
or more sternly than another imprinted on every atom of 
the visible creation, that principle is not Liberty, 
but Law.l 
But what has architecture to do with obedience? It is true 
that the a rchitect is not morally bound to any of his "authori-
ties," if such be admitted at all; but it can reasonably be as-
serted that only that architect who has learned humility and obe-
dience where they are, in their strict and more familiar sense, 
called for, will have the humility requisite to submit himself to 
!works, Vol. VIII, p. 248. 
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authorities that would over-rule his artistic vagaries. Of this 
more later. 
Ruskin begins the argument for obedience in architecture 
with this proposition and with a word that, especially, defines 
what he means by obedience: 
• • • this one condition has been constant, this one 
requirement clear in all places and at all times, that 
the wo.rk shall be that of a school, that no individual 
caprice shall dispense with, or materially vary, ac-
cepted types and customary decorations ••• 
Further, he defines obedience by its opposite, "original-
ity." The very word gives occasion for some remarks aside from 
Ruskin's that may show how closely this "moralizing" of his is 
bound up with the thought of critics of art in general. "Origin-
ality" suggests "individualism"; the one term means pretty much 
the same as the other; only the latter has a wider application. 
or it is used by historians, as well as by art critics, and by 
all thinkers on social matters, to denote a phase of that shift 
of culture from the medieval to the modern, from Catholicism to 
aturalism. It signifies that specious valuation of the individ-
1 man which came in with the Renaissance, which flowered in 
emocracy, which madeevery man his own interpreter of Scripture 
nd freed every artist from the "shackles of out-worn convention. 
It is when we see its full, broad application that we can more 
that it is no matter merely of the rules of art, but 
it is of the moral order first of all. This Individualism 
revolt against authority - a Catholic thinker would say a 
~ong one; it is of the will as well as of the intellect. What 
~~------------------------------------------------~1~1~-f 
is of moment here is that it takes "originality" with it into thE 
moral order; that those who revolt against the principles of 
their arts, and would constantly assert their originality against 
all precedent, are, for the most part, living in the spirit of 
revolt against every authority. The critics and philosophers of 
art then are really engaged on one and the same problem with 
Ruskin when they speak of originality and individualism and he 
speaks of obedience. 
"A day never passes without our hearing our English archi-
tects called upon to be original, and to invent a new style," 
says Rusk1n,l and he might say the same today when he would hear 
the protests against the eclecticism which works, at the client's 
choice, in Norman Romanesque, early French Renaissance, Tudor, 
Queen Anne, Dutch Colonial, Byzantine; and would hear the demand 
for something "expressive" of our modern civilization, and see 
the various answers described as moderne. Ruskin's answer is 
that·· "it does not matter one marble splinter whether we have an 
old or new architecture, but it matters everything whether we 
have an architecture whose laws might be taught at our schools 
n And then to the eye-brow raised at his apparent disdain • • • 
for originality he explains: 
There seems to me to be a wonderful misunderstand-
ing among the majority of architects of the present day 
as to the very nature and meaning of Originality, and 
of all wherein it consists. Originality in expression 
does not depend on invention of new words; nor origin-
a~ity in poetry on invention of new measures; nor in 
~orks, Vol. VIII, p. 252. 
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painting on invention of new colours, or new modes of 
using them ••• Granting that they may be, such addi-
tions or alterations are much more the work of time aru 
of multitudes than of individual inventors ••• Orig-
inality depends on nothing of the kind; a man who has 
the gift, will take up any style that is going, the 
style of his day, and will work in that, and be great 
in that, and make everything that he does in it look a: 
fresh as if every thought of it had just come down frox 
heaven • • • And though it is the nobility of the high· 
est creatures to look forward to, and partly under-
stand the changes which are appointed for them • • • 
yet it is the strength of every creature, be it change· 
ful or not, to rest, for the time being, contented witl 
the conditions of its existence, and striving only to 
bring about the changes which it desires, by fulfiLling 
to the uttermost the duties for which its present state 
is appointed and continued. · 
Neither ori~inality, therefore, nor change ••• 
is ever to be sought in itself, or can ever be health-
ily obtained1by any struggle or rebellion against connnon laws. 
That obedience means that the architect should follow a 
school, that he should work in a tradition, that he should not 
seek originality for its own sake, nor to create a new style be-
cause weary of an old, is clear enough. Ruskin goes on to show 
in more detail how this obedience is to be practised, and in 
the vivid picture of that process it becomes clear how obedience 
can produce the good fruit that he promised. Perhaps here, too, 
it will be easiest of of all to see how a moral quality spreads 
through an artistic activity as it does through the polity, the 
economics, the social customs of a people. 
He begins with this simple illustration to show how the ar-
chitect is to learn with the guidance of authority and how in 
this way something truly "original" may come about: 
1works, Vol. VIII, pp. 253 ff. 
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When we begin to teach children writing, we force them 
to absolute copyis~ and require absolute accuracy in 
the formation of the letters; as they obtain command of 
the received modes of literal expression, we cannot 
prevent their falling into such variations aB are con-
sistent with feeling, their circumstances, or their 
characters. So, when a boy is first taught to write 
Latin, an authority is required of him for every ex-
pression he uses; as he becomes master of the language 
he may take a license, and feel his right to do so 
without any authority, and yet write better Latin than 
when he borrowed every separate expression. In the 
same way our architects would have to be taught to 
write the accepted style. We must first determine what 
buildings are to be considered Augustan in their au-
thority ••• under this absolute, irrefragable author-
ity, we are to begin to work ••• when we can speak 
this dead language naturally, and apply it to whatever 
ideas we have to render, that is to say, to every prac-
tical purpose of life; then, and not till then ••• it 
might come to pass that a new style should arise • • .l 
Ruskj.n has shown what he means by obedience, and how it is 
the first condition of learning the art. He thus sums up the re-
sults in the architect who has so trained himself: 
It is almost impossible for us to conceive, in our 
present state of doubt and ignorance, the sudden dawn 
of intelligence and fancy, the rapidly increasing sense 
of power and facility, and, in its proper sense, of 
Freedom, which such wholesome restraint would instantly 
cause throughout the whole circle of arts. Freed from 
the agitation and embarrassment of that liberty of 
choice which is the cause of half the discomforts of 
the world; freed from the accompanying necessity of 
studying all past, present or even possible styles; and 
enabled, by concentration of individual, and co-opera-
tion of multitudinous energy, to penetrate into the 
uttermost secrets of the adopted style, the architect 
would find his whole understanding enlarged, his prac-
tical knowledge certain and ready to h~nd, and his 
imagination playful and vigorous ••• 
1W.Rtk~, Vol. VIII, p. 257. 
2 Ibid., P• 259. 
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4. 
"The Nature of Gothic" 
In 1853, ten years after the inception of his serious work; 
four years after the thought had been fore-shadowed in The Seven 
Lamps, and two years since the beginning of The Stones of Venic~~ 
his greatest piece of work, came its second volume. In the mid-
dle of this, the second of a three volume work, was a chapter he 
called "The Nature of Gothic." Here, dealing with one of the 
qualities of that style, was a section with the unpromising head 
inp; of "Savageness"; but on six of these pages,l with magnifi-
cence of imagination, with a straight marching logic, with all 
the stirring sound of language he bad at his command, he wrote 
the greatest words of his life, the very core of all the doctrine 
he was later to preach, the central thought toward which he had 
all along been moving and from which radiated everything of value 
he had yet to say. Afterwards he was to say much that was triv-
ial, much that was fantastic, much that was absurd; but all that 
was great in him in later times depended from this great ~ment. 
Of this passage no one of the trite criticisms can be made: that 
it is a "purple patch," that it is self-contradictory, that it is 
trivial or fantastic or dreaming or moralizing. It is one of the 
great passages of our literature. 
Seven years later, and after the completion of the long la-
bor of Modern Painters, he would announce in Unto this Last the 
1 Ibid., pp. 90-95. 
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turnin~ of his mind definitely from art to economics, or better, 
to social reconstruction. But it is here in "The Nature of 
Gothic" that the union of the two movements of thought takes 
place in such perfect fusion that the man has ceased to be simpl~ 
an art critic and become, not less a critic of art, but somethin@ 
much more. 
It is the one element of his mind for which he has been most 
abused that made this fusion of art critic and social thinker 
possible. It is his so-called "moralizing." Misnamed, it is 
really his power to see that in the life of man there is but one 
thing, and in that all is contained in inter-related complexity; 
that neither art nor economics can be understood without refer-
ring them to God by way of understanding that nature in which Man 
was created for His service. And here now is the moment of 
fusion. 
He explains at the very beginning of the chapter his scheme 
for analyzing the nature of Gothic architecture by looking to in-
ternal qualities, what was primarily of the character of the ar-
chitect, rather than of the external forms of what he built. 
Ruskin names some six of which the first is the quality of "sav-
agene.ss," the characteristic of a· people just removed from the 
barbarism of the northern tribes of Europe. But this, he says, 
"may be considered, in some sort a noble character; it possesses 
a higher nobility still, when considered as an index, not of 
climate, but of religious principle. Its nobility is brought out 
by contrasting it with the architecture of the pagan civilizatior 
12C 
preceding it and with that of the Renaissance which followed it. 
The style of the ancients, he says, was marked by perfectior. 
of execution by a slave following the designs of a dominating 
intelligence; but the designs were of no great inventive power 
that would have been beyond the skill of a slave. The style of 
the Renaissance demanded, not only the inventive power of the 
middle ages, but also the perfect execution of the ancients. The 
one style was~unded on slavery, the other on pride. Both are 
dependent on the characteristic social organization and religious 
spirit of the civilizations they served. In contrast to these, 
then, he explains the "savageness" and nobility of medieval 
architecture: 
But in the mediaeval, or especially Christian, sys-
tem of ornament, this slavery is done away with alto- · 
gether; Christianity having recognized, in small things 
as well as great, the individual value of every soul. 
But it not only recognizes its value; it confesses its 
imperfections, in only bestowing dignity upon the 
acknowledgment of unworthiness. That admission of lost 
power and fallen nature, which the Greek or Ninevite 
felt to be intensely painful, and, as far as might be, 
altogether refused, the Christian makes daily and hour-
ly, contemplating the fact of it without fear, as tend-
ing, in the end, to God's greater glory. Therefore, to 
every spirit which Christianity sum.mons to, her service, 
her exhortation is: Do what you can, and confess 
frankly what you are unable to do; neither let your ef-
fort be shortened for fear of failure, nor your con-
fession silenced for fear of shame. And it is, perhaps 
the principal admirableness of the Gothic schools of 
architecture, that they thus receive the results of the 
labour of inferior minds; and out of fragments full of 
imperfection, and betraying that imperfection in every 
touch, 1indulgently raise up a stately and unaccusable whole. 
1works, Vol. X, pp. 189, 190. 
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This paragraph is, in all truth, the very innermost spark of 
life even of that very heart of Ruskin's thought displayed on 
these six pages; and it would be wrong to do other than let him 
draw out its implication. But this much may now be noted: The 
ancient slavery is destroyed; and that because Christianity rec-
ognizes the value of each soul, and because each individual, witb 
his powers and nobility as an individual, may show himself forth. 
But all this is possible only by yirtue of Christian humility, 
the Christian's readiness to confess his limitations, the imper-
faction, the rudeness of his work - terms which Ruskin now sub-
stitutes for "savageness." The first enlargement upon what is 
here in germ is this: 
• • • perfection • • • is a noble character in the ab-
stract, but becomes ignoble when it causes us to forget 
the relative dignities of that nature itself, and to 
prefer the perfectness of the lower nature to the impeP 
fection of the higher ••• And therefore, while in all 
things we see or do, we are to desire perfection, and 
strive for it, we are nevertheless not to set the 
meaner thing, in its narrow accomplishment, above the 
nobler accomplishment, above the nobler thing, in its 
mighty progress; not to esteem smooth minuteness above 
shattered majesty; not to prefer mean victory to hon-
ourable defeat ••• in our dealings with the souls of 
men we are to take care how we check, by severe require 
ment or narrow caution, efforts which might otherwise 
lead to a noble issue; and, still more, how we withhold 
our admiration from great excellencies, because they 
are mingled with rough faults • • • And this is what 
we have to do with all our labourers; to look for the 
thoughtful part of them, and get that out of them what-
ever we lose for it ••• He thinks, and ten to one, he 
thinks wrong • • • But you have made a man of him for 
all t~at. He was only a machine before, an animated 
tool. 
lWorks, Vol. X, pp. 190 ff. 
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Ruskin here insists on that which may be taken as the founda 
tion of his later economics, of his notion of "value": the 
thoughtful part of man, his inventive powers of imagination,which 
are to be sought even at the cost of imperfection, rudeness, in 
his work. He closes the paragraph on a thought that, as a coral-
lary, is equally a part of his economic and social doctrine: 
That the alternative is to make a tool of the laborer. He con-
tinues: 
And observe, you are put to stern choice in this 
matter, You must either make a tool of the creature, 
or a man of him. You cannot make both. Men were not 
intended to work with the accuracy of tools, to be pre-
cise and perfect in all their actions. If you will 
have that precision out of them, and make their fingers 
measure degrees like cog-wheels, and their arms strike 
curves like compasses, you must unhumanize them. All 
the energy of their spirits must be given to make cogs 
and compasses of themselves. All their attention and 
strength must go to the accomplishment of the mean act. 
The eye of the soul must be bent_ upon the fingerpoint 
and the soul's force must fill all the invisible nerves 
that guide it, ten hours a day, that it may not err f~ 
its steely precision, and so sou+ and sight be worn 
away, and the whole human being be lost at last - a 
heap of sawdust, so far as its intellectual work in 
this world is concerned • • • On the other hand, if you 
will make a man of the working creature, you cannot 
make a tool. Let him but begin to imagine, to think, 
to try to do anything worth doing; and the engine-trnT.sd 
precision is lost at once. Out come all his roughness, 
all his dulness, all his incapability; shame upon 
shame, failure upon failure, pause after pause; but out 
comes the whole majesty of him also ••• 1 
From these alternatives it is an easy passage to thoughts 
that have already begun to preoccupy Ruskin, thoughts on that 
thing we call Democracy: 
1 Ibid., p. 192. 
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It is verily this degradation of the operative into 
a machine, which, more than any other evil of the times, 
is leading the mass of the nations everywhere into vain, 
incoherent, destructive struggling for a freedom of which 
they cannot explain the nature to themselves. Their 
universal outcry against wealth, and against nobility, is 
not forced from them either by the pressure of famine, or 
the sting of mortified pride ••• It is not that men are 
ill fed, but that they have no pleasure in the work by 
which they make their bread, and therefore look to wealth 
as the only means of pleasure • • • I know not if a day 
will ever come when the nature of right freedom will be 
understood, and when men will see that to obey another 
man, to labour for him, yield reverence to him or to his 
place, is not slavery ••• But to feel their souls 
withering within them, unthanked, to be counted off into 
a heap of mechanism numbered with its wheels, and weighed 
with its hammer strokes - this, nature bade not, - this 
God blesses noti - this, humanity for no long time is 
able to endure. 
Welll This passage will never make its way into a book of 
readings for American college students to stand alongside the 
choice encomiums of Democracy. But perhaps it should. Democracy 
seems to mean for too roony university teachers today a perfect 
and unbounded freedom and to be found in Russia and under Stalin; 
just what is the freedom under a Five-Year-Plan would be better 
understood for the reading of this passage. 
Here too ends that longer passage of six pages which has 
been called the core of Ruskin's doctrine. What follows seems 
equally vital, even more, at first sight, for he begins at this 
point to describe what is to be done as well as what is to be 
thought. But the practical suggestions are not nearly so valu-
able as the analysis which preceded theni.. What Ruskin thought, 
his analysis of the society of his and our times and of the 
1rbid., PP· 193 ff. 
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~ociety of the middle ages is profound and brings up a great 
truth. For surely it is industrialism and its machine production 
that has brought most of the ruin on the world today; and surely, 
though it may not be the whole cause, as Ruskin admits it is not, 
the misery of heart engendered in factories is largely responsi-
ble for that spirit of revolt nearly always found centering in 
industrialized areas. What then, Ruskin thinks of us is eminentl 
true; but what Ruskin wants to do about it is another matter. 
Yet something of what he now proposes reflects so much of 
~is later thou~ht, or rather, is so accurately the definition of 
that "value" he made the foundation of his economics that it must 
be examined. He b~ns: 
• • • all the evil • • • can be met only by a right 
understanding, on the part of all classes, what kinds 
of labour are good for men, raising them, and making 
them happy; by a determined sacrifice of such conveni-
ence or beauty, or cheapness as is to be got only by 
the degradation of the workman; and by equally deter-
mined demand for the products and results of healthy 
and ennobling labour • • • 
Never encourage the manufacture of anything not 
necessary, in the production of which invention has no 
share. 
For instance. Glass beads are utterly unnecessary, 
and there is no design or thought employed in their 
manufacture • • • 
But glass cups and vessels may become the subjects 
of exquisite invention; and if in buying these we pay 
for the invention, that is to say, for the beautiful 
form, or colour, or engraving, and not for mere finish 
of execution, we are doing good to humanity.l 
Note that Ruskin's first direction concerns what is "unneces-
sary." For it is of the waste of energy on things unnecessary 
libid., p. 197. 
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that he so continually speaks in later years; it is the false 
"value" that economists assign to so much that is of no use what-
ever to man which will rouse his indignation. This then is the 
"value" that Ruskin will for the rest of his life preach as the 
right basis of economics: what is necessary or truly useful for 
man's right living; what in its making exhibits the mind of the 
man who made it • 
He now takes up the objection that would obviously be made 
by the modern economist and industrialist, an objection based on 
the principle of the division of labor. He says: 
1 
All ideas of•this kind are founded upon two mistaken 
suppositions: the first, that one man's thoughts can be 
or ought to be, executed by another man's hands; the 
second, that manual labour is a degradation, when it is 
governed by intellect. 
On a large scale, and in work determinable by line 
and rule, it is indeed both possible and necessary that 
the thoughts of one man should be carried out by the 
labor of others; in this sense I have already defined 
the best architecture to be the expression of the mind 
of manhood by the hands of childhood. But on a smaller 
scale, and in a design which cannot be mathematically 
defined, one man's thoughts can never be expressed by 
another; and the difference between the spirit of 
touch of the man who is inventing, and of the man who 
is obeying directions, is often all the difference be-
tween a great and a common work of art ••• in these 
days • • • we want one man to be always thinking, and 
another to be always working, and we call one a gentle-
man, and the other an operative; whereas the workman 
ought often to be thinking, and the thinker often to be 
working • • • Now it is only by labour that thou'ght can 
be made healthy, and only by thought that labour can be 
made happy, and the two cannot be separated with ~­
punity.l 
Ruskin closes his discussion of the "savageness," or ru<bress 
Ibid., pp. 200, 201. 
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or imperfection of Gothic architecture with the final assertion 
that "the demand for perfection is always a sign of a misunder-
..§._tanding of the ends of art," and this for two reasons: 
Moreover: 
••• first, that no great man ever stops working till 
he has reached his point of failure • • • his mind is 
always far in advance of his powers of execution • • • 
besides that he will always give to the inferior por-
tions of his work only such inferior attention as they 
require. 
The second reason is, that imperfection is in some 
sort essential to all we know of life. It is the sign 
of life in a mortal body, that is to say, of a state of 
progress and change. Nothing that lives is, or can be, 
rigidly perfect; part of it is decaying, part nascent 
• • • No human face is exactly the same in its lines on 
each side, no leaf perfect in its lobes, no branch in 
its symmetry. All admit irregularity as they imply 
change. All things are literally better, lovelier, and 
more beloved for the imperfections which have been di-
vinely appointed, that the law of human life1may be Effort, and the law of human judgment Mercy. 
Perhaps one will be accused of weakly bowing before the 
blast of Ruskin's great eloquence, of submitting without suffi-
cient sense of the realities to a far-fetched rather than a pro-
found analysis, if he says that in these great pages he finds the 
deepest insight into the causes of our age's woes, excepting, in-
deed, the insight and wisdom of Christ's Vicar speaking by virtue 
of his office. But when Ruskin finds at the bottom of social and 
industrial organization the same vice in the evil organization 
and same virtue in the good that Christianity achieved in another 
age; when Ruskin finds humility at the root of the greatness of 
1 Ibid., pp. 203, 204. 
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medieval architecture and the medieval social system and finds 
pride and slavery in ours- surely when his findings are those of 
the Vicar of Christ, it is excusable for the reader to be carrie 
away willingly by his great argument. And if he be a Catholic 
teacher of literature he will be well justified if he takes these 
thoughts of Ruskin as a contribution to Catholic culture. 
Vlhile this is not the time to summarize all the work that 
Ruskin did, at least it is worth noting now how fundamental is 
this teaching of his that in humility we are to learn w}:-l...at is the 
right kind of labor for men to do, and that on the notion of 
"value" thus derived we are to build our economics and sociology. 
We may see how this humility is a first condition of all Ruskin's 
thought: how when he speaks of the spirit of Sacrifice, this 
humility is supposed, not only in the formal acknowledgement of 
God's dominion but in showing it by giving the best we have, how-
ever poor that may be; again how the spirit of Truth makes no 
pretenses to cover its poverty because it is humble enough to get 
along without shams; how the spirit of Obedience in an architect 
is first of all humble, so that he does not insist on displaying 
is own imagined originality, but submits to the teaching of 
tradition. 
This is also the place again to draw attention to the com-
,ent, implicit in these pages of Ruskin, on that Individualism 
has so much taken the admiration of men. It was accepted 
nd it dominated the thinking, religious, political, economic, 
and artistic, of the world in what is therefore called a new age, 
~~-------------------------------------------------------1~2~8 
"Modern times." That its excesses have recently been rejected ii 
a good part of the world is only to say that the totalitarian 
concept of society has gone to an opposite extreme. But a right 
individualism was achieved in that society which Ruskin has been 
describing and by the very principles he has been emphasizing. 
The society of the middle ages was not built on slavery, either 
in its feudal institutions, or its ecclesiastical, or in the lifE 
of its townsmen and craftsmen. Rather, as Ruskin says, "Chris-
tianity recognized the value of every soul," and at the same tim: 
humbly recognized the limitations of that soul. The Christian, 
then, rejoiced in the greatness that was his by divine adoption, 
rejoiced in the liberty God gave him to return it freely in His 
service, rejoiced in his equality before God and in the receptior 
of the Sacraments with every other man. But he humbly admitted 
that it was not for him to make up his own religion, to inter-
pret for himself the Scriptures. Under the supreme guidance of 
such a Faith, he lanew his place in the social system, the feudal 
system, a man with rights and with duties as well. 
And in the medieval artist too this right Individualism as-
serted itself. What was personal, individual, in him and in his 
creative powers, was given freedom of expression. But that free 
dom, he acknowledged in his humility, was not an end in itself; 
he would never have defined art or literature as the "expression 
of the artist's personality"; he would never have offered to the 
world his "stream of consciousness" simply because it was lli,; he 
would not publish every aberration of his imagination because it 
'r~------------~ 12~ 
was so original. No, art was not to him the expression of his 
interesting personality, but was an effort to convey, in a par-
ticular medium, Truth and Beauty. And because it was a communi-
cation, and because it was truth, and because he had his limita-
tions in doing the one and seeing the other, he was humble enough 
to submit himself to the teaching of others and the tradition of 
the men with whom he lived. And the communication of Truth in 
Beauty thus made to his fellows on the walls of every parish 
church and cathedral and even in his home was, he was simple 
enough to believe, a pleasing offering to God. 
In this Catholic Individualism is the epitome of Ruskin's 
thought as it developed in his study of architecture. 
r __________________________________ ~ 
CHAPTER V 
DEVELOPMENT INTO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
To one whose introduction to Ruskin, and his first enthu-
siasm, was the Stones of Venice and to whom Ruskin's architectur-
al teaching has always been an illumination of the work he saw 
about him, whether of the eclectics or the functionalists, Ruskin 
the sociologist has always been a little disconcerting. It has 
een hard to admit the failings of the genius of the architectur-
1 writings who in architecture found so surely the solid princi-
les of Catholic social life; hard to admit that the later lee-
social reconstruction did not live up to the great be-
_innings and really bored him with their diffuseness, repetitions 
nd impracticability. 
But much of this weakness can be explained by the form 
uskin's later work took: Lectures and letters. Small audiences, 
and many of them, called for the repetition of his teaching; and 
any kind of audience requires the diffuseness, the thin spreading 
of thought, which can only be absorbed a little at a time. And 
anyone who will write so much must repeat himself. 
But so it is that the last of Ruskin's really concentrated 
thought - it was first written for the Cornhill 1fugazine and not 
or the lecture platform - is Unto this Last. It is therefore 
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the last of his works that can be used ror reading 
a class, though there is no record of any compiler or readings 
having ever used it, at least in any of those collections now 
rent. For this reason, in part, it is chosen now for study. 
But there is a very much better reason for examining it now. 
Though there is scarcely a word in it about the Artist and his 
place in Society, and it is as exclusively a work on economics as 
uskin could write, still it represents in a definite form those 
social ideas that were rooted in Ruskin's first criticism of art 
and grew through those studies in architecture just now reviewed-
those ideas that by the year 1860 had grown into a consistent 
view of the social system. Whether at this time Ruskin viewed hi 
social system primarily as a condition under which, and only 
under which, great architecture, painting, and sculpture was 
possible; or whether his sympathy was now in the main in the 
amelioration of society for its own sake, is rather hard to say. 
ertainly a reading of his later work inclines one to think that 
s was the latter attitude of mind. But the unique thing about 
uskin is that his sociology grew so oddly out of art criticism, 
and that the latter is never very far in the background. 
1. 
The Transition from Art to Economics and SociologY 
Since it is this transition from Art to Economics and the 
elations between them that first prompted this study, it is now, 
r 
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then, time to trace this connection more accu~ately than has so 
far been done. The history of the matter as it developed in 
Ruskin's mind provides an arrangement for studying the relations 
between Art and Economics that is logical as well as biographicaJ, 
and may therefore be conveniently followed. 
A first stage may be marked as extending from Ruskin's boy-
hood on through the early years of his writing. We may call it 
simply a time of observation. "I It is well described by F. W. Roe~ 
as the time of his travels with his father and the meetings with 
the latter's business associates in England and on the continent; 
of his shocked perception their callousness toward the impover-
ished peasants from whose wine these merchants made such fine 
profits and on whose poverty they lived so grandly in Paris and 
London. These too were the years when the horrors of the Indus-
trial Revolution were working toward their climax and when men 
were beginning to perceive them. Carlyle was already protesting; 
Cobbett had written of their ultimate cause - the Protestant des-
poliation of the poor in the sixteenth century, a history which 
Ruskin himself later recommended as the only true one. Chartist 
agitation and "Christian Socialism" under Maurice and Kingsley 
would come to a head in the very years of Ruskin's own turning to 
the same problems. Dickens was doing his work to the same end. 
And men's minds had been turned back to the earlier, the middle 
age, even before Cobbett. Gothic romances and the Oxford-movement 
1op. cit., pp. 136-138. 
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do not seem to play much part in Ruskin's sociology, but they 
were "in the air," and the older civilization was preoccupying 
men's minds. All this is both biography of Ruskin and the his-
tory of his age, but the ideas they were turning over are a nec-
essary part of our thought today as well as of Ruskin's. 
Troubled by all he saw and read, Ruskin did not yet see the 
full connection that these matters would have with the work he 
had elected to do. He had first fallen to with enthusiasm to de-
fend the art of Turner; then in the second volume of Modern 
Painters to an exposition of his own critical principles. It was 
in doing this last that he took the logical step, the first one, 
that led him on from Art to Economics and Sociology. As has been 
described he laid down three fundamentals of his Aesthetics: that 
Creation was for the glory of God; that that glory is given by 
men when they delight in His creation and praise Him; that in 
seeing reflected in Creation His attributes and mode of being, 
they learn what their own life should be. The last opened up, or 
laid the foundation for, all in Ruskin that we would call his so-
ciology. It exhibits basic relations between Art and Economics, 
at least as Ruskin understood the matters, though the immediate 
inferences and application to the abuses in the world around him 
are not yet apparent. 
A third stage, or point, in the history of this transition 
came when Ruskin, acclaimed as an art critic, entered upon a sort 
of apostolate of his doctrine - for, if Art was for the service 
of God, it must be preached to all men, and not to the reviewers 
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of books and fellow-critics. But the apostolate failed, and with 
the years Ruskin came to realize more and more another relation 
of Art and Economics: Art and its worship of God was impossible 
or a people as degraded in soul as were the poor of England in 
those days of triumphant industrialism. Before he could talk Art 
to them, he must cure them of their economic distress. 
During these same years, but through other experiences, 
uskin was coming to discover another point at which Art and Eco-
omics touched. He had begun b.is studies in architecture from 
1hich came the Seven Lamps and the Stones of Venice. In his ana 
ysis of the great works of the middle ages he was discovering 
qualities that reflected the religious and social ways of their 
builders. It was not an original discovery so much as a realiza-
tion of truths for himself. But the realization that the power 
shown in the architectural work of the earlier epoch, a power pe-
culiar to that age, was the result of that beautiful balance of 
freedom and submission to authority, of that exercise by the or-
dinary workman of all his human powers, of his true manhood, that 
distinguished the social life of the age, drove Ruskin to seek to 
restore all that life in his own day. 
So came the transition, never absolute, but rather one of 
emphasis, from the writings on Art to those on Sociology. 
Wilenski, of course, must see the matter differently: 
We now reach 1858 and 1859 when he realized that 
his bid for Art-Dictatorship had failed; and when he 
ascribed the fault to the obstinate stupidity of the 
architects and artists who had not done as he bade 
r 
And again: 
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them. 1 
To understand these lectures - A Joy For Ever - we 
must visualize Ruskin established at Denmark Hill • • • 
a troop of servants, each with his appointed station, 
and all obedient to the appointed government of the 
best and most serviceable peop~e in the home ••• 
There was no competition ••• 
Such is the interpretation of literature in the light of biog-
raphy. Even if it were true, of what use is it in estimating thE 
ideas, the work itself1 And is such gossip important enough to 
nullify the author's most direct statements of his motives? Let 
Wilenski's stand beside Ruskin's own explanation of the change: 
• • • I feel the force of mechanism and fury of avari-
cious commerce to be at present so irrestible, that I 
have seceded from the study, not only of architecture, 
but nearly of all art; and have given myself, as I 
would in a besieged city, to seek the best modes of 
getting bread and water for its multitudes ••• As tbe 
evil spirits of avarice and luxury are directly con-
trary to art, so, also, art is directly contrary to 
them. 
Such words, uttered in The Study of Architecture, in 1865, have 
too much reason in them to be put aside as the delusion of a 
manic depressive. 
This transition of Ruskin's thinking from Art to Economics 
is, of course, viewed with alarm by other critics, and for the 
reasons that might be expected. Amabel Williams-Ellis cannot bui 
conplain of "morality" touching economics: 
But unfortunately Ruskin too often in his economic 
1 . On. C1t., P• 284. 
2Ibid., p. 280. 
writing ••• is apt to drag in morality and 
• He is apt to go on to defend ••• not what peo-
ple do in fact want and desire, but what they ought 
••• This sort of argument is fundamental in Ruskin. 
His mother's moral concepts lay deep and heavy on his 
heart • • • sooner or later a bubble from this thick 
dark morality rises to the surface. 
Indeed, Ruskin had introduced morality into Economics as he 
had introduced it into Art - the morality of the Mystical Body o 
Christ, in part announced by the words of Christ from which 
Ruskin drew the title of his book: "Amen, I say to you, as long 
as you did it to one of these my least brethern, you did it to 
me." (Matthew, x:xv, 40.) Ruskin, who for all his confession of 
disbelief, was too much the "anima naturaliter Christiana" ever 
to doubt in the depths of his heart that man was created to 
serve and glorify God in a common love for God and a mutual love 
of his fellow man and a co-operation with him, heartily hated 
the accepted economic doctrine of his day that the greatest good 
of the greatest number would come from the enlightened self-in-
terest of every individual, from their self-interested opposltio 
and competition. This confessed opposition of every man to his 
every fellow had as its correlative the doctrine of buy in the 
cheapest market and sell in the dearest at whatever injury to 
other men, and for its necessary condition of operation the 
third doctrine that man must be free - and what a freedoml - th 
to cut his neighbors' throats; more specifically, free in the 
pursuit of his business from all interference from the govern-
ment and any of its hampering regulations. Against these three 
doctrines, which were almost as one, Ruskin threw all his power. 
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His argument should still be of interest to us, for it is still 
~eeded. The optimists are singularly blind who say that Ruskin's 
~rgument is useless today because his giants have all been 
slaughtered these forty years. 
2. 
"The Roots of Honour" 
"Among the delusions which at different periods have pos-
sessed themselves of the minds of large masses of the human race, 
perhaps the most curious • • • is • • • that an advantageous code 
of social action may be determined irrespectively of the influ-
ence of social affection,"l are tlm words with which Ruskin opens 
his attack in "The Roots of Honour." He continues: 
Disputant after disputant vainly strives to show 
that the interests of the masters are, or are not, an-
tagnostic to those of the men: none of the pleaders 
ever seeming to remember that it does not absolutely or 
always follow that the persons must be antagonistic be-
cause their interests are. If there is only a crust of 
bread in the house, and mother and children are starv-
ing, their interests are not the same • • • Yet it does 
not necessarily follow that there will be "antagonism" 
between them, that they will fight for the crust, and 
the mother, being the strongest, will get it ••• 
• • • all endeavour to deduce rules of action from 
balance of expediency is in vain. And it is meant to 
be in vain. For no human actions were ever intended by 
the Maker of men to be guideq by balances of expedienCYJ 
but by balances of justice. 
I have said balances of justice, meaning, in the 
term justice, to include affection, - such affection as 
one man ~ to another. All right relations between 
master and operative, and all their best interest ul-
timately depend on this.2 
~orks, Vol. XVII, p. 25. 
2rbid., pp. 27, 23 . 
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Arguing that in any case the "largest quantity of work will 
not be done . . • for pay ••• " but only "when the motive force, 
that is to say, the will or spirit of the creature, is brought tc 
its greatest strength by its own proper fuel: namely, by the af-
fections,"l Ruskin reminds the reader at once of that passage in 
the "Nature of Gothic" in which he contrasts the factory wage-
slave with the freely inventive, and therefore happy, craftsmen 
in the middle ages, and of the consequences in the relation be-
tween master and man: servile fear in the one; reverence and loy 
alty in the other. It is to this same purpose that Ruskin is nov 
pushing his argument: 
Passing ••• to the more complicated relations ex-
isting between a manufacturer and his workmen, we are 
met first by certain curious difficulties, resulting, 
apparently, from a harder and colder state of moral 
elements. It is easy to imagine an enthusiastic affec-
tion existing among soldiers for the colonel. Not so 
easy to imagine an enthusiastic affection among cotton-
spinners for the proprietor of the mill • • • Not only . 
are we met by this apparent anomaly, in moral matters, 
but by others connected with it, in administrative sys-
tem. For a servant or a soldier is engaged at a defin-
ite rate of wages, for a definite period; but a workmar 
at a rate of wages variable according to the demand for 
labour, and with the risk of being at any time thrown 
out of his situation by chances of trade. Now, as, 
under these contingencies, no action of the affections 
can take place, but only an explosive action of ~­
affections, two points offer themselves for considera-
tion in the matter. 
The first - How far the rate of wages may be so 
regulated as not to vary with the demand for labour. 
The second - How far it is possible that bodies of 
workmen may be engaged and maintained at such fixed 
rate of wages (whatever the state of trade may be,) 
without enlarging or diminishing their number, so as to 
give them permanent interest in the establishment with 
which they are connected, like that of the domestic 
libid., p. 29. 
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servants in an old family, or an esprit de corps, like 
that of the soldiers in a crack regiment.! 
It is well worth noting here, not the proposition of a fixec 
wage, but the reason for it. We are inclined to look upon it 
simply as an assurance of sufficiency of the supplies of life. 
Rus1rin, characteristically, thoug~t of it as assuring loyalty, a 
certain devotion to and interest in the work to be done and in 
his master. To Ruskin, this came first; and then all other good 
things would follow. The proposition was aimed at the fundamen-
tal error of his contemporary economists, the principle of 
antagonism between master and man, of the class war, of competi-
tion even for work, in which the laboring man had to sell his la-
bour, not for·just price, but for whatever he could get. 
To the objection against a fixed wage, Ruskin simply replies 
that we have a fixed price for the most important work that is 
being done, that there is a fixed fee for lawyer, doctor, clergy-
man, soldier, and that the 
• • • natural and right system respecting all labour 
is, that it should be paid at a fixed rate, but the 
good workman employed and the bad workman unemployed. 
The false, unnatural, and destructive system is when 
the bad worbnan is allowed to offer his work at hal~­
price, and either take the place of the good, or force 
him by his competition to work for an inadequate .sum.2 
Having attacked this economic doctrine of opposition and 
competition, by showing how a spirit of loyalty might be rendered 
possible in the men, Ruskin proceeds to argue for a corresponding 
1 1£1Q., pp. 32, 33. 
2 Ibid • ' p • 34 . 
140 
loyalty in the master to his men. As the soldier, the priest, 
the physician all have a sense of their responsibility to the men 
Who entrust their various welfare to them, and are ready to sac-
rifice themselves in the performance of their duties, and are hon 
orad in their offices for that reason, so the man of commerce, or 
the industrialist, is held by the world in some contempt, or at 
least is looked upon with suspicion, because he considers only 
his "enlightened" self-interest, because he cozens rather than 
serves his fellow. Were the merchant, or the industrialist, to 
consider that he too has a high duty to man, to supply man's 
needs of .food, clothing, housing, and were he ready to sacrifice 
himself to perform his duty rightly, he too would stand in honor. 
~s would be a double responsibility: to the public whom he sup-
plies, and to the men whom he directs: 
And as into these functions, requiring for their 
right exercise the highest intelligence, as well as pa-
tience, kindness, and tact, the merchant is bound to 
put all his energy, so for their just discharge he is 
bound, as soldier or physician is bound, to give up, i.f 
need be, his life, in such way as it may be demanded 
of him. Two main points he has in his providing func-
tion to maintain: .first. his engagements (faithfUl-
ness to engagements being the real root of all possibil 
ities, in commerce); and secondly, the perfectness and 
purity of the thing provided; so that, rather than fail 
in any engagement, or consent to any deterioration, a~ 
teration, or unjust and exorbitant price of that which 
he provides, he is bound to meet .fearlessly any form o.f 
distress, poverty, or labour, which may, through main-
tenance o.f these pointa, come upon him. 
Again: in his office as governor of the men em-
ployed by h~, the merchant or manufacturer is invested 
with a distinctly paternal authority and responsibility 
• • • the only means which the master has of doing jus-
tice to the men employed by him is to ask himself 
sternly whether he is dealing with such subordinates as 
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he would with his own son ••• 1 
Such is the argument o~ the "Roots of Honour." At the very 
beginning of his e~~orts to formulate an economic system and a 
plan ~or social reconstruction, Ruskin goes to what he considers 
the root o~ all the evils he saw around him. The system in power, 
he saw, had no root in anything sound; its root was in the sel-
~ishness o~ men, and what grew out o~ it was the system of com-
petition, o~ buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market, 
while the political organization stood aside or even encouraged 
the process. Ruskin would substitute, and he re~used to believe 
that it was impossible to substitute, a system rooted in Chris-
tian charity, out o~ which would appear a li~e - Christian life -
in which men would co-operate with one another, In this system 
the laborer would learn loyalty to his master, and in that loyalt~ 
could live as a Christian shouJd - happily; and his master would 
accept his responsibility to the people whom he supplied with 
their daily needs and to the workman under his direction; both 
~ould have their roots o~ li~e in Honour - in Charity. 
To see how much truth there was in this teaching o~ Ruskin 
we have only to compare it with th~ o~ficial teaching o~ the 
Dhurch, announced in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum. o~ Pope Leo XII 
and the Quadragesimo Anno o~ Pope Pius XI. From the ~ormer these 
passages are particularly pat: 
The great mistake that is made in the matter now 
under consideration is to possess onesel~ o~ the idea 
~orks, Vol. XVII, pp. 41, 42. 
142 
that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and 
poor are intended by nature to live at war with one an-
other. So irrational and so false is this view, that 
the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry 
of the human body is the result of the disposition of 
the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained 
by nature that these two classes should exist in har-
mony and ~reement, and should, as it were, fit with one 
another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body 
politic. Each requires the other; Capital cannot do 
without Labor, nor Labor without Capital. Mutual 
agreement results in pleasantness, and good order; per-
petual conflict necessarily produces confUsion and out-
rage. Now in preventing such strife as this, and in 
making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is 
marvellous and manifold • • • 
Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that 
their work people are not their slaves; that they must 
respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a 
Christian • • • · 
But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes 
will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but 
also those of brotherly love. For they will understand 
and feel that all men are the children of the common 
father, that is God; that all have the same end, which 
is God himself ••• that all and each are redeemed by 
Jesus Christ, and raised to the dignity of children of 
God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with 
each other and with Jesus Christ.l 
Of that competition in the labor market which Ruskin de-
nounces, Pius has this to say: 
1 
Labor ••• is not a mere chattel, since the human 
dignity of the workingman must be recognized in it, and 
consequently cannot be bought and sold li~e any piece 
of merchandise. None the less the demand and supply of 
labor divides men on the labor market into"two classes, 
as into two camps, and the bargaining between these par 
ties transforms this labor market into an arena where 
the two armies are engaged in combat • • • 
• • • How completely deceived are those inconsiderate 
reformers who, zealous only for commutative justice, 
proudly disdain the help of charity% Clearly charity 
cannot take the place of justice unfairly withheld ••• 
Rerum Novarum, Sections 15 and 21 (as edited by Joseph Husslein, 
S. J.,In The Christian Social Manifesto.) 
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For, justice alone, even though most faith~lly obser~, 
can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can 
never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet thi: 
union, binding men together, is the main principle of 
stability.in all institutions ••• Working men too 
will lay aside all feelings of hatred or envy ••• 
will cease to feel weary of the position assigned them 
by Divine Providence in human society; they will become 
proud of it ••• following the footsteps of Him ••• 
who chose to became a carpenter among men ••• 1 
Surely then, Ruskin was right, when, thirty years before the 
Rerum Novarum, he attacked, in the face of all the world, the 
doctrine that competition for the goods of life and hatred of 
class for class was the basis of society. 
3. 
"Qui Judicatis Terram" 
To reduce all the teaching of Ruskin to a few and fundamen-
tal principles would be a piece of work, indeed admirable, but 
~equiring time and a power of analysis, perhaps, not available 
~ere. It was a work he never did for himself, and it may well be 
quite beyond the powers of students of him who are lesser men. 
Nor is such a reduction to a few principles and the exposition of 
~uskin's consistency in them, the proper aim of this study. Ther~ 
fore it is not unreasonable to put forward what from general im-
pression rather than from scientific analysis are guiding prin-
ciples and to study them in part as a system, but chiefly for 
their intrinsic and individual worth. 
So it is that, if the thought of "Quid Jud.icatis Terram" is 
1 Quadragesimo Anno, Sections 29 and 46b. 
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not in ~act one of Ruskin's fundamentals, at least it is worth 
attention. It is at once in important opposition to so much of 
the thought and practice of his day and ours, and at the same tim 
so close to the traditional Catholic ethics and the teachings of 
the Encyclicals. Against the competitive system, the buy-in-the-
cheapest-and-sell-in-the-dearest-market system, with its absolu-
tion from all interference of government, Ruskin asserts in this 
essay that prices are not thus to be determined, but by justice 
enforced by the regulation of authority. 
The preceding essay in Unto this Last, HT.he Veins of Wealt~' 
is really an introduction to the principle just enunciated. In 
"The Veins of Wealth" he argues that inequalities of wealth are 
not in themselves right or wrong, that they suppose neither a 
healthy society nor a sickly one. They are right or wrong ac-
cordingly as they have come about justly or unjustly: 
The whole question, therefore, respecting not only 
the advantage, but even the quantity, of national 
wealth, resolves itself finally into one of abstract justice. It is impossible to conclude, of any given 
mass of acquired wealth, merely by the fact of its ex-
istence, whether it signifies good or evil to the na-
tion in the midst of which it exists. Its real value 
depends on the moral sign attached to it, just as 
sternly as that of a mathematical quantity depends on 
the algebraical sign attached to it. Any given accumu-
lation of commercial wealth may be indicative, on the 
one hand, of faithful industries, progressive energies, 
and productive ingenuities; o~, on the other, it may be 
indicative of mortal luxuries, merciless tyranny,ruin-
ous chicane • • • One mass of money is the outcome of 
action which has created, - another, of action Which 
has annihilated, - ten times as much in the gathering 
of it ••• That which seems ~o be wealth may in verity 
be only the gilded index of far-reaching ruin; a 
wrecker's handful of coin gleaned from the beach to 
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which he beguiled an argosy • 1 • • 
Ruskin's first blow for Justice is aimed against that neces 
sary condition of the competitive system, the "freedom" to be 
given the competitors to do their worst, each to the other, and 
it is rather hard to say that this is not the main point of the 
whole essay, as certainly this "paternalism" he urges, at least 
as its enemies call it, is one of the great principles of his so 
cial system. The argument rises from analogy: 
I have just spoken of the flowing of streams to thE 
sea as a partial image of the action of wealth. In on3 
respect it is not a partial, but a perfect image. The 
popular economist thinks himself wise in having dis-
covered that weath, or the forms of property in gener-
al, must go where they are required; that where demand 
is, supply must follow. He farther declares that this 
course of demand and supply cannot be forbidden by 
human laws. Precisely in the same sense, and with the 
same certainty, the waters of the world go where they 
are required • • • Whether the stream shall be a curse 
or a blessing, depends upon man's labour, and adminis-
tering intelligence. For centuries after centuries, 
great districts of the world, rich in soil, and favor-
ed in climate,have lain desert under the rage of their 
own rivers; not only desert,. but plague-stricken. The 
stream which rightly directed, would have flowed in 
soft irrigation from field to field • • • now over-
whelms the plain and poisons the wind • • • In like 
manner this wealth "goes where it is required." No hu 
man laws can withstand its flow. They can only guide 
it: but this, the leading trench and limiting moundcm 
do so thoroughly,that it shall become water of life •• 
The necessity of these laws of distribution or re-
straint is curiously overlooked in the ordinary polit-
ical economist's definition of his own "science" ••• 
to grow rich "scientifically" we must grow rich just-
ly; and therefore, know what is just;so that our econ-
omy will no longer depend merely on prudence, but on 
jurisprudence - and that of divine, not human law ••• 
~orks, Vol. XVII, pp. 52, 53. 
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"DILIGITE JUSTITIAM QUI JUDICATIS TERRAM. 111 
They who rule the world and judge it are not to do so by 
standing aside and letting the stream of industry and commerce gp 
as it pleases; they are to love justice and see that it is done. 
And in particular this justice is to be dane the labouring man; 
the price of his labour is not to be settled in a 11free market," 
but by What is due hLm in justice: 
The abstract idea, then of just or due wages, as 
respects the labourer, is that they will consist in a 
sum of money which will at any time procure for him at 
least as much labour as he has given, rather more than 
less. And this equity or justice of payment is, ob-
serve, wholly independent of any reference to the num-
ber of men who are willing to do the work. I want a 
horseshoe for my horse. Twenty smiths, or twenty 
thousand smiths, may be ready to forge it; their number 
does not in one atom's weight affect the question of thE 
equitable payment of the one who does forge it. It 
costs him a quarter of an hour of nrs-life, and so much 
skill and strength of arm, to make that horseshoe for 
me. Then at some future time I am bound inEquity to 
give a quarter of an hour ••• 2and also as much strength of arm and skill • • • 
The practical working of the competition for jobs and the in· 
justice involved is briefly and clearly given: 
1 
Supposing, then, the just wages of any quantity of 
given labour to have been ascertained, let us examine 
the first results of just and unjust payment, when in 
favour of the purchaser or employer: i.e. when two men 
are ready to do the work, and only one wants to have it 
done. 
The unjust purchaser forces the two to bid against 
each other till he has reduced their demand to its low-
est terms. Let us assume that the lowest bidder offers 
to do the work at half the just price. 
The purchaser employs him, and does not employ the 
other. The first or apparent result is, therefore, that 
Ibid., pp. 60, 61, 62. 
2-
Ibid., p. 66. 
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one o~ the two men is le~t out o~ employ, or to starva-
tion, just as de~initely as by the just procedure o~ 
giving ~air price to the best workman. The various 
writers who endeavoured to invalidate the positions o~ 
my ~irst paper never saw this, and assumed that the un-just hirer employed ~. He employs both no more than 
the just hirer. The only di~~erence (in the outset) is 
that the just man pays su~~iciently, the unjust man in-
su~~ciently, ~or the labour o~ the single person em-
ployed. 
I say, "in the outset"; ~or this ~irst or apparent 
di~~erence is not the actual di~~erence. By the unjust 
procedure, hal~ the proper price o~ the work is le~t in 
the hands o~ the employer. This enables him to hire 
another man at the same unjust rate, on some other kind 
o~ work; and the ~inal result is that he has two men 
working ~or him at hal~-price, and two are out o~ 
employ. 1 
But Ruskin's analysis o~ what happens when a just wage is 
~aid is more di~~icult, and the result discovered o~ ~ar greater 
~nd wider signi~icance. It might be said to have implied in it 
~he whole system o~ Belloc and Chesterton and the Distributists. 
~t least here is a rirst cause o~ such a state o~ distributed 
~ealth Which they envision: 
By the just procedure, the whole price o~ the ~rat 
piece o~ work goes into the hands o~ the man who does 
it. No surplus being le~t in the employer's hands, he 
cannot hire another man ~or another piece o~ labour.--
But by precisely so much as his power is diminished, t~ 
hired workman's power is increased: that is to say, by 
the additional hal~ o~ the price he has received; which 
additiona~ hal~ he has the power o~ using to employ an-
other man in his-service • • • T.he di~~erence between 
the just and unJUSt procedure does not lie in the num-
ber o~ men hired, but in the price paid to them and the 
tersons bt whom it is paid. The essential di~~erence, 
Eat whic I want the reader to see clearly, is, that 1r. 
the unjust case, two men work ~or one, the ~irst hirer. 
In the just case, one man works ~or the ~irst hirer,one 
~or the person hired, and so on, down or up through the 
~Ibid., pp. 68, 69. 
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various grades of service; the influence being carried 
forward by justice, and arrested by injustice. The uni-
versal and constant action of justice in this matter is 
therefore to diminish the power of wealth in the hands 
of one individual over the masses of men, and to dis-
tribute it through a chain of men.l · 
This is not all. There are further results, and the extent 
of them can be easily discerned from Ruskin's very next para-
graph: 
The immediate operation of justice in this respect 
is therefore to diminish the power of wealth, first in 
the acquisition of luxury, and secondly, in exercise of 
moral influence. The employer cannot concentrate so 
multitudinous labour on his own interest, nor can he 
subdue so multitudinous mind to his own will. But the 
secondary operation of justice is not less important 
••• the sufficient or just payment, distributed 
through a descending series of offices or grades of la-
bour, gives each subordinate person fair and sufficient 
means of rising in the social scale, if he chooses to 
use them; and thus not only diminishes the immediate 
power of2wealth, but removes the worst disabilities of poverty. 
These matters lead Ruskin at the end of the essay to take up 
the suggestion that he was a socialist, as indeed was said of him 
as it has been said of any man who has proposed to prevent the 
unjust accumulation of great wealth: 
••• Whatever their conclusion may be I think it neces-
sary to answer for myself only this: that if there be 
any one point insisted on throughout my works more fre-
quently than another, that one point is the impossibil-
ity of Equality. My continual aim has been to show the 
eternal superiority of some men to others, sometimes 
even of one man to all~hers; and to show also the ad-
visability of appointing such persons or person to gui~ 
to lead, or on occasion even to compel and subdue their 
inferiors according to their ow.n better knowledge and 
lrbid., p. 69. 
2Ibid. 1 p. 70. 
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wiser will. My principles of Political Economy were alJ 
involved ••• in a single sentence in the last volume 
of Modern Painters - "Government and co-operation are ir-
all things the Laws of Life; Anarchy and competition 
the Laws of Death." 
And with respect to the mode in which these general 
principles affect the secure possession of property, so 
far am I from invalidating such security, that the ~ole 
gist of these papers will be found ultimately to aim at 
an extension in its range; and whereas it has long been 
known and declared that the poor have no right to the 
property of the rich, I wish it also to be known and de-
clared that the rich have no right to the property or 
the poor.l 
The reply is not so important as a defense against the 
charge of Socialism, of which Ruskin could easily clear himself, 
but it is significant for its iteration, which seals their im-
portance in his system, or two ideas: that the competitive sys-
tem is to be replaced by a co-operation among men under the di-
rection or authority - "paternalism" it would have been called 
not long ago, but today "rascism" with too uncritical a compre-
hension of what Ruskin meant, a Christian submission or lesser ~ 
higher powers; and, secondly, that the vast accumulations of 
wealth are to be distributed, not by taking all property from all 
men, but by the wider possession of smaller properties to be ef-
fected by the logical operation or just prices in place of com-
petition. 
Ruskin closes the essay with a statement, of moment to 
Christian readers, and almost identical with one of Newman's, on 
the controlling influence that the study of Theology and the 
practice or what it teaches should have on all other studies and, 
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in particular, Political Economy, and of the grossest errors and 
inconsistencies that arise when it has no such controlling in-
fluence: 
• • • nothing in history has ever been so disgraceful 
to human intellect as the acceptance among us of the 
common doctrines of political economy as a science 
• • • I know no previous instance in history of a na-
tion's establishing a systematic disobedience to the 
first principles of its professed religion. T.he writ-
ings which we (verbally) esteem as divine, not only 
denounce the love of money as the source of all evil, 
and as an idolatry abhorred of the Deity, but declare 
mammon service to be the accurate and irreconcileable 
opposite of God's service; and, whenever they speak of 
riches absolute, and poverty absolute, declare woe to 
the rich, and blessing to the poor. Whereupon we 
forthwith investigate a science of becomi~g rich, as 
the shortest road to national prosperity. 
The sum of Ruskin's argument in this essay may be stated 
thus: T.he working man must be given a just wage as a condition 
of peace as well as for justice itself; that a just wage is im-
posmble in a competitive market for labour; the State must in-
tervene in this competition to see that justice is done. We may 
see how this argument is confirmed by the papal encyclicals: 
1 
••• Just as the unity of human society cannot be hDlt 
upon class warfare, so the proper ordering of economic 
affairs cannot be left to free competition alone. Fron 
this source have proceeded in the past all the errors 
of the "individualistic" school. This school, ignor-
ant or forgetful of the social and moral aspect of 
economic matters, teaches that the State should refraii 
in theory and practice from interfering therein, be-
cause these possess in free competition and open mar-
kets a principle of self-direction better able to con-
trol them than any created intellect. Free competitiaq 
however, though within certain limits just and pro-
ductive of good results, cannot be the ruling principle 
of the economic world; this has been abundantly proved 
Ibid., pp. 75, 76. 
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by the consequences that have followed from the free 
rein given to these dangerous Individualistic ideals. 
It is therefore very necessary that economic affairs 
be once more subjected to and governed by a true and 
effect! ve guidin.g principle. Still leas can this 
function be exercised by the economic supremacy which 
within recent times has taken the place of free com-
petition; for this is a headstrong and vehement power, 
which, if it is to prove beneficial to mankind, needs 
to be curbed strongly and ruled w:t th prudence. It can 
not, however, be curbed and governed by itself. More 
lofty and noble principles must therefore be sought in 
order to control this supremacy sternly and uncompro-
misingly: to wit, social justice and social charity 
••• to that end ••• this justice ••• must build 
up a juridical and sociil order able to pervade all 
economic activity ••• 
That the laiasez-faire economics resulted in injustice is 
clearly insisted on in this passage, and that injustice must be 
curbed by state regulation; moreover that the system formally ac-
cepted injustice as a necessary and unavoidable condition of 
economic life is noted in the following: 
Capital, however, was long able to appropriate to 
itself excessive advantages; it claimed all the pro-
ducts and profits, and left to the laborer the barest 
minimum nece~sary to repair his strength and to insure 
the continuation of his class. For by inexorable 
economic law it was held,all accumulations of riches · 
must fall to the share of the wealthy, while the work-
ingman must remain perpetually in indigence or reduced 
to the minimum needed for existence. It is true that 
the actual state of things was not always and every-
where as deplorable as the liberalistic tenets of the 
so-called Manchester school might lead us to conclude; 
but it cannot be denied that a steady drift of econo~­
ic and social tendencies was in this direction • • • 
Pope Leo in his earlier encyclical had insisted on the same 
~eed of regulation of economic life by the State to insure justice 
1Quadrageaimo Anno, Section 30. 
2Ibid., Section 21. 
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to the workman: 
The ~irst duty, there~ore, o~ the rulers o~ the 
State should be to make sure that the laws and insti-
tutions, the general character and administration o~ 
the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce o~ them-
selves public well-being and private prosperity. This 
is the proper o~~ice o~ wise statesmanship and the 
work o~ the heads o~ the State • • • 
• • • Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of 
the poorer population be care~lly watched over by the 
administration, so that they who contribute so largely 
to the advantage o~ the community nny themselves share 
in the bene~its they create ••• 1 
That the Popes did not envision a bureaucracy to govern the 
economic li~e o~ a people is shown quite clearly in the 
Quadragesimo Anno in which Pius XI develops the idea o~ corpora-
• 
tiona akin to the guilds o~ the middle ages ~or governing the 
various branches o~ economic li~e. That this proposal in a large 
measure corresponds to Ruskin's proposals to revive guild li~e 
might be made the subject o~ a lengthy discussion at this point. 
But it seems better in this study to limit the matter to the most 
~damental notions of Ruskin; they indeed call ~or all the at-
tention it is practical here to give. 
4. 
"Ad Valorem" 
At the end o~ the essay, "The Veins o~ Wealth," the third in 
Unto this Last, Ruskin wrote: 
••• it may even appear, a~ter some consideration •• 
that the ~inal outcome and consummation of all wealth 
is in the producing as many as possible ~11-breathed, 
bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures. Our 
~erum Novarum, Sections 26, 27, and 29. 
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modern wealth, I think, has rather a tendency the oth-
er way; - most political economists appearing to con-
sider multitudes of human creatures not conducive to 
wealth, or at best conducive to it only by remaining 
in a dim-eyed and narrow-chested state or being.l 
This question of value, of what true wealth consisted in, 
was one of Ruskin's great preoccupations. It seems to have ante-
dated in his mind his criticism of the competitive system, and is 
the thought Which more than any other forced the transition from 
art-critic to economist. So it appears, as has already been 
noted, in The Stones of Venice. Now again he develops it as the 
fourth of those essays on fUndamentals in Unto this Last, "Ad 
Valorem." There is this difficu~ty in reconnnending it for read-
ing: it is not a well-organized piece of thought. Yet, as the 
nucleus of.some of Ruskin's noblest writing, as principle stated 
to which he returns again and again in later work as his earlier 
work leads to this, the essay is worth some study. 
The matter of Ruskin's disagreement with his contemporary 
economists is in the passage quoted from 11 The Veins of Wealth." 
Wealth, that on which they put "value," was to these economists 
something quite different from the happiness and well-being of 
the people; there might be great "wealth" in the nation but the 
people might be miserable. For wealth to them, that which had 
value, was what could be sold on the open market. Ruskin 
explains: 
In his chapter on Capital, Mr. J. S. Mill in-
stances, as a capitalist, a hardware manufacturer,who, 
1works, Vol. XVII, pp. 55, 56. 
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having intended to spend a certain portion of the pro-
ceeds of his business in buying plate and jewels,c~~ 
his mind, and 0 pays it as wages to additional work-
lieople.u The effect is stated by Mr. Mill to be, that 
more food is appropriated to the consumption of pro-
ductive labor" ••• I very seriously inquire why 
ironware is produce, and silverware is not? That the 
merchant consumes the one, and sells the other, cer-
tainly does not constitute the difference, unless it 
can be shown (which indeed, I perceive it to be becom-
ing daily more and more the aim of tradesmen to show) 
that commodities are made to be sold, and not to be 
consumed.l 
That "· •• commodities are made to be sold, and not to be 
consumed" is the view he attacks for its fatal consequence. And 
he adds: 
• • • a steel fork might appear a more substantial 
production than a silver one; we may grant also that 
knives, no less than forks, are good produce; and 
scythes and ploughshares serviceable articles. But, 
how of bayonets? Supposing the hardware merchant to 
effect large sales of these by help of the "setting 
freett of the food of his servants and his silver-
smiths,- is he still employing productive labourers, 
or, in Mr. Mill's words, labourers who increase 11 the 
stock of permanent means of enjoyment"? Or if, in-
stead of bayonets, he supply bombs • • .2 
Well, bayonets and bombs are eminently saleable articles in 
this world; and gardens, the produce of his servants, and highly 
wrought silver cannot be sold at all or at only a fraction of 
their first price. Therefore it is productive of "wealth" to de-
vote your capital to the making of armament. Similar is Ruskin's 
criticism of the common notion of Capital: that it is not pro-
ductive of happiness in the lives of people but primarily issues 
1 Ibid., pp. 77, 78. 
2Ibid., p. 79. 
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in interest and more capital. Like production or goods simply tc 
sell them, its only end is more money. He says: 
Capital signiries "head, or source, or root material"-
it is material by which soma derivative or secondary 
good is produced. It is only capital proper ••• 
. when it is thus producing something dirrerent rrom 
itselr. It is a root, which does not enter into vital 
runction till it produces something else than a root: 
namely, rruit. That rruit will in time again produce 
roots; and so all living capital issues in reproduc-
tion or capital; but capital which produces nothing 
but capital is only root producing root ••• 
The best and simplest general type or capital is a 
well-made ploughshare. Now ir that ploughshare did 
nothing but beget other ploughshares ••• it would 
have lost its runction or capital ••• And the true 
home question, to every capitalist and to every nation 
is not, "how many ploughs have you"? but "where are 
your rurrows?" Not "how quickly will this capital re-
produce itself'?" but " ••• what substance will it 
fUrnish, good for lire? what work construct, protecti~ 
of lire?" if none, its own reproduction is use-
less • • .1 
Economists so minded see wealth in strange things. Any-
thing that issues in more money is the sole criterion; to make 
~hat is saleable is to produce wealth; to invest in what will 
earn interest is the proper use or capital and its only end. 
~ence it is that the investment or capital in a munitions ractory 
is produc~ive of wealth, and the making or bayonets is productive 
or wealth. But the making or a garden produces nothing that can 
pe sold; the investment or money in the decoration of a house 
~11 never bear "interest." To the same point, namely, that pro-
~uction or goods is ror consumption, and that wealth is in those 
~oods in so far as they can be consumed in making happy the lives 
~bid., pp. 98-102. 
156 
of men, Ruskin argues from the etymology of the word "value": 
••• To be "valuable," therefore, is to"avail towards 
life." A truly valuable or availing thing is that 
which leads to life with its vbole strength. In pro-
portion as it does not lead to life, or as its stren~ 
is broken, it is less valuable in proportion as it 1 leads away from life, it is unvaluable or malignant. 
And again: 
• • • it follows that if a thing is to be useful, it 
must be not only of an availing nature, but in avail-
ing hands. Or, in accurate terms, usefulness is value 
in the hands of the valiant; so that this science of 
wealth being, as we have just seen, when regarded as 
the science of Accumulation, accumulative of capacity 
as well as of material, when regarded as the Science 
of Distribution, is distribution not absolute, but 
discriminate; not of everything to every man, but of 
the right thing to the right man • • • Wealth, there-
fore, is 2"THE POSSESSION OF TEE VALUABLE BY THE VALIANT." 
It is an easy criticism of the propositions put forward in 
this essay that they are too vague, that Ruskin's charge against 
the economists of his day is a playing w1 th their words or a 
purely fantastic one, that the criterion of value he sets up is 
so general in its terms that it can mean anything and therefore 
means nothing. Such a criticism might well be justified if we 
are to look to Ruskin as an economist simply, and if we are to 
ask him for precise directions for governing the issue of the 
currency, for marketing the surplus of crops, for the control of 
industries and the prevention of monopolies. But he is not asked 
for th~se things; he comes to us now, not for study in our 
Schools of Business Administration, but for study in our classes 
~' 'Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
2 lli£· I P• 88. 
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in Literature. Here we are asking for that higher wisdom that 
would be Philosophy were it notso much a matter of intuition, a 
matter of insight rather than scientific analysis, the wisdom of 
the poet, or better, of the saint, the wisdom that sees things in 
the light of eternal Truth and takes a view of them as parts of 
that Creation which was made to glorify its Creator. And this 
sort of wisdom Ruskin gives us; he turns to things which we say 
are matter for the economist; but he deals 'rlth them, exactly and 
fully as he can though probably with much error, yet vdth an in-
sight or wisdom he has from his higher stand; and he does see 
down into some depths where apparently others can not. 
That this talk of economic value consisting in What navails 
for life" is not the mere dreaming of Ruskin and the intervention 
of his poetry into economics, becomes quite plain when Sections 
32 and 33 of the Rerum Novarum are interpreted by Joseph 
usslein, s. J. As Ruskin does, and as any Jesuit might follow 
St. Ignatius in beginning with the "First Principle and Founda-
tion" that Man is made to praise, reverence, and serve God • • • 
d its corollary that all other creatures are to be used in so 
far as they contribute to tins, Father Husslein explains: 
Applying to industry and conmerce these imperative 
first principles of all human conduct, which nowhere 
may be set aside, it forthwith follows that no econom-
ic system can ever stand approved by us, whose supreme 
end is profit • • • 
A system of profits for profits' sake only must 
therefore be unconditionally condemned. It is the 
apotheosis of selfishness itself. The duty of every 
man and woman is to contribute to their neighbor's 
welfare, spiritually or materially, intellectually or 
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manually, domestically or industrially. 1 
As profit cannot be accepted as the sole motive of economic 
life, and the price that can be got for goods in the open market 
cannot be our sole criterion of value, so we are to look for a 
criterion of value in what "avails for life" as that, in turn, 
must avail for eternal life: 
••• no employer, corporation, supertrust, or merger, 
no matter how powerful, may presume to outrage the 
human dignity of the worker, which as we lmow, "God 
Himself treats with reverence, 11 nor yet may they stand 
in the way of the proper unfolding of that higher life 
in the laborer which is by far the most important of 
all and Whose fruits of blessedness last on for eter-
nity. . 
More specifically to apply this truth we may say 
that the laborer is not to be worked, like a senseless 
brute, to the fUll of his physical capacity. He 
should be given the opportunity of leisure which is 
not only intended to recreate mind and body, but also 
to bring him'back into contact with family life and 
cultural associations, and which above all other thi~ 
should enable him to worship God, to keep in touch wit1 
the invisible, the supernatural, ~he Divine Source 
and Ul time. te End of all his being. 
After Ruskin 
It might be objected that there has been presented here 
1very inadequate view of Ruskin's social teachings, that nothing 
has been said of his work with the St. George's Guild, his lec-
tures to working men, and nothing of that vast mass of writing 
and the multitude of suggestion he proposed in it for the ameli-
oration of the life of men, that this work has not even been 
1J. Husslein, The Christian Social Manifesto, pp. 165, 166. 
2 Ibid., pp. 161, 162. 
159 
summarized. But it is impossible to consider all that Ruskin did 
and talked of doing, and to weigh it; nor would any summary be 
just to him, as it must gloss over all those elements which enter 
into any particular and practical suggestions. Partly because 
Unto this Last is the most coherent of his social writings and 
suitable for class study, but chiefly because it embodies those 
ideas on the right ordering of social life which most coincide 
with Catholic principles - for these reasons the discussion has 
been limited to Ruskin's attack on the prevailing scheme of his 
day. It was the doctrine initiated by the nPhysiocrats" of the 
eighteenth century, the doctrine of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill, 
of the Manchester School, sometimes called Liberalism~ sometimes 
0 Laissez-faire." That he did this, even as did the great Popes, 
Leo and Pius, makes him worthy of study. What mistakes he made 
can be brushed aside. His virtue is that against the world a_nd 
at the cost of his reputation he laid down that nT.he great law 
which is to govern the production and distribution of wealth is 
the law of Co-operation • • • Government and Co-operation are the 
laws of Life; anarchy and competition are the laws of Death." 
ment: 
Benjamin Evans Lippincott says of Ruskin's final achieve-
His teaching, according to Ernest Baker [Political 
Thought in England, 1840-19141 influenced the teaching of 
pure economics, Ruskin's advocacy, he says, of the economic 
ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon has helped to turn 
economists since the days of Jevons from the theory of pro-
duction to the theory of consumption; it has helped to cor-
rect the old emphasis laid on saving, and to give more 
weight to spending; it has helped to modify the old con-
ception of value as mainly determined by cost of production 
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and to give more consideration to utility as a ~actor 
in its creation. 
Ruskin's attack on the middle-class liberal state 
and the system o~ capitalism it sheltered helped to 
diminish the authority o~ both. His criticism, like 
Carlyle's, helped to undermine "laissez-~aire" both in 
principle and in application.l 
And Frederick Harrison, writing in 1902, perhaps too cheer-
fully, summarizes what he thinks had resulted already ~om 
Ruskin's teaching: 
The pedantic, pseudo-scienti~ic Plutonomy, or 
Science o~ Wealth, Which he denounced, is as dead as 
Alchemy or Phlogiston. His notion that economic pros-
perity is subordinate to the wellbeing o~ the people is 
the axiom o~ politicians as o~ philosophers. His idea 
that the wise use o~ wealth, the distribution o~ proa-
ucts, the health and happiness o~ the producers, come 
be~ore the accumulation of wealth, is a commonplace, 
not o~ philanthropists, but o~ statesmen and journalisu. 
His appeal ~or organization o~ industry, the suppres-
sion o~ public nuisances, and restriction o~ all anti-
social abuses, is a truism to the re~ormers o~ today. 
So is much o~ what he said about national education 
long years be~ore Mr. Forster, a bout old-age pensions 
long years be~ore Mr. Chamberlain, about the housing o~ 
the working classes long years be~ore the Statutes, 
Con~erences and Royal Commissions o~ our own generatio~ 
Read all he says as to the necessity of training 
schools, technical schools, State supervision o~ prac-
tical and physical education, help to the unemployed, 
provision for the aged, the recovery o~ waste lands, 
the qualified ownership o~ the soil • • • read all 
these glancings o~ a keen and pure soul from heaven to 
earth on a multitude o~ things social and humane, and 
you will recognize how truly John Ruskin ~orty years 
ago was a pioneer of the things which today the best 
spirits o~ our time so earnestly yearn to see.2 
1op. cit., pp. 58, 59. 
2John Ruskin, pp. 107, 108. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that one conclusion can now be clearly drawn 
~rom this study o~ Ruskin: that the Catholic teacher o~ litera-
ture will f'ind in the writings o~ John Ruskin a body o~ thought 
worthy o~ his teaching. 
He will find not what too many critics claim to have ~ound -
an art criticism into which "morality" has been impertinently 
obtruded, that kind o~ morality which the Catholic teacher would 
reject as mere humanitarian cant, a matter o~ 11proper ~eelings," 
a sentiment merely, without reason as its light and without any 
ultimate end worthy o~ man. He will ~ind rather what other crit-
ics too vaguely realized as a way o~ li~e, a religious view o~ 
li~e o~ which Beauty and Art ware but parts, yet integral parts. 
He will find that supernatural, or Christian, view o~ li~e 
obscured by misunderstanding or ~orget~ulness o~ it, just as all 
Protestant England was ~orget~l o~ it and the supernatural li~e 
o~ the sacraments in its ~ulness, just as "liberal" and "humani-
-
tarian" England had ~orgotten all but the "personality" o~ Christ 
and His kindness, justice, and simplicity. Not knowing the ~ul­
ness o~ the supernatural li~e o~ the Church, he did not teach a 
way or lire that, studied only by itselr, was in the strict sense 
supernatural. 
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But he will find that supernatural and Christian view o:f 
life when he sees Ruskin's teachings against the light of his own 
Faith. They fit in with all he believes, they complement it as 
the reasonings of the theologian enlarge on or clarif'y that which 
has been revealed. They are o:f the "atmosphere" of the Faith; 
they have it for "background," to use the jargcn o:f the day. 
The Catholic teacher will agree as he reads the words o:f 
Cardinal Manning to Ruskin of something which he had written: 
"Such :flowers can grow in one soil alone. They can be found onlJ 
in the Garden of Faith, over Which the world of light hangs 
visibly." 
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